The Constitutional Position Of The Attorneygeneral In The Sudan by Gabriel Mamur, Thomas
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE ATTORNEY-
GENERAL IN THE SUDAN 
 
 
 
 
BY: 
THOMAS GABRIEL MAMUR 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISED BY: PROFESSOR AKOLDA MAN TIER 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of LL.M. 
Degree of the University of Khartoum., Faculty of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARCH 2005 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
Contents i 
Dedication  iii 
Acknowledgements  iv 
Preface v 
Abstract in English vi 
Abstract in Arabic vii 
Table of Cases viii 
Table of Agreements, Constitutions and Statutes Cited 
1. Table of Agreement cited. 
2. Table of the Sudan Constitutions Cited 
3. Table of the Foreign Constitutions Cited. 
4. Table of the Sudanese Statutes Cited 
x 
x 
xi 
xii 
xiii 
Chapter One 
Historical Background  
 
1 
1. The Period Prior to 1898. 1 
 (i) The period of the Funj Sultanate 1 
(ii) The Period of the Turkiyya 2 
(iii) The Period of the Mahdiyya 3 
(iv) The Period of the Fur Sultanate. 5 
2. The Period of the condominium Rule 6 
3. The Period since independence in 1956 14 
4. Conclusion  23 
Chapter Two 
Position of the Attorney -General in the Sudan Constitutions and Laws 
 
24 
1. Position of the Attorney General in the Sudan Constitutions 24 
2. Position, Functions and Powers of the Attorney General in the Sudan Laws 32 
(i) The Ministry of Justice Orginaization Act, 1983  32 
(ii) The Revised Edition of the Laws Act, 1974 58 
(iii) The Civil Procedure Act, 1983 61 
(iv) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1991 71 
(v) Customs Act, 1986 91 
(vi) The Public Premises Eviction Act, 1969 96 
(vii) The Advocates Act, 1983 98 
(viii) The legal Profession (Regulation) Act, 1966 100 
(ix) Prevention of Unlawful Enrichment Act, 1989 100 
(x) The Constitutional and Administrative Justice Act, 1996 101 
3. Conclusion 102 
Chapter Three 
Powers of the  Attorney–General in the Constitutions and Laws of other Countries 
 
104 
1. The English legal system 
(i) Constitutions and legal position of the Attorney–General 
(ii) Powers of the Attorney–General  
(a) Criminal powers  
(b) Civil powers  
104 
104 
106 
106 
111 
2. Position and powers of the Attorney–General in the Legal System of the United 
States of America 
(i) Constitutional and legal position 
(ii) Powers of the Attorney-General   
 
119 
119 
121 
3. Constitutional and Legal Position of the Attorney-General in the legal system of 
India.  
(i) Constitutional and legal position 
(ii) Functions of the Attorney-General  
 
127 
127 
130 
4. Conclusion  135 
Chapter Four 
Conclusion  
 
136 
Bibliography  140 
Appendix  143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To my dear wife, children and friends 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 My sincere thanks and gratefulness go to my dear supervisor 
Professor Akolda Man Tier whose valuable comments and guidance were 
instrumental in the accomplishment of this thesis. 
 
 My gratefulness also goes to professor Moses Machar  Kacuol, former 
Vice Chancellor of the Upper Nile University and his Successor Professor 
Joshua Otor Akol for their  kind assistance. 
 
 I again so much appreciate the effort of Mr. Hamid Yunis and Miss 
Huda for the tedious work of typing they both carried out on my behalf. 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Attorney-General is a public official whose decisions very much 
affect the public in various ways. The Sudanese Legal System largely based 
on common law as it is, borrowed the post of Attorney-General from the 
English legal system. The immense legal work entrusted to him warrants 
examination in order to avoid loopholes and deficiencies which 
accompanied this important legal experience whose seed was planted in the 
early years of the Condominium Rule. The various sultanates, states and 
Kingdoms of the Sudan never had a similar legal development. And since 
this post was borrowed from the former colonial master it cannot be 
examined in isolation from other countries legal experiences. Hence comes 
the importance of selecting for examination the experiences of the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America and India. All of them are common 
law countries and their experiences can no doubt benefit our experience 
which badly needs coping-up. Of course our experience, as indeed those 
experiences of the said countries, is bound to develop as it did in the last 
hundred years.  
ABSTRACT 
 
 The post of Attorney-General in the Sudan, compared with that in 
other countries, is a recent development; and vital as it is it has not attracted 
attention of researchers. The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 
One deals with historical background of the post and therefore it examines 
possible existence of Attorney-General in the legal systems of former 
political set-ups which emerged in the Sudan in different periods of time. 
 
 Chapter Two is about the constitutional and legal position of the 
Attorney-General, his powers and functions in the laws of the Sudan. 
 
 Chapter Three focuses on the experiences of other legal systems 
namely the legal system of the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and India. No doubt each legal system has its own peculiarities in 
relation to the post of Attorney-General and his assistants, as Attorney-
General cannot alone discharge those tremendous legal functions assigned to 
him. Given those functions the Sudanese legal system can easily mend its 
loopholes as far as Attorney-General is concerned.  
 
 Chapter Four sums up the conclusions arrived at in different chapters. 
Although the Sudanese experience carries the same deficiencies and 
loopholes, in general, it is in harmony with the basic idea behind the creation 
of the post in those countries.  
  ﺍﻟﺨــﻼﺼـــﺔ
ﻴﻌﺘﺒﺭ ﻤﻨﺼﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﺘﻁﻭﺭﺍﹰ ﻗﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺎﹰ ﺤﺩﻴﺜﺎﹰ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻤﺎ ﻗﻭﺭﻥ ﺒﺄﻤﺜﺎﻟﻪ ﻓﻰ ﺩﻭل  
ﻭﻤﻥ . ﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺼﺏ ﻓﺈﻨﻪ ﻟﻡ ﻴﺠﺫﺏ ﺇﻨﺘﺒﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺤﺜﻴﻥﻟ ﻷﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﻯﻤﻥ ﺍﺇﻻ ﺃﻨﻪ ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ . ﺃﺨﺭﻯ
ﻭﺍﻷﻁﺭﻭﺤﺔ . ﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥﺜﻡ ﺘﺄﺘﻰ ﺃﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺃﻁﺭﻭﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺒﻭﻀﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻰ ﺩﺴﺎﺘﻴﺭ ﻭﻗﻭﺍﻨﻴ
ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻷﻭل ﻴﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻴﺔ ﻟﻤﻨﺼﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻋﻨﻪ . ﺘﻨﻘﺴﻡ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﺭﺒﻌﺔ ﻓﺼﻭل
ﻓﻰ ﺍﻷﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻜﻴﺎﻨﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ ﺒﺭﺯﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺤﻴﺯ ﺍﻟﻭﺠﻭﺩ ﻓﻰ ﺇﻗﻠﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﻓﻰ ﺤﻘﺏ 
  .ﺯﻤﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ
ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻓﻬﻭ ﻴﺘﻌﻠﻕ ﺒﺎﻟﻭﻀﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﺴﺘﻭﺭﻱ   
  .ﻭﺴﻠﻁﺎﺘﻪ ﻭﺍﺨﺘﺼﺎﺼﺎﺘﻪ ﻓﻰ ﻗﻭﺍﻨﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻥ
ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺙ ﻴﺴﻠﻁ ﺍﻟﻀﻭﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻷﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﺨﺭﻯ ﻓﻰ ﻤﺠﺎل ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ   
ﻭﻻ ﺭﻴﺏ ﺃﻥ ﻟﻜل . ﻜﺎﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﻟﻜل ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﻻﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻨﺩ
ﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺫﻜﻭﺭﺓ ﻤﻤﻴﺯﺍﺘﻬﺎ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻤﻨﺼﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﻤﺴﺎﻋﺩﻴﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻟﻴﺱ ﻓﻰ ﻤﻘﺩﻭﺭ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻷﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺍ
ﻭﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ ﺘﻠﻙ .  ﺇﻟﻴﻪﺕﻜﻠﺃﻭﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺤﺩﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﻡ ﺒﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻷﻋﺒﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺴﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ 
  .ل ﺴﺩ ﺍﻟﺜﻐﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭﺠﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﻴﺴﻬل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻲ ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺒﺎﺱ ﻤﻥ ﺃ
  
ﺼل ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻊ ﻴﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﻭﺤﺔ ﻭﺒﺎﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺭﺒﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺩﺍﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻰ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻀﻤﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻔ  
ﺘﺤﻤل ﻓﻰ ﺠﻭﻓﻬﺎ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻭﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﺜﻐﺭﺍﺕ ﺇﻻ ﺃﻨﻬﺎ ﺘﻨﺴﺠﻡ ﺒﺼﻭﺭﺓ ﻋﺎﻤﺔ ﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻔﻜﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻰ 
  . ﻤﻥ ﺍﺠﻠﻬﺎ ﺨﻠﻕ ﻤﻨﺼﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻰ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭل
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Chapter One 
 
Historical Background 
 
Introduction 
 
 Before we discuss the main themes of this dissertation it is important 
to examine the historical background of the kinds of legal systems which 
existed prior to and since 1898. 
1- The Period Prior to 1898: 
The period prior to 1898 is, according to one writer 1 divided into three 
periods,  namely, the period of the Funj Sultanate, the period of the 
Turkiyyah and the period of the Mahdiyyah. The legal arrangements of 
Darfur Sultanate will also be looked into. I will discuss them in turn. 
(i) The period of the Funj Sultanate: 
This period lasted from 1504 to 1821. The sort of set up that existed just 
before the above Sultanate could emerge and what legal system 
characterized it are described as follows2:  
 Their attempt to bring about the collapse of the well established Christian 
kingdoms of Soba and Dongola was successfully completed  in 1504. 
Unfortunately, however, the Funj tribes had no ready substitute which 
could replace the legal and administrative arrangements of the Christian 
kingdoms. Their knowledge of Islam, both as a religion and as a legal 
philosophy, was vague and superficial. It was heavily coloured with 
superstition and tribal usages and customs.  
 This period was characterized, among other things, by the diversity of the 
Sunni Madhaib (religious sects) which were advocated and practiced . 
                                                 
1 Zaki Mustafa, The Common Law in the Sudan, 33 (1971). 
2 Id., at 34. 
 
  The above account does not, however, imply complete non-existence 
of a legal system in the Sultanate. Though it had been ineffective and weak 
the Sultan established a judicial system represented by a Supreme Court and 
other courts of different jurisdictions located in various parts of the 
Sultanate3. 
  The legal system in that Sultanate, Islamic as it was, did not entertain 
any post of Attorney- General. 
(ii) The Period of the Turkiyya: 
 This period is known in history as the Turko-Egyptian Rule. It lasted 
from 1821 to 1884. Through a military campaign both the Turks and the 
Egyptians succeeded in bringing down the Funj Sultanate. Mr. Richard Hill 
gives an account and picture of the legal system during this period as 
follows4:  
 Before the coming of the Egyptians the Muslim people of the Sudan 
knew only the Islamic Law, and they knew that vaguely. Codes of civil 
and military laws were Egyptian importations inspired by the Western 
practice and administered fitfully with uncertain skill and heavy-handed 
interpretation. The law at the beginning of the Egyptian rule was the law 
applying to the personnel of the Government. In the large 
correspondence concerning criminal investigations and trials there is 
scarcely any mention of the Sudanese except occasionally as petitioners 
and witnesses against alleged injustice. The Egyptian rulers reversed the 
policy of the Sultans of Sinnar. The three religious notables whom 
Ismail Pasha brought with him to the Sudan in 1821 were 
representatives of  that other aspect of Islam, the official, legal religious 
side. From that time the highest post in the administration  of  the 
Islamic Law  were  filled  by  tried  men brought from Egypt, and the 
popular mystics found themselves excluded from official recognition 
and treated as ignorant, if harmless, purveyors of superstition. But 
though the Egyptian Government did not greatly love the Sudanese 
Fakis, it took particular pains to conciliate the orthodox professors of 
Islamic Law. The learned men were of all classes the most amenable to 
Egyptian rule, for they owed their influence and their pay to the 
conquerors. Sudanese members of the legal hierarchy early took their 
                                                 
3 Hussein Sid Ahmed El-Mufti, The Development of Legal System in the Sudan, Part I, 16-39 (1959). 
4 Cited in Zaki, supra note 1, at 34 
seats with the important ulama  and formed a class invariably friendly to 
established order. 
 
   As we have seen in the above passage, Islamic law was being 
administered. Its administration had been through Sharia Courts which were 
established to have jurisdiction to try all disputes whether criminal, civil or 
relating to matters of personal status. But the position did not remain the 
same for Province Commissioners and Mamurs were empowered to exercise 
jurisdiction in criminal cases. This state of affairs could not hold by reason 
of establishment of local benches which were to replace the commissioners 
of the provinces in trying all cases which were triable before the Sharia 
Courts. In terms of hierarchy the highest court was the Supreme Court5. 
  Given those circumstances the legal system in that era did not 
envisage a post of Attorney- General. 
 (iii) The Period of the Mahdiyya: 
  The Mahdists succeeded in bringing about the collapse of the Turko-
Egyptian rule in 1884 which marked the beginning of their period which 
lasted until 1898 as a result of a military campaign by the Anglo-Egyptian 
army. The basis of the legal system during this period was not different from  
that of the Funj and the Turko-Egyptian. It was the Islamic law that had been 
administered. The position is described as follows6:  
  With the fall of Khartoum in 1884, the Mahdi's authority was established 
over all the important areas in the country with the exception of the port of 
Suakin which continued to be held by the Egyptians. The Mahdi 
repeatedly stated in his letters and circulars that the purpose of his mission 
was to revive the faith and the customs of the Prophet and to purify and rid 
Islam of superstition as well as of some of the highly complex differences 
among muslim jurists which made the faith practically inaccessible to, and 
beyond the understanding of, the average muslim. It followed from this 
basic philosophy that justice was to be administered upon the dual basis of 
                                                 
5  Hussein El-Mufti, supra note 3, at 76-83. 
6  Id., at 127-191; Zaki, supra note 1, at 38-41. 
the Koran and the Sunna. The Mahdi asserted a unique system on matters 
of law and claimed to speak as one directly inspired.  
 
 The main sources of legal rules according to the Mahdi's instructions to 
his followers, were the Koran and the Sunna, as interpreted by the Mahdi 
and the Mahdi's circulars. Since there were many problems on which 
there were no clear ruling in the Koran and the Sunna, the Mahdi had to 
issue an enormous number of circulars to deal with them. In these 
circulars he tried to reflect his own interpretation and reading of the letter 
and the spirit of the Koran and direct link with the recognized rules of the 
Islamic Law. This is clearly reflected in the the Sunna. Quite a few of the 
rules contained in those circulars had no Mahdi's penal legislation for 
what may be described as petty offences.  
 The Mahdi was the supreme head of the judicial structure but his power 
to hear and determine cases was widely delegated. There was a Qadi al-
Islam, Province Qadis, District Qadis attached to army units moving into 
new territory. During the Khalifa's period the court structure became 
much more complex with special courts being set up for administering 
and claims for or against bayt-al mal, for determination of complaints 
against the governors, princes, commanders of the army and the ruling 
class in general. This last court was known as Mahkmat Radd al-mazalim. 
The law which the courts purported to apply was Islamic Law as set out 
in the Koran and the Sunna and the circulars issued by the Mahdi and the 
Khalifa after the Mahdi's death. 
  The Mahadists were no exception to the Funj and the Turks hence they 
could not be expected to adopt that western-derived concept called Attorney-
General. 
 (iv) The Period of the Fur Sultanate. 
 In this Sultanate the Sultan was the supreme head of the judicial 
system. He could appoint qadis (judges) or delegate judicial powers to any 
of the Ulama he decreed appropriate and fit to exercise such powers. The 
law applicable had been the Koran, Sunna or the local customs. As far as the 
Kordofan region was concerned it had an independent  judicial  system  
though  it was part of the Fur Sultanate7. 
  The Fur Sultanate, or the Kayra Sultanate as it was also known was 
described by one writer8 to be one of  a series of States in the belt of 
Savanna land below the Sahara known to the Arab geographical writers as 
the Belad al-Sudan, the country of Sudan, occupying   what is now the 
westernmost   Province of the 
 
 Republic of the Sudan, Darfur, the home of the Fur. To the west of Darfur 
lay the Sultanate of Waday and between them a series of petty states. To the 
East, separated by Kordofan and the White Nile, lay the Funj Sultanate of 
Sinnar, with whom the Kayra Sultanate contended for control of Kordofan 
and its trade.  
  The Kayra, Sultanate of Darfur grew out to what was probably in 
origin a Fur tribal chiefdom. The Kayra dynasty ruled Darfur from the 
seventeenth century to 1874; and was restored in 1899 by Ali Dinar, who 
succeeded in preserving his kingdom’s independence until 1916 when 
Darfur was conquered by the British9. 
   The Fur Sultanate existed alongside with the Mahadiyya for a decade. 
After it was restored a year after the defeat of the Mahadiyya, the Fur 
Sultanate also managed to exist for nearly two decades.  
 The Sultanates and States which existed in the Sudan, prior to the 
Condominium Rule or a alongside with it, with exception of Christian 
Kingdoms, applied Sharia Law that constituted the basis of their legal 
                                                 
7 Hussein Elmufti, supra note 3, at 49-65. 
8 Yusuf Fadl Hassan, Sudan in Africa,87 (2ed. 1985). 
9 Id,. at 88. 
systems. No post of Attorney-General could therefore be contemplated to 
have been created in those systems including the one of the Fur. 
2- The Period of the Condominium Rule. 
  The Condominium or the Anglo-Egyptian rule lasted from 1898 to 
1956. It followed the defeat of the Mahdists by the Anglo-Egyptian army. 
The new administration was confronted at the outset with the urgent 
problems of restoring peace and establishing a system of justice capable of 
winning the confidence of the local population. The measures taken to attain 
all that are described as follwos10: 
  One of the immediate problems which faced the new administration was the 
problem of restoring peace and order to a  country  which  had  for a  long  
time, been  torn apart by continuous fighting and the problems of winning the 
confidence of a nation whose confidence in its rulers had been successively 
and severely  shaken. The establishment of an effective system for the 
administration of justice was viewed as most of the important means of 
acquiring this badly needed confidence. 
 
  It was in the above spirit that the Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
Penal Code and the Civil Justice Ordinance, 1900 were promulgated. It was 
deemed necessary by the two conquering Governments of the Britannic 
Majesty the Queen and of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, in the light of 
the urgent problems faced by the new administration that future 
administration of the Sudan needed an agreement. Hence, an agreement 
called the Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan, 1899 was made. 
The preamble to the Agreement acknowledged the joint military and 
financial effort of the parties, the necessity of deciding upon a system for the 
administration and for the making of laws for re-conquered provinces and 
that the parties to the Agreement conceive that Wadi Halfa and Suakin were 
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to be most effectively administered in conjunction with the re-conquered 
provinces to which they were respectively adjacent.  
 In fact the content of the preamble is reflected in the Articles of the 
agreement. Article (I) defined the word 'Sudan':  
  The word Sudan in this Agreement means all the territories south of 
the 22nd parallel of latitude, which: 
1- have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882 or 
which having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by    
 the Government of His Highness the Khedive were improperly lost to 
Egypt and have been re-conquered by Her Majesty's Government and the 
 Egyptian Government acting in concert or 
2- which may hereafter be re-conquered by the two Governments acting in 
concert.  
Article (III) stipulated the powers of the Governor-General and the manner of his 
appointment. It read: 
  The Supreme military and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested 
in one officer termed the Governor-General of the Sudan. He shall be 
appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of the Britannic 
Majesty's Government.  
 
 Another essential Article of the Agreement is Article (IV) which provided 
for the legislative power of the Governor-General. It read:  
 Laws, Orders, and Regulations with the full force of law for the good 
government of the Sudan and for regulating the holding, disposal and 
devolution of property of every kind therein situate may from time to time 
be made, altered or abrogated by Proclamation of the Governor-General. 
Such Laws, Orders and Regulations may apply to the whole or any named 
parts of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, 
alter or abrogate any existing Law or Regulation. All such Proclamations 
shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-
General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His 
Highness the Khedive. 
 
  In respect also to administration of the Sudan the two conquering 
Governments signed a treaty known as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936. 
This Treaty restored the rights of the Egyptians after they had been expelled 
from the Sudan following assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo in 1924.  
 Article (II) read: 
1. While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future , modifying 
the agreements of the 19th January and of the 10th July, the High Contracting 
Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that 
resulting from the said agreement. The High Contracting Parties agree that 
the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of 
the Sudanese. 
2. Appointments and promotion of officials in the Sudan will in consequence 
remain vested in the Governor-General, who, in making new appointments 
to posts for which qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable 
candidates of British and Egyptian nationalities. 
 
  Paragraph 2 above explicitly confered upon the Governor-General the 
power to appoint and promote officials in the Sudan.  This is tacit in 
Article (III) of the Agreement since the Governor-General was the Supreme 
Military and Civil Authority in the country. Therefore, it was on the basis of 
Article (III) of the Agreement and Article (II) of the Treaty that the 
Governor-General appointed three Secretaries namely: the Civil Secretary, 
the Financial Secretary and the Legal Secretary. These three Secretaries were 
to assist the Governor-General in the discharge of his duties. The emphasis 
will be on the functions of the Legal Secretary as the other two secretaries are 
irrelevant to this dissertation. The functions of the Legal Secretary were not 
regulated by  specific enactment but they were as follows11: 
1. He was the head of both the legal department and the High Court. In this 
capacity he exercised administrative, legislative and judicial functions. 
2. He was a member of the Governor-General's Council which was 
established in 1910. As such he exercised the following functions: 
(i) Receipt of memoranda relative to any matters not provided for in any 
law. 
(ii) Placing of bills before the Governor-General's Council to be 
deliberated thereupon. 
(iii) Issuing of legal opinion on matters referred thereto by the Governor-
General. 
(iv) Participation on any of the committees as may be directed by the 
Governor-General. 
 The legal department was established for the first time in 1904 and the 
first post created under it in the same year was that of the Advocate General. 
The Advocate General was to litigate on behalf of the Government, to draft 
contracts to which the Government was a party and to conduct the 
prosecution of accused before criminal courts. Hence, the legal department, 
until 1953, was the only institution of justice in the country.12 But in 
February 1953 another essential development occurred. The legal officers 
department had been created. It was to operate separate from the legal 
department which had been turned into an independent institution called "the 
Judiciary" with the Chief Justice as the head. The legal officers' department 
was divided into three sections, namely, the civil and criminal section, the 
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legislation section and the administration and translation section. Therefore, 
the legal officers' department was the nucleus of the present Ministry of 
Justice13. The post of the Minister of Justice was first created when the first 
Sudanese national government was formed in 195414. But the post of the 
Attorney-General appeared for the first time under the May Revolution 
regime in 1969 when it embodied it in the Permanent Constitution of the 
Sudan, 1973; and  a law named the Attroney-General's Act,  1973 was 
enacted to regulate his business. In fact it is apparent that what was called 
Attroney-General, under the Attroney-General Powers Distribution Act, 
1968 and the Ministry of Justice (Reorganization) Act, 1972 was of the 
status of the Undersecretary whose post was created for the first time under 
the Ministry of Justice (Reorganization) Act, 1969. Both the 1968 and 1972 
Acts subordinated Attroney-General to Minister of Justice who was the 
hieghest authority in the Ministry of Justice. Therefore it was the May 
revolution of 1969 that made the Attroney-General the top authority in the 
Chambers after the Attroney-General's Act, 1973 had abolished  the titiles 
"Ministry of Justice" and "Minister of Justice" in favour of titiles 
"Chambers" and "Attroney-General" . 
  It is to be deduced from the above development that the functions  of  
the   Legal   Secretary   are  now  divided   between   the Judiciary and the 
Ministry of Justice as separate institutions of justice. 
 As seen previously the Legal Secretary, as head of both the legal 
department and the High Court had, inter alia, judicial functions. There are 
authorities to the effect that his judicial function had been appellate. One of 
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those authorities is the case of David Kohen v. Suliman Hilali15, in which  
facts were as follows- On November 10th., 1899 the defendant borrowed 
from the plaintiff  LE.150 and gave him a bill payable after 60 days. The rate 
of interest chargeable was 15% per month payable in advance. On the same 
day the defendant paid the plaintiff LE.22.500m/ms interest for the first 
month. At the end of the first month the defendant again paid 
LE.22.500m/ms interest. On January 10th, 1900 he made the third payment 
of LE.22.500m/ms and also paid LE.50 out of the principal debt. Defendant 
cancelled the old bill and gave the plaintiff a new bill dated January 10th, 
1900, and payable after thirty days. He renewed this bill on February 10th 
and March 16th, and paid LE.45 more by way of interest under it. On March 
10th, being pressed by the plaintiff for a security the defendant pledged two 
river boats to the plaintiff. A dispute having arisen as to who should receive 
the income of the boats, the plaintiff brought an action in the Wad Medani 
Court on the bill dated March 10th, claiming the LE.100 and interest. The 
Court decided that the interest charged by the plaintiff was excessive, that  
part  of  it  should  be  considered as repayment of the principal, and  that as  
a  result the defendant should pay the plaintiff no more than LE.30.250m/ms. 
From this decree the plaintiff appealed to the Legal Secretary. He held that 
there is doubt that in this case either the plaintiff David Kohen or the 
defendant Suliman Helali is committing perjury. And as Suliman Helali's 
statements are corroborated by Babikir Osman Makawi's whose evidence is 
against his own interest and agrees with the documents. There is no 
hesitation in accepting his story in preference to that of Kohen. The 
plaintiff's agent argues that as the bill is in proper form, the court cannot go 
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behind it. But in every country the court has power as between the original 
maker of the bill and the original drawee to go into real facts of the case, 
when there is evidence of fraud., undue influence or the like. Under the 
Sudan Civil Justice Ordinance the Court is directed to determine cases of 
this sort in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. There is no 
hesitation in deciding in this country that to enforce an agreement to pay 
interest at the rate of 15% per month between an alien and a Sudanese would 
not be in accordance with good conscience. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The defendant will be given until December to pay the judgement debt. 
  It has been indicated before that the first national Government was 
formed in 1954. The basis of its formation was the Self-Government Statute, 
1953. The 1953 Statute implemented the Agreement on Self-Government 
and Self-Determination of 1953. The unique characteristic of the Statute is 
that it introduced the well-known constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers. Hence the organs of the State were divided into the Executive, the 
Legislative and the Judicial Organs.  
 Both Articles 13 and 14(2) vested in Governor-General power to 
appoint Prime Minister and Ministers. Therefore Article 13 read: 
 The Governor-General shall appoint as Prime Minister such person as from 
time to time be elected for the purpose by the House of Representatives 
from among the existing members of Parliament.  
 It was on the strength of these provisions that the Minister of Justice 
was appointed in 1954. 
Article 14(2) read: 
The Governor-General shall, on the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint 
not less than ten nor more than fifteen ministers to other departments, or 
ministers without portfolios, of whom not less than two ministers in each 
Council shall be members of Parliament representing Southern 
Constituencies. 
 
  What qualified a person to be appointed as minister was regulated by 
Article 15 which read: 
 
(1) No person shall be appointed as minister to one or more of the several departments 
of Government unless he is qualified for membership of Parliament. 
 
(2) A person who is a party to existing contract with the Government shall not be eligible 
for appointment unless he shall have disclosed to the Prime Minister the existence 
and nature of such contract and of his interest therein,  and either the Prime Minister 
have raised no objection thereto, or he shall at the request of the Prime Minister shall 
have terminated his interest therein. 
 
 The compostion of the Council of Ministers so appointed and the 
responsibilities thereof are stipulated in Article 19 which read: 
 The Prime Minister and other Ministers shall together constitute a Council 
of Ministers, which shall be responsible to the Parliament for the executive 
and administrative functions of government. 
 
  In turn each Minister, was individually responsible for the conduct of his 
Ministry, to the Prime Minister in accordance with the provisions of Article 
20 of the Statute. That In Council of Ministers with the Minister of Justice as 
its member, clearly represented the executive organ of the Government 
which was responsible to the Parliament for the In turn  each Minister, was 
individually responsible for the conduct of his Ministry, to the Prime 
Minister in accordance with the provisins of Article 20 of the Statute, That 
Council of Ministers with the Minister of Justice as its member, clearly 
represened the executive organ of the Government which was responsible to 
the Parliament for the  administrative and executive functions of the 
Government. Until then the post of the Attroney-General was not yet created. 
As shown previously this had been the first national Government since re-
conquest in 1898.  
  In relation to the legislative organ Article 30 stipulated that the 
Governor-General together with the Parliament constituted the legislature 
for the Sudan. The Parliament in accordance with the provisions of Article 
29 consisted of two Houses namely, a Senate and a House of 
Representatives. Hence, unlike the position in the 1899 Agreement the 
Governor-General did not enjoy the monopoly of being the sole legislature.  
 Elsewhere in this chapter it has been seen how both the Judiciary and 
the Ministry of Justice had emerged as separate institutions of justice. The 
Judiciary is the organ of the State endowed with the administration of justice 
in the Sudan. The relevant Article of the Statute is Article 76. Paragraphs 1 
and 5 provided, respectively, for the establishment of the Judiciary and the 
powers to be exercised by the Chief Justice. The powers of the Legal 
Secretary had been vested in the Chief Justice, based on paragraph 1 which 
read: 
  The administration of justice in the Sudan shall be performed by a 
separate and independent department of the State, which shall be called 
the Judiciary. 
 
Paragraph 5 also read: 
 There shall be vested in the Chief Justice all the powers conferred upon 
the Governor-General or the Legal Secretary by the Civil Justice 
Ordinance., the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Chiefs 
Courts Ordinance and the Native Courts Ordinance only such of the same 
as are specified in the First Part of the Second Schedule (which powers 
shall lapse and cease to be exercisable and in the second part thereof 
(which powers shall remain vested in and exercisable by the Governor-
General  at his discretion). 
 
 
 
  
3. The Period since Independence in 1956 
The Ministry of Justice continued to grow and early in 1956 a department 
called the religious affairs department was created within the ministry. It 
was to carry out its functions under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice 
until it was  annexed in 1963 to Religious Affairs and Wakf's Council. In 
1962 the Ministry witnessed another progress as the department of criminal 
affairs was created with the Prosecutor-General as its head. A number of 
district attorneys located in the major towns of the Northern part of the 
country fell under this department16. These district attorneys, each within its 
jurisdiction, performed the following duties: 
1- To render assistance to police in evaluation of evidence in relation to 
offences committed. 
2- To specify the sections of law alleged to have been violated by the 
accused. 
3-  To conduct the prosecution in connection with the offences against the 
state and murder. 
4-  To render legal opinion to Government institutions. 
5- To render assistance to local Government authorities in resolving tribal 
conflicts. 
           Again the Attorney General's Act, 1981 permitted the establishment of 
administrations within the Chambers and the States. Consequently, the 
administration for ifta and research was established inside the Chambers. Its 
functions were to render legal aid to the public, to undertake the law reform, 
to encourage research and studies, to provide the public with legal opinion 
on various matters and to undertake research with the object of providing 
proposal for law reform17. 
 It is evident that the development of the Ministry of Justice did not 
stop there. From 1989 to the present date the bulk of legal work entrusted to 
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it prompted and necessiated establishment of specialized  administrations 
reflective of various legal fields in which the ministry operates. The basis for 
establishment of such administrations is the Ministry of Justice 
(Organization) Regulation, 1983 which was made by the Minister of Justice 
pursuant to the provisions of section 40 of the Ministry of Justice 
Organization Act, 1983. Sections 2  to 16 of the Regulations provide for the 
functions of administrations thus created and they are High Administration, 
General Administration for Civil Affairs and Opinion, General 
Administration for Criminal Affairs, General Administration for Legislation 
and Drafting of Bills, General Administration for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, General Administration for Contracts, General 
Administration for Administrative and Financial Affairs, General 
Administration for Training, General Administration for Legal Aid, General 
Administration for Prevention  of  Unlawful  Enrichment, General 
Administration for Commercial Registrations and General Administration 
for Registrar General of Intellectual Property18. It has been indicated earlier 
that some of these administrations, such as Civil Affairs and Opinion, 
Criminal Affairs and Legislation and Drafting of Bills Administrations were 
established prior to 1989. The above administrations are called specialized 
administrations and their functions will be dealt with in turn except 
Administrative and Financial Affairs and Training General Administrations 
as these two do not exercise any legal functions. 
(i)  High Administration: The High Administration is presided over by the 
Minister of Justice and it is the highest administrative and legal authority of 
the Ministry. The functions and powers of the Minister of Justice will be 
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deferred for discussion in the next chapter. The Minister is, in the discharge 
of his duties, assisted by an executive office whose functions are : 
(a) To prepare legal studies and to make recommendations as to the 
course of action to be taken on matters referred to the Minister of Justice, 
State Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary. 
(b) To draft decisions made by the Minister of Justice, State Minister of 
Justice and Undersecretary. 
(c) To follow-up administrative matters referred thereto. 
(d) To draft administrative decisions of the Undersecretary relative to 
appointment, promotions and transfers and to supervise the same. 
(e) To prepare matters to be forwarded to the Federal Council of 
Ministers. 
(f) To follow-up reports by and to the Ministry of Justice. 
 
(g) To lay out plan for the Ministry of Justice and to make a follow-up 
thereof. 
  The executive office is presided over by a head whose duties are as 
follows: 
(a) He is secretary for the organization of the Council for the regulation of 
Legal Profession who in that capacity holds legal profession 
examinations. 
(b) To prepare for all the meetings of the Minister. 
(c) To supervise technically and administratively businesses of the 
executive office. 
(d) To forward legal memoranda, prepared by the Legal Counsels, to the 
Undersecretary, State Minister and Minister and to recommend for the 
course of action to be followed on the same. 
(e) To make a follow-up of the execution of decisions made by the 
Undersecretary, State Minister and Minister and to supervise the same. 
 
(ii) The General Administration for Civil Affairs and Opinion: The 
General Administration for Civil Affairs and Opinion is headed by the 
Advocate General. It is divided into four sections, namely, the Legal 
Opinion section, Civil Suits section, Administrative Suits section and 
Constitutional Suits section. These sections carry out specific legal duties. 
The legal opinion section undertakes the provision of State Institutions with 
legal opinion in disputes of civil nature. The civil suits section is endowed 
with power to appear and litigate, before all courts, on behalf of State 
institutions; and to supervise the conduct of arbitration in disputes arising 
between State institutions. The duty which the administrative suits section 
discharges is that it litigates on behalf of State institutions in disputes 
relating to contracts and administrative decisions. Similarly, the 
constitutional suits section is vested with the function of litigating before the 
Constitutional Court, on behalf of State in constitutional suits. 
(iii) The General Administration for Criminal Affairs: The General 
Administration for Criminal Affairs is headed by the Prosecutor-General and 
its function is to supervise the conduct of investigation in criminal cases and 
to undertake prosecutions before the criminal courts. In addition to his being 
head of this administration the Prosecutor-General discharges the following 
functions: 
(a) To conduct administrative and technical supervision of the attorneys. 
(b) To recommend to the President of the Republic remission of sentence 
to which any prisoner has been sentenced. 
(c) To determine objections against decisions to place telephones under 
surveillance. 
(d) To examine extradition to or from countries having extradition treaties 
with the Sudan. 
(e) To determine complaints by any person in respect of any act purporting 
to be done by an attorney. 
(f) To determine appeals against decisions made by the head of State 
Attorney. 
(g) To determine applications for waiver of immunity of any person alleged 
to have committed an offence. 
(h) To  transfer any case from the jurisdiction of one Attorney, within the 
Sudan, to that of another. 
  There have been created under the above administration a 
considerable number of Criminal Attorney Agencies some of which are 
specialized by reason of their dealing with taking cognizance of, inquiring 
into and conducting prosecution in special criminal offences. In so doing 
they exercise the powers of the Minister of Justice under the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1991, or any other Act for the time being in force. The 
number of specialized Criminal Attorney Agencies is twenty-eight and they 
operate in fields of offences regarding public fund, land, cheques, abductions 
of women etc. The  other  non-specialized  Criminal  Attorney Agencies  are 
172 in number and they are located in all the States of the country19. These 
agencies, other than those located in Khartoum State, represent the Minister 
of Justice for the purposes of section 33(4) of the Civil Procedure Act, 1983. 
 (iv) The General Administration  for Legislation and Drafting of Bills: 
The General Administration  for Legislation and Drafting of Bills is headed 
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by the Solicitor General and it functions through three sections, namely, the 
drafting of bills section, the translation section and the publication and 
editing of laws section.  
 (v)  The General Administration for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: The General Administration for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law was established in 1998. It is headed by a head of 
administration and it performs, inter alia, the functions of preparing and 
supervising reports relating to human rights in the Sudan, to study the 
conventions to which the Sudan may accede and to make reservations to 
them,  to  train  legal  counsels  in the fields of human rights and 
humanitarian law and to refute accusations against Sudan in relation to 
human rights. 
(vi)  The General Administration for Contracts: The General 
Administration for Contracts is headed by a head of administration. It 
discharges the functions of drafting local and international contracts and to 
represent the state before competent tribunals in disputes relating to such 
contracts. 
 (vii) The General Administration for Legal Aid: The Counsel-General 
heads the General Administration for Legal Aid. It is divided into three 
sections namely, the Ifta (Islamic religious opinion) and research section, the 
administration of documents section and the legal aid in litigation section. 
The function of the Ifta and research section is to provide, in consultation 
with Sharia clerics, legal services to the public such as advice on personal 
matters of Muslims. The authentication of documents section carries out the 
duty of authentication of documents, taking of affidavits and legal 
attestations and administering of oaths. The duty to appear and plead on 
behalf of an accused who is a pauper is vested in the legal aid section. 
 (viii) The General Administration for Prevention of Unlawful 
Enrichment: The General Administration for Prevention of Unlawful 
Enrichment was established in 1989 pursuant to the provisions of the 
Prevention of Unlawful Enrichment Act, 1989. It is presided over by a head 
of administration. Its most important function is to receive complaints 
relating to unlawful and questionable enrichment and to inquire into them. 
 (ix)  The General Administration for Commercial Registrar-General: 
The General Administration for Commercial Registrar-General is   headed  
by  the  Commercial  Registrar - General.  It      functions  through  five   
sections:  the  companies  section,  business   names   and   partnerships  
section, trade marks  section  and  commercial agencies section. Each of 
these sections carries out registration in definite fields as its title suggests. 
 (x) The General Administration for the Registrar-General of 
Intellectual Property:  The General Administration for the Registrar-
General of Intellectual Property is headed by the Registrar-General. It carries 
out the business of registration of patents and industrial designs. 
 Besides these specialized administrations there have been established 
also within the States and Government institutions legal administrations and 
offices. The aim is to provide such states and institutions with legal services. 
Actually these legal administrations and offices perform, as it will be seen 
later, the functions and powers of the Minister of Justice provided for in the 
Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983. 
  We now turn to the experience of Southern Region of Sudan after the 
conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. This agreement 
culminated in granting the Southern  Provinces of the Sudan self-
Government. The legal basis for this kind of set-up was the Southern 
Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, 1972. Section 4 of the Act 
provided for the legislative and executive organs for the Southern Region. In 
accordance with section 9 of the High Executive and the People's Regional 
Assembly Act, 1981, members of the High Executive Council assumed 
ministerial portfolios in the Southern Region of which the portfolio of the 
Minister of Legal Affairs was one. But there existed a legal hurdle which, 
before the Minister of Legal Affairs could exercise any legal functions, had 
to be overcome by the legislature. On the face of it the establishment of the 
Ministry of Legal Affairs in the Southern Region contradicted the provisions 
of the Ministry of Justice (Re-organization) Act, 1972 and subsequent 
legislations. The problem had been that these legislations provided for the 
creation of a post of a single official, for the whole country, called the 
Attorney-General. This official, to the exclusion of everybody else, had been 
and is still the legal advisor of the State and he carries out on its behalf all 
businesses of  legal nature20.  
  In  order  to  remedy  the  situation  the Distribution of Legal Powers 
between the Central Ministries and the Ministries of Southern Region of the 
Sudan Act, 1977 was enacted. This Act provided that the Regional Minister 
for Legal Affairs could, within the Southern Region of the Sudan, exercise 
the powers vested in the Attorney-General. But this legal arrangement only 
lasted from 1972 to 1983 for the Addis Ababa Agreement was abrogated and 
forthwith the High Executive Council and the People's Regional Assembly 
were dismantled and consequently the 1977 Distribution Act became a dead 
letter.  
 In April 1997 another similar development also occurred in the 
Southern States of the Sudan following the conclusion of a peace agreement 
called the Khartoum Peace Agreement. To implement the peace agreement, 
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the 14th. Constitutional Decree was passed. This Constitutional Decree, in 
accordance with provisions of Article 137 of the Constitution  of the Sudan, 
1998, is still in force. It provides under Article 5(P) that in addition to 
powers of the States provided for under the 12th. Constitutional Decree 
federal organs must exercise, within their boundaries, specific affairs within 
the framework of political plans and federal legislation. In accordance with 
the provisions of Article 3(b) of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, 1997, State 
Attorney General has been a matter  to be exercised by the Southern States 
of the Sudan. Hence, an executive set-up called the Co-ordinating Council 
for the South has been establised and its members hold ministerial 
protfolios, with the status of Federal Ministers, among whom is the Minister 
for Legal Affairs. But this Minister faces again the same hurdle that had 
been faced during the 1972 Agreement by his predecessor before the 
enactment of the 1977 Distribution of Powers Act. The remedying of this 
situation obviously requires making of an instrument regulative of how the 
Southern States are to exercise what Article 3(b) of the Agreement provides 
for. However, time has shown that federal legislation desired will not be 
forthcoming and unless the Minister of Justice delegates some of his powers 
the legal affairs protfolio will remain a redundant one. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 There is lack of authority as to what kind of legal arrangements 
existed in the Christian Kingdoms of Soba and Dongola. Of course it cannot 
be envisaged that Islamic Law had been the basis of legal arrangements in 
those kingdoms. Perhaps Christian and local values were the law applicable. 
But surely the Funj, Turks Egyptians, Mahdists and Fur had legal 
arrangements represented by the legal systems that were established in the 
territories they occupied. Hence, the judiciary became the oldest institution 
of justice in the Sudan. The common factor between the Governments they 
had established had been that those Governments were Islamic in nature and 
consequently the law applicable had been the Koran and the Sunna and some 
local values of the population. Therefore, prior to 1898 there had been no 
question of emergence of that essential institution of justice called “the 
Ministry of Justice or Attorney General”. However, contemporary Ministry 
of Justice developed as shown previously, through stages starting from legal 
department to Ministry of Justice. It had been a by-product of the British 
administraiton in the Sudan and hence Western inspired. The constitutional 
and legal position of the Attorney General or Minitser of Justice, as these 
expressions are interchangedably used, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
However, the working legal force of the Ministry of Justice is at present 807 
persons21.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Position Of The Attorney General in the  
Sudan Constitutions and laws 
 
Introduction  
 This chapter discusses the constitutional and legal position of  
Attorney-General in the constitutions and laws of the Sudan. Functions and 
powers under different laws will also be discussed. Definitly we will not 
explore all the laws but we will cover the most important ones.  
1. Position of the Attorney-General in the Sudan Constitutions: 
 There is lack of information as to whether there ever existed any 
constitution in the proper meaning of the word during any of the periods we 
have seen beginning from the Christian Kingdoms to the Anglo-Egyptian 
era. Surely the system of rule in those periods except the Anglo-Egyptian 
had been largely theocratic in nature; whether that was based on Christian or 
Islamic values. But that was not the case with the Anglo-Egyptian rule. 
Their system of rule including the legal one had been secular in nature. The 
first law that was applied in this period was martial law, which was 
necessiated by the fact that the state of the country was still very 
disturbed22The proclamation of martial law was a temporary arrangement 
that lasted from 1898 to the date of the establishement of the new system of 
rule. Despite the making of so many ordinances during the Anglo-Egyptian 
era those enactments did not include a constitution. It was in 1953 that a 
specific constitutional reference was made under Article 12(1) of the Self-
Government Statute, 1953. It provided that the Governor-General must be 
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the Supreme Constitutional authority within the Sudan. Article 13 of that 
Statute constituted the basis for the formation of the first national 
Government. The protfolios of that government included that of the Minister 
of Justice. But the importance of the 1953 Statute had been that it constituted 
a major step towards the independence of the Sudan which eventually it did 
attain in 1956. 
 The first Constitution ever made in the Sudan was the Transitional 
Constitution of the Sudan, 1956. It did not contain any specific provisions 
relating to the post  of the Attroney-General or Minister of Justice. But the 
Minister of Justice was member of the first national government that was 
formed in 1954 in accordance with the provisions of Article 14(2) of the 
1953 Self-Government Statute. The position remained the same until that 
constitution was overthrown in a military coup on November 17th., 1958 and 
General Ibrahim Aboud came to power. To enhance his grip a number of 
constitutional decrees were issued . The Constitutional Decree No.3 
provided for the suspension of the Constitution. The second Constitutional 
Decree provided for the appointment of the Prime Minister and Ministers 
who were charged with specific functions and powers each within the limits 
of his ministry. But the Military Supreme Council which was the highest 
authority vested its head with all the legislative, judicial and executive 
powers as well as the military command. This era was characterized by the 
complete absence of any constitution. Obviously, the Junta was ruling by 
constitutional decrees. In October 1964 the 1958 Military rule was in turn 
deposed in a popular uprising and the Transitional Constitution, 1956 
(Amended in 1964) was revived. Yet there was no particular reference to the 
Attorney-General. As to the  Minister of Justice he had been member of the 
Council of Ministers and hence Constitutional provisions applicable to other 
Ministers applied to him as well.  
 The first specific constitutional mention of the Attorney-General came 
under Article 161 and 162 of the Draft Sudan Islamic Constitution, 1968. 
Article 161 of that Constitution provided that there must be established by 
law Attorney-General's Chambers which was to be charged with the 
business of appearing and litigating in law suits on behalf of the State in 
addition to supervision of criminal inquiry. Article 162 stated that the 
functions of the Attorney-General's Chambers were to be regulated by law. 
The law also was to prescribe the conditions of service, promotion, 
discipline and removal of the officials of the Chambers. It is now evident 
that these two Articles impliedly indicate that the Attorney-General was in 
fact the Legal Advisor of the State whose duty was to transact and carry out 
on its behalf all businesses of legal nature. But as a matter of fact the 1968 
Islamic Constitution never saw light by reason of another military coup 
d’etat in May 1969. 
 In 1969 a new era began in the Sudan and on the very day of the coup 
the Military Junta made the first Republican Order which suspended the 
Transitional Constitution of the Sudan (Amended 1964). Also the third 
Republican Order was issued forming the Council of Ministers with the 
Minister of Justice as member. But the most important step taken by the 
regime was when its First Peoples Assembly passed a Constitution named " 
the Permanent Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1973". 
Article 197 of that Constitution provided for the manner of appointment of 
the Attorney-General, his status and manner in which his duties, jurisdiction 
and responsibilities would be determined. That article read: 
 The President of the Republic shall appoint Attorney-General for the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, who shall by virtue of his office be a 
Minister, the law shall determine his duties, jurisdiction and 
responsibilities.  
 
 This was an important constitutional development as far as the 
Attorney-General was concerned.  It had been the first time that a direct 
constitutional reference to the position and status of the Attorney-General 
was enshrined in a Constitution in force. And as it is clear from the context 
the Attorney-General according to 1973 Constitution was not a Minister but 
he was so by virtue of office. Definitely that status gave him the right to 
attend the deliberations of the Council of Ministers. As to the part relating to 
his duties, jurisdiction and responsibilities this will be discussed under the 
sub-title "Position, Functions and Powers of the Attorney-General in the 
Sudan Laws". 
 In April 1985 the May 1969 Government fell by reason of popular 
uprising with the help of the Military. The 1973 Constitution was 
suspended and in October 1985 a Constitution came into force after having 
been passed and signed by the Transitional Military Council. Again under 
this Constitution the Attorney-General was granted a special constitutional 
status under Article 132. Hence, constitutionally the post of the Attorney-
General had been established. His duties, jurisdiction and responsibilities 
were to be spelt out by law. That Article read: 
  There shall be an Attorney-General for the Republic of the Sudan, who 
shall by virtue of his office be a Minister. He shall transact on behalf of 
the State all businesses of legal character and the law shall determine his 
duties, jurisdiction and responsibilities. 
 
 The provision above excludes any other person, other than the 
Attorney-General or his representative, from transacting, on behalf of the 
State, businesses of legal character. There had been no similar emphasis 
under Article 197 of the 1973 Constitution which merely left the duties, the 
jurisdiction and the responsibilities of the Attorney General to be regulated 
by law. The law envisaged by the two constitutions is the Attorney-General's 
Act, 1973 which was repealed by the Attorney General’s Act, 1981. 
 In June 1989 another constitutional era, affecting the office of the 
Attorney-General, began. There has been another successful military coup in 
the country the consequence of which was the suspension of the 1985 
Transitional Constitution. The Revolutionary Command Council of the 
National Salvation Revolution made the first Constitutional Decree which 
suspended the Constitution. The same Council also made Third 
Constitutional Decree which provided for the functions and powers of the 
Head of State who should, inter alia, supervise the Attorney-General's 
Chambers and appoint the Attorney-General and Undersecretary of the 
Chambers. Hence, the constitutional position of the Attorney-General has 
been once again preserved since a constitutional decree has the force of the 
constitution. But the National Salvation Revolution legislative authority took 
a further step by making the Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 
1998, which is the one now in force. Article 137 repealed all the 
Constitutional Decrees save the 14th which regulates the so called Khartoum 
Peace Agreement which has been concluded between the Sudan Government 
and some rebel factions of Southern Sudan in 1997. This Article reads: 
 
1- There shall be repealed as from the date of the Constitution coming into 
force all the Constitutional Decrees. 
2- Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-article (2), the 14th. Constitutional 
Decree (Implementation of the Peace Agreement), 1997, shall remain in 
force, and shall expire upon termination of the Transitional Period 
mentioned therein. 
 Despite the fact that the 1998 Constitution repeals, inter alia, the Third 
Constitutional Decree it upholds and recognizes, but under different Articles, 
the important role the Minister of Justice, the Legal Counsels and Attorneys 
play in the legal system of the country. The Minister of Justice, based on the 
federal system followed in the Sudan23, is a federal minister who, like any 
other federal minister, exercises in addition to his collective functions as 
member of the Federal Council of Ministers24, the functions provided for in 
Article 50 of the 1998 Constitution which reads: 
 
(1) The Minister shall have functions and powers by law or delegation. 
(2) The Minister shall be the highest responsible authority in his ministry, and 
his decisions shall prevail therein. The Council of Ministers may amend or 
cancel the same. 
 
(3) The President of the Republic may suspend the decision of a Minister 
pending submitting the same to the Council of Ministers. 
(4) There shall be between a federal and a State Minister a relation of 
coordination, cooperation and complementation of the federal and State's 
roles. 
 
 It is likely that federal ministers, whether acting severally or jointly as 
Council of Ministers, may act in excess of their legal or constitutional 
powers thereby aggrieving a person or group of persons. Hence, in order to 
contest such acts Article 55 provides:  
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 An aggrieved person may contest any of the acts of the Federal 
Council of Ministers  or a Minister: 
 
a) before the Constitutional Court in any claim of excess against the    
Constitutional Federal System or constitutional freedoms, sanctities and 
rights. 
b) before a court in any claim of excess against the law 
 
 Article 50 of the Constitution also regulates several and joint 
responsibility of federal ministers, as distinguished from State's Ministers. It 
reads: 
1) The Minister shall be responsible for the business of his Ministry to the 
President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers and the National 
Assembly. 
2) Ministers shall be jointly responsible for the executive performance to the 
National Assembly. 
 The instances in which the office of the federal minister falls vacant 
are enumerated by Article 53 as follows: 
a) acceptance of resignation by the President of the Republic; 
b) relief from office by a decision of the President of the Republic; 
c)  death. 
 It is to be remarked that the 1998 Constitution does not whatsoever 
refer to "Attorney-General". The reason is that the expression "Attorney 
General" is not any longer part of our law as it has been deleted from the 
Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983, as will be seen when we deal 
with the powers of the Attorney General in the laws of the Sudan. 
 As to the responsibilities of the legal counsels and attorneys, the 
Constitution in Article 106 describes the functions that they are to strive to 
carry out, in accordance with the constitution and laws. This Article reads: 
 
 Legal Counsels working in the public service and Attorneys shall strive to 
stress the values of justice, truth, legality, protection of public and private 
rights, tender advice and render legal services to the State and Citizens, 
and shall perform their functions truthfully and impartially in accordance 
with the Constitution and the Law. 
  
 In fact the functions contained in this Article are the very functions 
which the Minister of Justice performs under section 5 of the Ministry of 
Justice Organization Act, 1983. But this is the first time a Constitution in 
this country has ever endeavoured to prescribe the functions of Legal 
Counsels and Attorneys. 
 Another issue that is germane to the discussion is that all the 
provisions of the Constitutions of the Sudan we have already considered 
relating to the Attorney-General reveal that Attorney-General alternated with 
Minister of Justice as matter of policy in presiding over the Chambers. 
Therefore, it is vital that an attempt be made to compare and contrast the two 
posts as well as illuminate the requirements and pre-requisites for 
appointment of Attorney-General or Minister of Justice. As we have seen the 
post of the Minister of Justice was created under the first national 
Government in 1954. Neither Minister of Justice nor Attorney-General did 
have any special constitutional reference in the 1956 Constitution, but in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, Justice portfolio like any 
other portfolio of the Government had to be filled in the prescribed manner 
with tenure25. Each Minister had to be individually responsible for the 
business of his Ministry to the Prime Minister26. It has been seen that the 
legislature had yet to take a further step in enshrining a provision relating to 
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the Attorney-General in the Constitution27. Hence, the Attorney-General, as 
required by the Constitution, had to be  appointed  in  a  particular  manner  
with   status  of  a  Minister. He  continued  to  enjoy  the  same  
constitutional position under the Transitional  Constitution  of   the  Sudan, 
1985. According to section 3 of the Attorney General's Act, 1973, which 
was made pursuant to Article 225 of the 1973 Constitution, the Attorney-
General, unlike the Minister of Justice under the 1956 Constitution, was 
appointed by the President of the Republic from among persons of 
qualifications and legal experience.  
 The 1956 Constitution had not been explicit about such qualifications 
and legal experience as pre-requisites for appointing the Minister of Justice 
who was the highest responsible authority in the Ministry of Justice as was 
the Attorney General in the Chambers after the post of the Minister of 
Justice and the expression "Ministry of Justice"  had been abolished'28. Some 
of the lawyers29  in an attempt to show the difference argue that an Attorney-
General in the Sudan must have Chambers established as prescribed by law 
whereas a Minister of Justice always has a Ministry established by an 
administrative order; that an Attorney-General has no tenure or term of 
office and therefore there is a rebuttable presumption of continuity of office 
whereas a Minister of Justice has tenure to be computed as of the date of 
convening of the first session of the Constituent Assembly; that the phrase 
'who shall by virtue of office be a Minister' means that the Attorney-General 
is not a Minister; and that both of them are for the performance of their 
duties, not responsible to the same authority.  But   when  we  look  at  the  
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issue  in  terms  of  the  legal functions  exercised  by  each  of  them it 
appears that that difference has no much significance as their legal positions, 
functions and powers are exactly the same given the provisions of the 
Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 198330. Those functions make  it 
imperative that both of them must be lawyers by profession as a non-lawyer 
is by no means qualified to discharge such duties. Another characteristic  of  
this  Sudanese  public  official,  Attorney-General or Minister of Justice, is 
that both posts may, at the same time, be held by the same person31. 
2. Position, Functions and Powers of the Attorney-General in the 
Sudan Laws: 
(i) The Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983: 
 In relation to the organization of the business of the Ministry of 
Justice or the Attorney General's Chambers as it used to be known, the 1983 
Act is not the first enactment in that regard. It was preceded by other 
enactments which were all repealed as the development of the chambers 
continued as it necessiated change of those enactments. All these enactments 
do not define the expression 'Attorney- General'. But Cambridge 
International Dictionary of English defines an Attorney- General as the top 
legal officer in some countries, who advises the King or Queen or 
Government. As he is the legal advisor of the State it will transpire later that 
this  definition  suits  the  Sudanese  Attorney- General32. The first 
legislation ever made to regulate the business of the Attorney-General had 
been the Attorney General's Power Distribution Act, 1968. By this Act   
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Powers  of  the  Attorney-General  under  given  enactment  were distributed 
to Advocate-General, Prosecutor-General and Solicitor-General. Hence, the 
powers provided for under the Advocates' Ordinance, Bankruptcy Ordinance 
and Public Trustee Ordinance were to be exercised by the Advocate-
General. The Prosecutor-General was vested with the powers provided for in 
the Code of Criminal  Procedure and Customs Ordinance. The Solicitor-
General was to exercise those powers as spelt out in the Legal Profession 
(Regulation)Act. Added to the powers exercised by the Solicitor-General as 
set out above were the powers specified in section 2(2) of the 1968 Act. This 
section read: 
1) The legislation set out in Column (i) of the schedule hereto shall 
be amended by the deletion of the words "Attorney-General" wherever 
they occur and substituted thereof by the words appearing in 
Column (ii). 
2) Any reference in any other legislation to the Attorney-General shall be read 
and construed as reference to the Solicitor-General. 
 The rationale behind the making of the 1968 Act was to enable the 
Ministry of Justice to function properly. This prompted an overall re-
organization of the work of the Ministry in order to achieve that end. That 
re-organization took the form of an internal divisional setup so that the 
duties were discharged properly. All this had been embodied in the 
Explanatory Note of the Attorney General's Powers Distribution Act, 1968 
which read:  
 
 To enable the Ministry of Justice to function properly was the motive for the 
enactment of the Attorney General's Act, 1968. To achieve that end the Act 
distributes and co-ordinates work inside the Ministry. The extensive 
development and progress of the country within the last few years entailed a 
considerable increase in the legal work entrusted to the Ministry of Justice. 
Such development necessiated diversified legislation and legal advice, 
involved the Government in abundant litigation and resulted in many and 
different types of criminal proceedings. Therefore it became apparently 
necessary to conduct an overall organization of the Ministry of Justice to 
enable it to carry out these functions. The laws of the country endowed the 
Attorney-General with different powers and duties which he exercised since 
this Ministry was established in 1954; these are legislative drafting, giving 
legal advice and conducting criminal as well as civil proceedings. The 
nature of these functions required an internal divisional setup for the proper 
discharge of these functions. Now it became necessary to distribute by law 
the powers of the Attorney- General to the Solicitor-General , the 
Prosecutor-General and the Advocate-General. 
 
 The nature of the powers distributed and the criterion for such 
distribution was spelt out in the same Note as follows:  
 The Act embodies a schedule allocating the powers of the Attorney-
General respecting civil litigation to the Advocate-General empowering him 
to conduct government litigation according to the powers of the Attorney 
General in the Civil Justice Ordinance and other laws. The conduct of 
criminal proceedings was allocated to the Prosecutor-General empowering 
him to carry out the functions of the Attorney-General according to the Code 
of Criminal Procedure and other laws. The residual powers of the Attorney-
General which were not comprised in the schedule and consequently not 
allocated thereby to either the Advocate-General or the Prosecutor-General 
were allocated to the Solicitor-General according to section 2(2) which 
provides that any reference in any other legislation to the Attorney-General 
shall be read and construed as reference to the Solicitor-General. In addition 
to all that the Solicitor-General shall exercise other powers of the Attorney-
General which are not provided for by law such as the drafting of all 
legislative instruments such as regulations, rules and orders and the drafting 
of Treaties and Contracts and giving legal advice to the Ministries and 
Government Units. This Act aims at achieving some degree of specialization 
to facilitate quick action which is pertinently needed now. 
 But the 1968 Act could not last long. According to the Explanatory 
Note of the Attorney General's Powers Distribution (Repealed) Bill, 1969, 
the 1968 Act was made for reasons not connected with the efficient work of 
the Ministry of Justice. The distribution affected only the legal powers of the 
Attorney-General to the complete disregard of the administrative powers. 
This omission had been described as having led to the unsatisfactory state of 
affairs in the Ministry. The Explanatory Note stated that the experience of 
the working of the 1968 Act, short as it was, had proved the failure of the 
distribution of powers as it resulted in the following: 
1- Overlapping of and conflict in legal jurisdictions without there being 
one person responsible as head of the Department to specify the 
jurisdictions of the three sections which have always been internal 
sections under the overall responsibility of the Attorney-General. 
2- The Ministry became disunited with its law officers divided into three 
separate groups with different loyalties. There was hence a lack of 
control and administrative supervision. 
3- The confusion of officials in the different Governmental Departments 
who found great difficulty in contacting the person concerned as they 
could not distinguish between the jurisdictions of the Solicitor-General, 
the Prosecutor -General and the Advocate-General. This resulted in a 
lot of unnecessary correspondences addressed to the Attorney-General 
without there being an Attorney-General to pass the correspondences to 
the appropriate section. 
4- Many citizens who had some work with the Ministry of Justice 
complained that they did not know whom to contact or write to in the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 The above reasons were considered adequate to justify the repeal of 
the 1968 Act. A new Act called the Ministry of Justice (Re-organization) 
Act, 1969 was enacted. Section 3 of it created the post of the Undersecretary 
and stated his functions. This had been a new development for that post 
never existed before. Its creation provided a remedy for the adverse results 
of the 1968 Act. The wording of section 3 is clear about this and it read:  
 The Undersecretary, Ministry of Justice, shall be responsible to the Minister 
of Justice for the efficient functioning of the Ministry. 
 Also section 4 of the same Act vested, by way of reference, statutory 
powers which were exercised, under the 1968 Act, by the Attorney-General, 
Solicitor-General, Advocate-General or Prosecutor-General, in the 
Undersecretary. This section read:  
 
 Any reference in any other law to the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, 
Advocate-General or Prosecutor-General shall be read and construed as a 
reference to the Undersecretary, Ministry of Justice. 
 
 The above section indicates that powers of the Attorney-General, 
which were distributed to his three deputies as specified by section 5 of the 
1969 Act, were now vested in the Undersecretary. Hence, it was decided to 
reinstate at the top of the Ministry one responsible person, the 
Undersecretary, who would be responsible to the Minister of Justice for the 
carrying out of all the technical and administrative functions which vested in 
the Attorney-General33. It could be said that the 1969 Act had abolished the 
post of the Attorney-General in favour of the Undersecretary who stepped 
into his shoes in assuming the powers that were exercised by the Attorney- 
General. 
 It has been seen above that the method of distribution of powers of the 
Attorney- General adopted by the 1968 Act had been abolished. And for any 
person to exercise the powers vested in the Undersecretary section 5 of the 
1969 Act provided for delegation of such powers as it read:  
 The Undersecretary, Ministry of Justice, may by order published in the 
Gazette, delegate all or any of the powers vested in him by virtue of this Act 
to any of his deputies, namely, the Advocate-General, the Prosecutor-
General or the Solicitor-General or any person officiating as such deputy.  
 The last issue to be dealt with in the 1969 Act is that the most senior 
person in the Ministry of Justice, as section 3 suggested, was the Minister of 
Justice himself. In this capacity he retained power to make regulations 
dealing with given matters. This had been provided for in section 6 which 
read: 
 The Minister of Justice may make regulations for carrying out the 
provisions of this Act and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the 
following matters namely: 
 
a. Organization of the Ministry of Justice. 
b. Formation of sections and distribution of work among them. 
c. Responsibilities of officers in charge of sections so formed. 
 Based on  the discussion of the provisions of both the 1968 and 1969 
Acts it must be acknowledged that all that the 1968 Act was about had been 
mere distribution of the powers of the Attorney-General. But the cardinal 
idea behind the enactment of the 1969 Act was reorganization of the work of 
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the Ministry with the Minister of Justice as the top person. On the contrary 
the top authority in the Ministry of Justice under the 1968 Act was the 
Attorney-General. 
 The continuous development of the Ministry of Justice prompted the 
repeal of the 1969 Act. An enactment named the Ministry of Justice 
(Reorganization) Act, 1972 was passed. Section 2 of this Act repealed the 
1969 Act. Section 3 allowed for the creation of the post of the Attorney-
General once more. The Attorney-General according to this section had the 
status of the President of the Supreme Court. He must,  in  accordance  with 
the provisions of section 4, be responsible, for the perfect discharge of his 
duties, to the Minister of Justice. This meant that the role of the Minister of 
Justice remained unaffected by the new legislation. Section 5 stated that any 
reference in any other law must be read and construed as reference to the 
Attorney-General. The significance of sections 3, 4 and 5 is that they 
indicate the abolition of the post of the Undersecretary in favour of that of 
the Attorney-General. As to the appointment of the Attorney-General both 
the 1968 and 1969 Acts were silent about it. But section 7 of the 1972 Act 
provided for the manner of appointment, when it stated that the President of 
the Republic, on the recommendation by the Minister of Justice, must 
appoint an Attorney General. By section 8 the Attorney General was 
empowered to delegate his powers under the 1972 Act. The form of 
delegation must be by order published in the Gazette. Such delegation ought 
to be to specific persons namely, his deputies, as referred to by section 6, i.e. 
the Advocate-General, the Prosecutor-General and the Solicitor-General or 
any person officiating as such deputy. 
 Just as it had been under 1969 Act, the Minister of Justice, as 
provided in section 10 of the 1972 Act, retained the power to make 
regulations for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 
 In 1973 a new legislation came into force. It was named the Attorney-
General's Act, 1973. Section 2 repealed the 1972 Act. Section 3 spelt out 
clearly the manner of appointment of the Attorney-General and the 
conditions required for appointment. This section read: 
 There shall be an Attorney-General for the Democratic Republic of the Sudan who 
shall be appointed by the President of the State from among persons of legal 
qualifications and experience. He shall fulfil, if possible, conditions required 
for the Supreme Court Judge. 
 
 It is important to mention that the 1973 Act was made pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 225 of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan, 1973. 
Article 197 of this Constitution, as seen previously, provided, inter alia, that 
the duties, jurisdiction and responsibilities of the Attorney-General must be 
determined by law. Of course the law referred to in that Article was the 1973 
Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 4 of that Act made 
the Attorney-General responsible for the carrying out of his functions and 
for the good performance of the Chamber, to the President of the Republic. 
But the most significant development under the 1973 Act had been that it did 
not refer whatsoever to Ministry of Justice or Minister as that had been the 
case under both the 1969 and 1972 Acts. The implication was that those 
expressions were abolished by the 1973 Act in favour of titles, the 
“Attorney- General” and the “Chambers”. By this Act the Attorney-General 
was the head of the Chambers who had been only responsible for the 
carrying out of his duties to the President of the Republic. That was not the 
case under 1972 Act which subordinated the Attorney-General to the 
Minister of Justice. 
 Section 6 established the Chambers presided over by the Attorney-
General. In accordance with the provisions of section 7 the Chambers 
comprised the Attorney- General, Undersecretary, Heads of Sections, Senior 
Legal Counsels, Assistant Legal Counsels, Officials and Workers. Section 8 
stated the manner in which the Undersecretary of the Chambers had to be 
appointed. The section gave the President of the Republic, on the 
recommendation of the Attorney-General, power to appoint the 
Undersecretary. The Undersecretary based on section 9(3) had to be 
responsible, for the discharge of his duties under section 9(1) and (2), to the 
Attorney-General. Those duties were to assist the Attorney-General in the 
carrying out of his duties, to supervise different sections of the Chambers 
and to be responsible for good performance and execution of regulations. 
 The 1973 Act went further in that it provided for the legal position of 
the Attorney-General, his functions and powers. Sub-section (1) of section 5 
provided for the legal position of the Attorney-General. He was the legal 
advisor of the State who ought in that capacity, to transact on behalf of it all 
businesses of legal character. Sub-section (2) of section 5 stated the 
functions and duties of the Attorney-General as follows: 
 Without prejudice to the generality of Sub-section (1), the Attorney 
General shall have the following functions and duties: 
 
a. to provide legal opinion on  any other matter referred to him by the 
President of the Republic and to undertake any other legal function assigned 
thereto. 
 
b. to provide Government institutions and various corporations thereof with 
legal services; 
 
c. to supervise the drafting of bills; 
 
d. to see that the rule of law is dominating and that prompt justice is prevalent 
in the legal order; 
 
e. to undertake law revision and law reform so that the laws will represent the 
true expression of the values of justice in the Sudanese society and will cope 
with the development of society; 
 
f. to exercise any functions, duties or any other powers assigned to him by any 
other law; 
 
g. to lay down laws expressing the reality of the Sudanese society, its needs 
and ethics and to achieve its aspirations and goals; 
 
h. to see that efficiency in the legal profession is improved and that proper 
rules and sound traditions for the legal profession and its ethics are laid 
down. 
 
 As the object behind paragraphs (a),  (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of section 
5(2) is clear and self-explanatory, they do not need discussion. Therefore, it 
is paragraph (d) which will be subject of discussion. The rule of law that 
ought to dominate is an important constitutional principle. It was embodied 
in Article 59 of the Permanent Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 
1973. This Article read:  
The State is subject to the Rule of Law and the Supremacy of the Rule of 
Law shall be the basis of Government. 
 The Transitional Constitution of the Sudan, 1985 in Article 11 
reiterated the above principle. But the Constitution of the Sudan, 1998, 
which is presently in force, does not contain express provision to that effect. 
There are glimpses of this principle provided for in Article 4 which reads:  
 Supremacy in the State is to God the Creator of human being and the  
sovereignty  is to the vicegerent  people of the Sudan who practice it as 
worship of God, bearing the trust, building up of the country and spreading 
justice, freedom and public consultation. The Constitution and the law shall 
regulate the same. 
 
           It must be noted that the 1998 Constitution is purely Islamic and so is 
the idea stated by Article 4 above. The glimpses of the concept of "the Rule 
of Law" are represented by the fact that the vicegerent people of the Sudan 
ought to spread justice and freedom, as the law is to regulate that. Of course 
the concept of the Rule of Law that had been enshrined in the 1973 and 1985 
Constitutions is a secular concept rid of any relation to Sharia Law. It has 
been derived from the Common Law. The extracts below support that 
argument. They provide for the following34: 
1- No man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except 
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every 
system of Government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, 
arbitrary or discretionary powers of constraints. It means in the first place, the 
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law  as  opposed  to  the  
influence of arbitrary power, and  excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of 
prerogative or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the 
Government. 
 
2- Every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of 
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. 
 
3- The general principle of the Constitution (as for example the right to personal 
liberty or the right of publication) are with us the result of judicial decisions 
determining the rights of the private persons in particular cases brought before 
the courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) 
given to the rights of individuals results, or appears to result from the general 
principles of the Constitution. Our Constitution, in short, is a judge-made 
Constitution. 
 
 The above extracts are from Dicey who divides the rule of law into 
three parts as stated. All the three parts constitute the concept of the rule of 
law, and are part and parcel of the British Constitution which is a judge-
made Constitution. 
 Besides the functions and duties of the Attorney-General stipulated in 
section 5 of the 1973 Act, he had powers under sections 12, 13 and 14. 
Section 12 empowered him to appear and litigate, before all courts, on 
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behalf of the State. Section 13 gave him discretion to make use of legal 
experience outside the Chambers when he deems this reasonable. Section14 
also empowered the Attorney-General to make regulations for the execution 
of the provisions of the 1973 Act. The powers provided for under sections 
12 and 13 were not expressly provided for in all the Acts precedent to 1973 
Act. As for the one stated under section 14 it used to be exercised under both 
the 1969 and 1972 Acts by the Minister of Justice other than the Attorney-
General as that was the case in 1973 Act. The 1968 Act was silent about all 
that as the only object had been distribution of the Attorney-General's 
powers. Another inference to be made about the 1973 Act is that it did not 
contain any provision in connection with delegation of powers whatsoever 
as that had been the practice under the 1969 and 1972 Acts. 
 Given the provisions of the 1973 Act it must be acknowledged from 
the outset that it was much comprehensive and detailed than all the 
preceding Acts relating to the Ministry of Justice. It unprecendentedly and 
expressly described the Attorney- General as the Legal Advisor of the State 
who must perform specific duties as enumerated in section 5. It was this 
comprehensive nature of the Act which prompted, in our opinion, the repeal 
of the 1972 Act. The 1973 Act also had another unique character which it 
shared with the 1968 Act. They were both exclusive about the Attorney-
General. No mention of the Minister of Justice was ever made under both 
Acts. 
 In 1981 another legislative development, relative to the Attorney 
General , occurred. This was represented by the Attorney General's Act, 
1981 section 3 of which repealed the 1973 Act. The Act introduced, under 
section 3 interpretation of certain expressions contained therein.  
 It must be pointed out that the preceding repealed enactment did not 
contain a provision similar to that of section 3 above. This had been entirely 
a new development.  
 The establishment of the Chambers and its composition were 
maintained under the 1981 Act. Section 10 of this Act reiterated the 
provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the 1973 Act. It read: 
(1) The Attorney-General shall have Chambers and shall have supervision over its 
order and administration and shall be responsible for good performance therein. 
 
(2) The Chambers shall consist of the Attorney-General, the Undersecretary, Heads 
of Administrations and all other Legal Advisors, Officials and Workers of the 
Chambers. 
 
 With exception to conditions required for the appointment of the 
Supreme Court Judges, section 4 of the 1981 Act preserved and reiterated 
the provisions of section 3 of the 1973 Act. Hence, it was enough, in order 
for a person to be appointed as an Attorney-General, to be from among 
persons of good manners and high legal qualifications. Similarly, the 1981 
provided for the legal position, functions and powers of the Attorney-
General. Section 5(1) repeated exactly the provisions of section 5(1) of the 
1973 Act. We have already dealt with that and there is no need to discuss it 
again here. Concerning the functions of the Attorney-General section 5(2) 
read: 
 Without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (1) and in addition to any 
functions conferred thereon by any other law, the Attorney-General shall 
have the following functions: 
 
a. To see that the rule of law is dominating and that prompt justice is prevalent. 
 
b. To see that efficiency in the legal profession is improved and that proper rules 
and sound traditions for the legal profession and its ethics are laid down. 
 
c. To undertake law revision and law reform so that the laws will represent the 
true expression of the values of justice in the Sudanese Society and will cope 
with the development of the society. 
 
d. To encourage legal research and studies and publish the same. 
e. To draft bills and all other legislative provisions of the State. 
f. To supervise the conduct of criminal cases, inquiry therein and to undertake 
prosecution before criminal courts. 
 
g. To provide or supervise the provision of Government institutions with legal 
services, drafting of decisions, contracts and agreements with legal advice 
respecting any activity or dispute involving such institutions and to represent 
them before the competent tribunals. 
 
h. To give legal advice on matters arising between Government institutions and 
shall conduct arbitration in civil disputes arising between these institutions. 
 
i. To undertake the registration of dealings and authentication of documents and 
to take legal attestations and issue the same in accordance with the law. 
 
j. To provide legal services for the public such as legal advice and legal aid in 
litigation. 
 
k. To undertake any other legal functions assigned to him by the President of the 
Republic. 
 
 It is clear that functions under (a), (b) and (c) above were part of 
section 5(2) of the 1973 Act. They survived the repeal of that Act and hence 
were embodied in the new Act. Also (d) is clear and self-explanatory and 
therefore it does not need any further explanation. Supervision, inquiry into 
and prosecution of accused persons before criminal courts, as stated under 
(f), was done in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. The details of this will be discussed when we examine the 
powers of the Attorney-General under that Code. The provisions under (g) 
are reiteration of section 5(2) (b) of the repealed Act but in an enlarged and 
detailed form. It had been in conformity with the fact that the Attorney-
General, as provided for under section 5(1), had been and is still the legal 
advisor of the State who must carry out on its behalf all businesses of legal 
character. Likewise the function under (h) supports the argument we have 
just advanced. But the legal advice so given under paragraph (h) is restricted 
to matters arising between Government institutions. This clearly excludes 
those matters arising between Government institutions and 
non-governmental bodies or individuals. The form of that legal advice, its 
effect and the manner in which it is to be objected against are regulated by 
section 7 which read: 
1- A legal advice relating to civil disputes signed by the Attorney-General shall be 
binding on all State institutions and shall not be rejected save with the consent 
of the President of the Republic. 
 
2- A legal advice tendered by any legal advisor in the Chambers relating to any 
civil dispute shall be binding on such State institutions unless revised by the 
Attorney-General by his own motion or an appeal to him. 
 
 It is unequivocal that legal advice tendered, either by the 
Attorne-General or by any legal advisor in the Chambers, must relate to civil 
disputes between Government institutions. It must be signed by the 
Attorney-General, which means that it must be in writing. The form of a 
legal advice tendered in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) is 
not clear. No writing and signature is required. But the fact that it is subject 
to revision by the Attorney-General implies that it ought to be in writing and 
signed by the Legal Advisor making it. Or else it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Attorney-General to revise an oral legal 
advice for the exact text of it will be almost untraceable. Both sub-sections 
of section 7 give a legal advice issued by the Attorney-General or legal 
advisor binding effect. It is binding on the State institutions unless altered or 
cancelled by the President of the Republic when made by the Attorney-
General or revised by the Attorney-General when made by a legal advisor. 
The problem with section 7 or rather the whole of 1981 Act is that it does 
not provide for any mechanism for enforcing legal advice so tendered. This 
glaring lacuna in the law encourages government institutions, with impunity, 
to totally disregard or be reluctant in implementing it. This, in civil disputes, 
has seriously shaken the credibility of the Attorney-General Chambers as a 
law enforcing institution35. 
 Another duty of the Attorney-General contained in (h) is that he must 
conduct arbitration. This arbitration is confined to civil disputes arising 
between Government institutions. Section 8 spelt out the legal effect of the 
arbitration so conducted and the manner in which it should be appealed 
against. This section read: 
1- If any dispute shall arise between two State institutions, the Attorney-
General may, on submission of the dispute to him direct that such dispute 
be referred to arbitration. 
 
2- An award made under sub-section (1) hereof shall bind the parties thereof 
but may be appealed against to the Attorney-General whose decision shall 
be binding and final. 
 
 The wording of sub-section (1) above suggests that, in order for 
Attorney-General to exercise this function a dispute must have been 
submitted to him by at least one of the parties thereto. He cannot force the 
parties to submit the same to him. But once a dispute is submitted and 
referred to arbitration the outcome of the arbitration is binding unless 
appealed against to the Attorney- General whose decision is binding and 
final. But the inherent defect of this section is similar to that of section 7 
already considered. It is lack   of   provision   for  the  enforcement   of  the   
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decision   of   the Attorney-General should any of the parties resist the 
award. When a dispute is referred to arbitration in accordance with section 8 
its disposal is done in accordance with the rules laid down in the Attorney-
General's (Arbitration Between the State Institutions) Regulation, 1981. 
Sections 3 of the Regulations disallows litigation between the Government 
institutions except with the leave of the Attorney-General who, under section 
5(1), constitutes Board of Arbitration. An award made on the strength of 
section 8 is subject, if appealed against, to confirmation or alteration or 
rejection by the Attorney-General under section 9 of the Regulation and his 
decision is final and binding on the institutions concerned. The rules 
governing arbitration before the courts are laid down under sections 139-156 
of the Civil Procedure Act, 198336. 
 The Attorney-General as stated under (i) must perform the functions 
of registration of dealings, authentication of documents and taking of legal 
attestations. Registration of dealings is regulated by law e.g. companies are 
registered under the Companies Act, 1925. Authentication of documents and 
taking of legal attestations are parts of powers given to the Attorney-General 
under section 6(3) of the 1981 Act. This sub-section read: 
 The Attorney-General shall have power to authenticate documents, take 
affidavits and administer oaths in accordance with the regulations. The law 
regulating this part is Order 3 of the  first  schedule   attached to  the  Civil  
Procedure Act, 1983 37. 
 
 The last specific function of the Attorney-General is provided for 
under (j). Some of the  instances considered  as  provision of legal services 
to the public is legal advice. This implies that it is rendered free. In relation 
to legal aid it is confined to criminal cases. The legal basis had  been  section 
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212  of  the  repealed Criminal Procedure Act, 1974. The conditions for 
granting it by the Attorney- General are laid down by that section which 
read: 
 Every person accused before any criminal court may as of right be defended 
by a pleader, provided that in the case of serious offences if the accused is a 
pauper, the Attorney-General, on application by the accused and if satisfied 
it is necessary in the interest of justice, shall appoint an advocate to defend 
the accused and pay all or part of the costs. 
 
 According to this section an accused person may as of right be 
defended by an advocate to be appointed, on application by the accused, by 
the Attorney-General. But before enjoying this right there are conditions to be 
met. That  the  offence  charged  must  be a serious one, the accused must 
show that he is a pauper and the Attorney-General must be satisfied that 
appointment of an advocate to defend the accused is in the interest of justice. 
If all these conditions are satisfied an advocate ought to be appointed and the 
Attorney-General must pay all or part of the costs. The 1974 Act was repealed 
but the position remained unchanged. Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure 
act, 1983 exactly repeated the letter of section 212. Again the 1983 Act was 
repealed and a new Criminal Procedure Act, 1991 has emerged. It is the law 
presently in force. Sub-section 3 of section 135 of this Act states that if an 
accused, charged of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of 10 
years or more, amputation or death, is a pauper the Attorney-General, on the 
application by the accused, must appoint an advocate to defend the accused. 
The State must pay all or part of the costs. Under this section there are specific 
instances that justify appointment of a pleader, as it had been the position 
under the 1983 Act. The fact that the Attorney-General must be satisfied that 
it is necessary and in the interest of justice to appoint such a pleader is no 
longer part of the law. But in all cases the accused must be proven to be a 
pauper.  
 The last item on the list of the functions of the Attorney-General is 
provided under paragraph (k). He must discharge any other legal functions 
assigned to him by the President of the Republic. This was not the case 
under the 1973 Act, which obliged him to perform any other functions, 
duties or powers assigned to him by any other law.  
 In addition to functions we have discussed above, the Attorney-
General had powers specified by the 1981 Act under sections 6, 9, 15 and 
20. Section 6 read: 
(1) The Attorney-General shall have power with respect to any dispute under 
his consideration to call any public servant to give any evidence or to order 
him to offer any information or submit any documents. Such power of the 
Attorney- General shall be as that of the courts regarding appearance and 
giving of evidence. 
 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the  Attorney-General 
shall have power to take cognizance  of any offence, to enquire thereinto 
and to undertake  prosecution and he shall have in this respect all the  
powers contained in any law regulating enquiry  especially in the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1974 with the  exception of the powers contained in sections 
119 and  120(2) thereof. 
 
b)  The Attorney-General shall exercise in particular all the powers contained in 
Chapters (vi) and (xii) of the  Criminal Procedure Act, 1974. 
 
(c)  All persons on whom powers are vested on the    commencement of this Act 
for holding enquiry in  accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act, or any   
other law shall continue to exercise such power subject  to any subsequent 
order of the Attorney-General  exercising or regulating such power.  
 
(3) The Attorney-General shall have power to authenticate documents, take 
affidavits and administer oaths in accordance with the regulations. 
 
 Given the provisions of sub-section (1) above the power vested in the 
Attorney- General relates only to disputes that are under his consideration. 
This implies that those which are not so must be excluded as they do not fall 
within the ambit of this sub-section. The person to be called upon by the 
Attorney-General to give evidence, offer information or submit documents 
must be a public servant38.  
 The court’s power regarding appearance and giving of evidence had 
been under section 85 of the repealed Civil Procedure Act, 1974. Under 
section 86 of the same Act there were punitive measures against those who 
neglect, refuse to obey summons or fail to comply with it without lawful 
excuse or have intentionally avoided service. Those measures were arrest of 
such a person, attachment of property or fine. The Civil Procedure Act, 1983 
which repealed the 1974 Act has adopted similar course with the exception 
of attachment of property. This is clear under section 85(2) which states that 
where such a person does not appear, or appears but fails to satisfy the court, 
the court may impose a fine on him as it thinks reasonable. 
 Section 6(2)(a) gives the Attorney-General power to take cognizance   
of  any  offence,  to  enquire  thereto  and  to  undertake prosecution. He 
exercises these powers irrespective of any other law to the contrary. In so 
doing he is to have all powers in any law regulating enquiry especially in the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1974. But he should not exercise powers provided 
for under sections 119 and 120(2). Section 119 required medical 
examination of suspect and taking of finger prints and photographs by a 
magistrate or policeman when that was in the interest of justice, trial, 
interrogation or investigation. 
  
 Section 120(2) gave the Magistrate, from time to time, the discretion, 
on the application of the officer in charge of a police station, to authorize 
detention of the accused under arrest in such custody as he deemed 
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expedient for a time not exceeding fifteen days. If he refused to authorize 
detention of the accused under arrest he ought to make an order of discharge 
unless he took bail. In case the police investigation was not completed 
within fifteen days the magistrate could remand the accused in custody as 
stated under section 236. 
The 1974 Act was repealed by the criminal Procedure Act, 1983. Sections 
129, 130 and 131 reiterated the provisions of sections 119 and 120(2) of the 
repealed Act. The only addition was the introduction of 'Attorney' as a 
separate authority to exercise, alternatively with the Magistrate or 
policeman, the power provided for under these three sections namely, 
subjection of suspect to medical examination, taking of fingerprints and 
taking of photographs during interrogation or trial as the case may be. 
Hence, the Magistrate had two exclusive powers under the aforementioned 
sections. They were the taking of fingerprints and photographs during trial 
and the remand of an accused person in custody during investigation. But the 
position now, under the Criminal Procedure Act, is quite different. The 
powers under sections 119and 120(2) of the 1974 Act or sections 129, 130 
and 131 of the 1983 Act have now been vested in both the Attorney and 
Police Officer in charge of a Police Station. As to remand of accused 
persons in custody section 79 of the 1991 Act empowers the Attorney to do 
the same for not more than three days if investigation cannot be finished 
within twenty four hours. Remand in custody for longer period is exercised 
by a Magistrate on the recommendation by Attorney on grounds to be 
recorded in the case diary provided that the period should not exceed two 
weeks. Section 79 also empowers a senior Magistrate to authorize remand in 
custody of an accused for a period not exceeding six months with the 
consent of the Head of the Judicial Panel concerned. 
 The powers vested in the Attorney-General by section 6(1) and (2) (a) 
are not the only ones given to him by that section. There are other powers 
under sub-sections (2) (b) and (3) of the same section. Under paragraph (b) 
he is vested with powers contained in Chapters (vi) and (xii) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1974. Chapter (vi) dealt with means to secure the production 
or discovery of documents and other things; and for the discovery and 
discharge of persons unlawfully confined. This comprised search during 
pursuit, summons to produce documents and searches generally and orders 
for production or discharge of persons. Chapter (xii) related to power of the 
Attorney-General in investigation and procedure. These two Chapters were 
preserved under the 1983 Criminal Procedure Act. Their contents remained 
unchanged except for the expressions 'Attorney-General' which were deleted 
and replaced by expressions "Attorney or Police Officer". The Attorney or 
Police Officer were to step into the shoes of the Attorney-General in 
discharging his powers during investigation. 
 In connection with the powers entrusted to the Attorney-General 
under section 6(3) we have already dealt with them when we examined the 
functions of the Attorney-General under section 5(2). Ostensibly the prima 
facie aim underlying introduction of section 6(2) (a)(b) has been to give the 
Attorney-General and his representative wide powers of investigation of 
offences. This has been a major departure from the past when the Judge 
alone predominantly discharged those powers. But the legislature, as a 
matter of policy, did not intend to end abruptly the powers of those who held 
enquiry or investigation into offences as well as taking cognizance thereof as 
so doing might not be in the interest of justice. The legislature wanted the 
process to be transitional and gradual. This has been the rationale behind 
section 6(2)(c). The most important judicial precedent on section 6 is the 
case of Sudan Government v. Mirghani Gaafer Hadra and Another39. In that 
case the court clearly explained the provisions of section 6 as follows: 
1. The principal object of section 6 of the Attorney-General's Act, 1981 is the 
abolition of previous unnatural procedure whereby the Magistrate 
exercised over the investigation and the  preparation  of  the  prosecution 
case and would therefore try the case. The section therefore, vests the 
powers of taking cognizance of the offence, the investigation thereof and 
undertaking the prosecution in the Attorney-General. He also has all the 
powers contained in any law regulating investigation especially in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Though the section provides that the court 
and other persons shall continue to exercise powers vested in them that 
exercise shall be subject to any subsequent order of the Attorney-General 
exercising or regulating such power. Thus he may suggest any accusation 
appropriate at any stage of the investigation   whether   he   initially  took  
cognizance  of  the offence or perused the investigation which was 
previously undertaken by a person other than himself. 
 
2. Where the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence he  may refuse 
detention of an accused in custody if he thinks that the offence of which a 
person is accused is less serious than the one suggested by the Attorney 
General's representative and it is bailable. However, the converse is not 
correct; he may not order the alteration of the accusation to more serious 
or grave one and may not refuse to set accused free where the Attorney 
General's representative has nothing to justify his detention in custody. 
 
3.  All courts below erred in deciding that the investigation was completed 
when the case was referred to the Magistrate for fixing a date for 
magisterial inquiry. The investigation papers remained to be un-sworn 
statement and collection of informations which might lead to admissible 
evidence and they are subject to the direct verification control of the 
Attorney-General or his representative therefore the Magistrate has no 
power with respect to the same except after the beginning of the 
magisterial inquiry or trial by hearing the evidence according to the usual 
procedure.  
 
 In fact as a matter of law we have seen previously that despite the 
introduction of section 6 there are things, though during investigation, the 
Attorney-General or his representative cannot do as they are beyond the 
limits of his legal powers. These things are remand in custody of an accused 
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person. But after the enactment of the 1991 Act his representative can now 
remand in custody for only three days if the investigation cannot be 
completed within twenty four hours. The power of the Attorney-General or 
his representative respecting investigation also ceases after the beginning of 
the magisterial inquiry. Another limitation is that recording of judicial 
confession of a crime committed by an accused is an exclusive power of a 
judge even if it is made during investigation just like the other two 
limitations. It is to be noted that since the enactment of the 1983 Criminal 
Procedure Act magisterial inquiry ceased to be part of our law. Another 
observation is that the court when it discussed section 6 referred only to one 
limitation, which is the beginning of the magisterial inquiry. The other two 
were not subject of discussion in that case. 
 Section 9 of the Attorney General's Act, 1981 endowed the Attorney-
General with power of appearance and litigation. In fact his representative 
exercises the same when appearing and litigating on his behalf40  . This 
section read: 
  The Attorney-General and his representatives from the Legal Advisors shall 
have power to appear and litigate before all courts. 
 Likewise he has power to make use of legal experience outside the 
Chambers. This implies that the persons being made use of are not Legal 
Advisors within the meaning of section 3 of the 1981 Act. The legal basis 
for him to do so is section 15 which read: 
 The Attorney-General may make use of legal experience outside the 
Chambers when he deems this reasonable.  
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 The last power under the 1981 Act is that of making regulations for 
the execution of the provisions of the Act. It was provided for under section 
20 which read: 
 The Attorney-General may make regulations for the execution of the 
provisions of this Act. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing 
such regulations may provide for the following: 
a) The organization skeleton of the Chambers and the methods of legal and 
administrative work and related matters. 
 
b) Establishment and constitutions of the administrations of the Chambers 
and specification of their functions and manner of responsibility and 
supervision over them. 
 
c) The conditions and procedure governing appointments, promotion and 
training of legal advisors. 
 
d) Procedure governing settlement of disputes among state institutions , 
tendering and revision of legal advice. 
 
e) Limits and rules governing legal services offered to the public. 
 
 Before ending discussion on the powers of the Attorney- General 
under the 1981 Act it must be acknowledged that powers entrusted to him by 
that Act are wider in scope than those under 1973 Act. Those under section 6 
are entirely new as they were not entrusted to him before the coming into 
force of the 1981 Act. But powers under sections 9, 15 and 20 are just mere 
repetition of similar ones that existed under the repealed Act of 1973. 
 We now turn to discuss the functions of the Undersecretary. We have 
seen previously under section 20 of the 1981 Act that the Undersecretary 
holds the second place after the Attorney-General in the composition and 
constitution of the Chambers. This important position gives him functions 
under section 12 which reads: 
(1) T
he Undersecretary shall assist the Attorney-General in the performance 
of his duties and shall have supervision over the different 
administrations of the Chambers and shall see to good performance 
therein. 
(2) T
he Undersecretary shall discharge the duties of the Attorney-General and 
exercise his powers in his absence. 
(3) T
he Undersecretary shall be responsible before the Attorney-General for 
the performance of his duties. 
 
 As to what necessiated the repeal of the 1973 Act it is apparent that 
the immensity of the functions and powers vested in the Attorney-General as 
a result of extensive progress of the country within the period after the 
enactment of the 1973 Act must have promoted the making of a new 
legislation coping with that immense increase in the legal work with which 
the Attorney-General was endowed. Hence, the 1981 Act came into being. 
This Act like its predecessor of 1973 is only about the Attorney-General. It 
has abolished the post of Minister of Justice. 
 The organization and improvement on legislation pertaining to the 
affairs of the Attorney-General continued. The latest legislation to this effect 
has been the Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983 section 2 of which 
repealed the 1981 Act. This is now the legislation in force. Section 3 of the 
new Act, which deals with interpretation of expressions and phrases, does 
not contain expression 'Chambers' as that had been the case under the 
corresponding section of the repealed Act. The word adopted now is 
'Ministry' as the word 'Chambers' has been deleted in its favour. Section 4 
also does not refer any more to the Attorney-General. Instead it refers to 
Minister of Justice with the same manner of appointment and qualifications 
exactly as it had been under the old Act. Hence, it transpires that those 
words and phrases like "Chambers' and 'Attorney-General' are not any 
longer part of the law. At present sections 5, 6, 9 and 40 enable the Minister 
of Justice to perform the same legal functions and powers which used to be 
discharged by his predecessor under sections 5, 6, 9 and 20 of the repealed 
Act and any other reference., under the old law, to the Attorney-General and 
Chambers thereof is now to be construed as reference to Minister and 
Ministry of Justice. Of course the legal position of the Attorney-General as 
the legal advisor of the State who ought to carry out on its behalf all 
businesses of legal character, is now entrusted to the Minister of Justice. The 
functions of the Minister of Justice are word by word the same ones which 
used to be carried out by the Attorney-General under section 5 of the 1981 
Act. The only new thing is that the Minister, when exercising his functions, 
must take into consideration the provisions of the Constitution which is at 
the moment the 1998 Constitution or any other Constitution for the time 
being in force. We have dealt with the functions of the Attorney-General, 
now Minister of Justice, before and since they are intact under the new Act 
we need not repeat them again. As far as legal advice tendered by the 
Minister of Justice and any of his representatives from legal advisors, in 
accordance with section 7 of the 1983 Act, is concerned the position has 
remained the same. This section has been re-embodied in the new Act with 
those shortcomings and deficiencies we have already pointed out. 
 The 1983 Act also carries provisions which are in fact repetition of the 
ones under the repealed Act. They provide for regulation of arbitration by 
the Minister of Justice, constitution and administration of the Ministry of 
Justice, manner of appointing the Undersecretary and his functions41. All 
those matters have been dealt with before. But strangely enough the Act 
                                                 
41 See ss. 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983. 
 
does not refer in any way to the legal position, functions or powers of the 
State Minister of Justice despite the fact that he has already been appointed. 
Indeed the Constitution of the Sudan, 1998 does not contain any explicit 
provisions to this effect. As to the manner in which the State Minister of 
Justice is appointed, the President of the Republic, as provided for in Article 
43 (a) of the Constitution,  has  the  power   to  appoint  holders  of  
constitutional federal posts. Surely, the State Minister of Justice is a holder 
of constitutional federal post and hence is appointed in the aforesaid manner. 
How the Courts deal with this situation will be considered when we discuss 
the functions of the Minister of Justice under the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1991. The 1983 Act has entirely introduced new provisions. Therefore, as a 
first development of its kind, courts are debarred from deciding over 
objections against decisions appointing legal counsels. Section 31 regulates 
termination of service respecting legal counsels. The grounds on which such 
service terminates are retirement on pension by reason of age, resignation or 
normal removal for public interest42.  
 In my view the rapidity of the development of legal functions and 
powers entrusted to the Attorney-General since 1968, when the first 
legislation was made, until 1983 the year in which the legislation now in 
force was enacted, is the central reason for the frequent changes that affected 
enactments pertaining to the Attorney- General. The emergence of the 1983 
Act  and the grounds which necessiated the same are attributed to the same 
fact. On the face of it the  1983  Act  is  characterized  by immensity of the 
legal provisions. This  made  mere  amendment  of  the  1981  Act 
inappropriate and hence prompted its repeal.  
 (ii) The Revised Edition of the Laws Act, 1974:  
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 The functions of the Minister of Justice under the Ministry of Justice 
Organization Act, 1983 are inter alia to undertake law revision and law 
reform. The object being that laws should represent the true expression of 
the values of justice in the Sudanese Society and should cope with the 
development of Society. To carry out this function he is empowered under 
this Act to revise and prepare a revised edition of the laws in force43. The 
Attorney General used to carry out the same in accordance with the 
provisions of the Revised Edition of the Laws Ordinance, 1954 which was 
repealed by the 1974 Act. But as stipulated under section 4 of the Act 
nothing in it is to be construed to empower the Minister to make any 
amendment  or  alteration  in  the  matter or in the  substance  of any 
enactment without the approval of the legislature. Despite this exception the 
Minister of Justice has under the Act specific powers to enable him to 
perform his function. These powers are: 
1. To omit: 
a) all Acts which have been expressly and specifically repealed or which have 
expired or have become spent or have had their full effect; 
b) all repealing Acts as well as tables or schedules attached thereto; 
c)     amendment of the Acts embodied in such Acts in exercise of the powers of 
the Minister of Justice as authorized by this Act; 
d) any Act repealed after 31st. December, 1974 but before the publication of the 
revised edition; 
e) any preamble to any Act where such omission can in the opinion of the 
Minister of Justice conveniently be made; 
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f)  any provisions in any Act prescribing the date when an Act or part thereof 
is to come into force, where such omission can, in the opinion of the 
Minister of Justice, conveniently be made; 
g) any enacting clauses; 
 
2. To consolidate into the Act any two or more Acts in parimateria making 
the alteration thereby rendered necessary and affixing such date thereto 
as may seem most convenient. 
3. To include in any Act all amendments made from the date of its coming 
into force up to date of editing the revised edition. 
4. To make such adaptation or alteration in any Act that may appear to be 
necessarily proper as a consequence of constitutional changes or 
executive reorganization resulting therefrom. 
5. To alter the order of any section of any Act and in all cases where it may 
appear necessary to renumber any section. 
6. To alter the frame or arrangement of any sections of any Act by 
transferring words or by combining such sections or by dividing it into 
two or more sub-sections. 
7. To divide any Act or consolidate it into parts or divisions. 
8. To transfer any provision contained in any Act to any other Act to which 
the Minister considers that it more properly belongs. 
9. To arrange any Act or consolidated Act into any sequence or group that 
may be convenient. 
10. To add any title or short title to any Act which may be required by it and 
to alter the title or short title of any Act. 
11. To add or alter any index or schedule in any Act. 
12. To add or alter marginal notes in any Act. 
13. To correct cross-references in any Act. 
14. To shorten or simplify the drafting of any Act. 
15. To correct grammatical and typographical errors in any Act and for that 
purpose to make verbal additions, omissions or alterations not affecting 
the meaning of any Act. 
16. To include any agreement or treaty which is in his opinion ought properly 
to be included in the revised edition 
17. To make such alterations of the non-enclosure and titles of subsidiary 
legislation as may appear desirable. 
18. To make an authentic Arabic translation of any Act that was originally 
promulgated in English. 
19. To do all things relating to form and method which appear necessary to 
him for the perfection of the revised edition. 
 (iii) The Civil Procedure Act, 1983: 
 The Civil Procedure Act, 1983 is not the country's foremost 
legislation in the field of Civil Procedure. The first legislation had been the 
Civil Justice Ordinance, 1900 which we could not trace. Then followed the 
Civil Justice Ordinance, 1929that repealed it. The relevant section is section 
109 which read: 
 
(1) No suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public 
servant in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public servant in 
his official capacity unless and until either the plaintiff or the court to which 
his plaint is presented shall  have served notice in writing of the claim or of 
the intention to institute proceedings on the Advocate-General and two 
months (or such shorter period as the Advocate-General shall agree) shall 
have elapsed after such service. 
(2) Such notice shall state with all necessary particulars the cause of action, the 
name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which 
he claims. 
 It is important to show that section 2 of the Attorney-General's 
Powers Distribution Act, 1968 conforms to the above section in that 
service of notice of the claim or of the intention to institute proceedings 
against the Government or public servant in respect of any act 
purporting to be done by him in his official capacity, in the prescribed 
manner, was to be made on the Advocate-General as he legally 
represented and litigated on behalf of the Government, in civil suits, 
before all courts of jurisdiction. 
 The legal effect of allowing a suit against the Government or public 
servant in respect of an act done by such public servant in his official 
capacity in violation of the provisions of section 109 was thoroughly 
discussed in the Sudanese case of Coptic Benevolent Society of Atbara v. 
Administrator General, Sudan Government44. The facts of the case are as 
follows: Plaintiff  Society submitted petition to the High Court, applying  for  
a  declaration  that  a  gift  made in favour of the Society was a valid gift and 
should be registered. On being notified the Administrator General replied 
that any suit against him in his capacity as an administrator of an estate is a 
suit against the Sudan Government and consequently notice of a claim or 
intention to institute proceedings must be served on the Advocate-General 
before suit can be instituted. It was held, firstly, that a suit  may  not  be 
allowed against Administrator General as a personal representative of a 
deceased person unless and until notice has been given to the Advocate-
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General as provided in the Civil Justice Ordinance, 1929. Secondly, where 
action has been allowed in the absence of such notice, it is wrongfully 
allowed and the suit must be struck out. The court itself may but is under no 
obligation to give the required notice. The argument on which the Court 
proceeded is that section 109 of the Civil Justice Ordinance is explicit. It is 
not permissive and permits of no exception. A Court is debarred from 
entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with its provisions. The 
plaint must be rejected until the notice of the claim has been served either by 
the plaintiff or the Court and the prescribed period has, unless waived, 
elapsed. Obviously, this irregular state of things could not stand, and the 
learned Judge of the High Court acted in accordance with the law in striking 
out this suit which should not have been allowed. 
 The consequence of striking out a suit for want of notice is explained 
by the Court as follows:  
 The order did not imply a judicial decision on the merits of the claim 
and the claim is not res judicata. 
 The rationale behind service of notice is explained by the Court in a 
subsequent case of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan v. Khalid 
Mohamed El- Haj 45 as follows: 
 
1. The object of the notice required by section 33(3) of the Civil Procedure Act 
is to give the Attorney-General an opportunity to reconsider his legal 
position and to make amends or settle the claim without litigation. And that 
a notice under this section should be held to be sufficient if it fulfills its 
objective. 
2. The privilege granted to Government institutions under section 33(3) does 
not prejudice in any way the rights of litigants. Hence, in computing the 
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period of limitation prescribed for a suit the period of notice should be 
excluded. 
 The above judgement is based on a quotation from a book on Civil 
Procedure46:  
 
 That the object of the notice required by this section is to give the 
Secretary of the State or the Public Officer an opportunity to reconsider 
his legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if advised 
without litigation. There has been a large body of decisions that a notice 
under this section should be held to be sufficient if it substantially fulfils 
its object. On computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit 
under this section, the period of notice should be excluded. 
 Of course the Civil Justice Ordinance, 1929 had been repealed by the 
Civil Procedure Act, 1974. Section 33(3) of 1974 Act which was the subject 
of discussion in the Khalid's case provided:  
 No suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public 
servant in respect of any act purporting to be done by such  public  servant  
in  his  official  capacity  or  during or by reason of discharge of his duty 
unless and until either the plaintiff or the Court as the case may be shall 
have served notice of the claim or of the intention to institute proceedings 
on the Attorney-General and two months (or such shorter period as the 
Attorney-General shall agree) shall have elapsed after such service. 
 
 The most significant difference between section 109 of the Ordinance 
and section 33(3) of the 1974 Act is that service of notice under the latter is 
made on the Attorney-General. When a suit is instituted against the 
Government or Public Servant, service of summons must be made on the 
Attorney-General in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of the 
1974 Act which stated:  
 Where the Government or any department or unit of the Government 
is sued, the summons shall be served on the Attorney-General. 
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 It is to be emphasized that institution of such suits and hence service 
of summons under section 49 cannot be possible unless and until the 
plaintiff complies with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 33. And 
when a suit is allowed by the Court against the Government or Public 
Servant it is conceivable that the Court may decide in favour of the plaintiff 
and hence such decision is capable of execution against the Government in 
accordance with the provisions of section 233 of the 1974 Act. This section 
read: 
(1) Where the decree is against the Government or against a Public Servant in 
respect of any such act as aforesaid in section 33(3) a time shall be specified 
in the decree within which at the expiration of such time the Court shall report 
the case to the Chief Justice. 
(2) Execution shall not be issued on any such decree unless it remains unsatisfied 
for a period of three months from the date of such report. 
 
 The Attorney-General also had, as member on the Rules Committee, 
joint functions under section 304 which read: 
(1) A committee to be known as the "Rules Committee", shall be established 
consisting of the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General and the Deputies to the 
Chief Justice and two Supreme Court Judges to be nominated by the Chief 
Justice. 
 
(2) The Rules Committee may from time to time make rules regulating the 
procedure of the Courts. 
 
(3) The Rules Committee may from time to time make any procedural rules not 
provided for in this Act if the ends of justice so demand. 
 
(4) Rules relating to the assessment and payment of fees shall require the consent 
of the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. 
 
 There is proviso in section 305 (1) that rules made by the Rules 
Committee under section 304 must not be inconsistent with the provisions of 
Civil Procedure Act, 1974. And section 305(2) provided for matters to be 
regulated by the Rules Committee namely: 
a) the serving of summons notices and other processes by post or in any other 
manner and the proof of such service; 
 
b) security for costs; 
 
c) the valuation of suits, appeals and other proceedings for the purpose of this 
Act; 
 
d) the taking of evidence or oath in proceedings before arbitrators; 
 
e) the assessment and payment of fees payable with reference to any suit, 
proceeding, appeal, order, notice or others or any business conducted by or 
before the Court or an official of the Court; 
 
f) the costs, charges and expenses to be allowed to parties, witnesses, experts, 
arbitrators, agents, advocates and others; 
 
g) the proof of any matter by affidavit; 
h) all forms, registers, books, entries and accounts which may be necessary or desirable 
for the transaction of the business of Civil Courts. 
 
 The Attorney-General also has a role to play in the interpretation of 
the Constitution and legislation in accordance with the provisions of section 
320 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1974 which read: 
1. The Supreme Court is competent to interpret the Constitution and any laws on 
the application of the Attorney-General. 
2. The Attorney-General, may of his own motion or on the application of the 
interested parties, submit an application for interpretation, if he is satisfied 
that the nature and importance of the provisions submitted require such 
interpretation to ensure consistency in their application 47. 
 
 What the application referred to in sub-section (2) above should 
contain is provided for in section 321.  
Disposal of the application for interpretation is done by the Court in 
accordance  with   the  provisions  of  section   322  which  made  it 
imperative for the Court to hear and determine the same on the documents 
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contained in the record. The Attorney-General may be called upon by the 
Court to file further statements or explanations. 
 The legislation now in force is the Civil Procedure Act, 1983 which  
repealed  the  Civil  Procedure  Act, 1974. Section  33 of this Act provides, 
with important modifications, for the manner in which suits are to be 
instituted generally. As provided for by sub-section (3) of this section suits 
by or against any of the State institutions, must be instituted by or against 
named institutions.  
 The State institutions referred to in section 33(3)are defined in sub-
section 5 to mean the Federal Government, State Governments, Local 
Government Institutions, Public Corporations and Public Sector Companies. 
Both the 1929 Ordinance and 1974 Act did not contain similar provisions. 
In order for a plaint to be allowed by the Court the plaintiff has to comply 
with section 33(4). It provides that no suit is to be instituted against any of 
the State institutions or against a public servant in respect of any act 
purporting to be done by such public servant in his official capacity or 
during or by reason of discharge of his duty unless and until the plaintiff 
must have served notice of the claim or of the intention to institute 
proceedings on the Minister of Justice or his representative and two months 
or such shorter period as the Minister of Justice or his representative must 
agree must have elapsed after such service. Given these provisions it is 
explicit that, unlike section 33(3)  of the Civil Procedure Act, 1974, service 
of notice is exclusive obligatory business of the plaintiff who has to make it 
on the Minister of Justice48. The effect of failure to comply with that and the 
object of service of notice have already been considered under both the 
Ordinance and Act. The ruling that the striking out of a suit for want of 
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notice is not on the merits of the claim and hence the claim is not res 
judicata is here also true. 
 The rule in section 33(4) seems to have exceptions given the practice 
of the Sudanese Courts. In the case of Adam Saeed Mohamed v. Wadidi 
Abdel Halim49 the Court of the first instance struck out the suit for want of 
notice of the claim and of the intention to institute a suit against the 
Government. This decision was set aside by the Court of Appeal on the 
ground that when it appears, after the suit has been allowed by the Court, 
that the Government should have been a party to the suit and hence joinder 
of it, in accordance with section  95  of the  Civil Procedure Act, 1983, 
becomes necessary it does not mean that a suit be struck out for lack of 
service of notice on the Attorney-General. Proceedings must be stayed 
awaiting service of notice, by the plaintiff, on the Attorney-General within 
the prescribed or such shorter period agreed by the Attorney-General. To 
decide otherwise would be prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff in terms 
of waste of time and money50. That a  distinction  must  be  drawn  between 
a  situation when a suit has, initially, been instituted against the Government 
and when the Court either of its own motion or on the application of the 
parties, at any time, before passing the judgement, orders that the 
Government be made defendant  if its  jointer is either necessary or proper 
for the fair and  just  trial of the suit  or its final disposal. In the former 
situation the Court of Appeal decided that notice must be served on the 
Attorney-General prior to the institution of suit against the Government and 
failure to comply with that the suit must be struck out.  
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 Another instance which constitutes an exception to the rule in section 
33(4) is whether objections against administrative decisions are within the 
contemplation of the aforesaid sub-section. The answer to this question 
comes in an Article entitled The Judicial Review of Administrative 
Decisions in Sudan51  in which the effect of section 33 (4) on objection 
against administrative decisions has been discussed and the following has 
been stated: 
 The provisions of section 310 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1983 which covers 
this question seem to add to the difficulty of understanding of the legal 
opinion on the point. To some people it seems that the Court has no 
jurisdiction till the expiration of the period of the given notice to the 
Attorney-General. But to others objections  against   administrative 
decisions are not suits and are not therefore within the contemplation of 
section 33(4) of the Act. Consequently it is not imperative that the Attorney-
General should first be notified. 
 In support of the second view the case of Administrative Council of 
West Nile Co-operation Union v. The Registrar General of Co-operative 
Associations 52 has been cited. In this case the Supreme Court held that 
under section 33(4) of the Act the giving of legal notice to the Attorney-
General  under  section  310 (4)  of  the  Act  is  not imperative in cases 
where the objection is being raised againstan administrative decision 
because an objection against an administrative decision is not a suit but it is 
in fact an appeal against the administrative decision. And that this justifies 
the use of the word 'objection' (instead of the word suit) which negates the 
conception of being called suit. That precisely speaking non-conformity with 
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requirements of section 33(4) does not preclude the jurisdiction of an 
administrative Court.  
 
Section 310 (4) reads: 
 The time specified in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) shall not begin to run 
where a notice under section 33(4) was given to the Attorney-General. 
 In the case we have just cited the Supreme Court interpreted the 
provisions of the aforementioned section as meaning the following: 
 Service of notice on the Attorney-General of the intention to bring a suit is 
discretionary since the time prescribed in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) 
must not begin to run where a notice was given to the Attorney-General  in 
compliance with section 33(4); and the plaintiff taking advantage of that 
averts the adverse effect of fulfilling the condition of waiting for two 
months period before instituting his suit. 
 
 But in the case of Owners of Sawagi 1-21 El Baja v. Northern State 
Government53  the Supreme Court reversed its decision in the 
Administrative Council of West Nile Co-operation that since the 
administrative suit was instituted, before the Supreme Court Judge at 
Dongolla, in contravention of section 33(4) it must be struck out for lack  of  
service of  notice of the  intention  to  institute such suit, on the Attorney-
General and that the law now which is governing the administrative suits is 
the Constitutional and Administrative Justice Act, 1996 which has repealed 
section 328(4) of the Civil Procedure Act, 1983 and which instead provides 
for the conformity with the rule laid down in section 33(4) when instituting 
an administrative suit. Hence, an objection against administrative decision 
is, within the meaning of section 33(4), a suit and the rule established in the 
                                                 
53 (1999) SLJR, 115. 
 
case of the Administrative Council of West Nile Co-operation Union does 
not anymore constitute an exception to the rule in section 33(4). 
 Besides his legal function in section 33(4) of the Civil Procedure Act, 
1983 the Minister of Justice has got other functions to perform in sections 
49, 231, 304 and 313 of the same Act. The Act has, intact, preserved 
sections 49, 304 and 313 which we have already discussed. But there is an 
important point to be elaborated upon in connection with the interpretation 
of the Constitution and the Laws. The Supreme Court as provided for in 
section 313 is no longer competent to interpret the Constitution and other 
statutory provisions. This has been vested in the Constitutional Court that 
has been established in accordance with Article 105 (1) of the Constitution 
of the Sudan, 1998. The application for   interpretation   is   submitted  to   
this  Court   in  accordance  with  section  13(1)  of  the Constitutional Court 
Act, 1998. The Minister of Justice, among several others, enjoys the right to 
submit such application. There is also slight difference between the 1974 
and 1983 Acts relating to the execution of decrees against the Government 
in section 231. There are additions that the Court at the expiration of the 
time specified in the decree must report the case to the President of the 
Supreme Court with copy of such report to the Minister of Justice. Sub-
section (3) which is non-existent under section 231 of the 1974 Act provides 
that at the expiration of the period specified in sub-section 2 the Court must, 
without further writing to any end, take measures to execute the decree.  
 
(iv) The Criminal Procedure Act, 1991: 
 The 1991 legislation is not the first one in this country in relation to 
Criminal Procedure. Prior to it were the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925, 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1974 and Criminal Procedure Act, 1983. All of 
them vested functions and powers in the Attorney-General. The most 
important power in the 1925 Act is the power of stay of proceedings or nolle 
prosequi contained in section 231 A which read: 
  At any time after the completion of an investigation under this Code 
into any alleged offence and  before the commencement of any inquiry or 
trial resulting therefrom, the Advocate-General may by writing under his 
hand inform the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of such offences, that 
he does not in respect of all or any of the offences alleged or charged, intend 
to prosecute the persons or any one or more of the persons accused; and at 
any stage in any inquiry or at any stage before the finding in any  trial under 
this Code the Advocate-General may by similar writing  or in person inform 
the magistrate or the Court conducting such inquiry or trial that he does not 
in respect of all or any of the offences alleged or charged intend to prosecute 
or further to prosecute the person or any or more of the persons accused and 
thereupon in every such case all proceedings in respect of any such offence 
alleged or charged shall be stayed and the person or persons accused shall be 
discharged of and from the same. 
 The ingredients of the above rule were discussed thoroughly by the 
High Court in the famous case of Sudan Government v. Zahra Adam Omer 
and Others54. The salient facts of the case are as follows:  
 On may 21, 1962, information was opened in Omdurman North Police 
Station under Sudan Penal Code, S.310, at the instance of one Um Salama 
Eisa Abu Anga against a certain Zahra Adam Omer and a relative of hers by 
name Dunia Anbak Abdalla, to the effect that they traffic in minors for 
purpose of prostitution.  
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 The investigation was carried out by the police. Statements of the 
complainant, the accused and witnesses were recorded. At the same stage the 
statements of the girls, the alleged victims of the offence were taken by the 
Magistrate. These interrogations by the Magistrate led to the disclosure of 
more houses allegedly run for the same illicit purpose and to the disclosure 
of more accused persons charged under Sudan Penal Code, S.317, and 
kindred offences. Some of those houses were situated outside the local 
jurisdiction of the Magistrate. On June 25, 1962, the said Magistrate verbally 
asked for the transfer to his jurisdiction of any similar case. He was directed 
to put in an application in writing. No mention was made that he was 
conducting the investigation in person. The application was forwarded on 
the next day. It contained a request for leave to continue the investigation. 
When the Magistrate was asked to explain this, as he was empowered by 
Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 318, he  replied  that it was just for 
information. Leave  for  transfer was, however, granted under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, s. 127.  
 The   product   of   the   Magistrate's   investigation   led  to  the 
discovery of more accused persons some of whom gave confessions until  on  
May 30, 1962, a veteran ex-politician of some standing was arrested. On 
June 4, 1962, three more ex-politicians and  persons  of  great  social 
distinction were arrested. The situation became delicate and tense with air of 
importance. The Magistrate disclosed that there were more persons in his list 
and more arrests of the same nature would follow. The above mentioned 
arrested persons were released on bail after a thorough examination of the 
record. It was thought that the evidence was sufficient to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion justifying the arrest. The Magistrate thought 
differently. He was entitled to that. However, because of the nature of the 
offences alleged to have been committed the positions of the persons 
involved, the possibility of doing irreparable damage resulting from any new 
arrest, the Magistrate was directed to seek advice before effecting any future 
arrests. He abided by that. On June 7, 1962, he appealed and disclosed that 
he was desirous to effect the arrest of the Minister of Foreign Affairs whom 
he had already charged with an offence under Sudan Penal Code, s. 318. The 
papers were called for and after consultation with the Chief Justice it was 
thought fit to approach the Government. Meanwhile the investigation was 
stayed. 
 On June 11, 1962, the record of the proceedings was sent to the 
Attorney-General upon his request who on June 20, 1962 seems to have 
asked the Public Prosecutor, Khartoum Circuit, to send his letter to the 
above accused containing an order for stay of proceedings. Prior to the 
receipt of the said letter, the Attorney-General had caused to broadcast a 
statement of his decision and his reasons for that decision. After he received 
the above mentioned letters, the Magistrate appeared in person and stated 
that he was not satisfied with that decision. He disclosed that he intended to 
disregard it and resume the investigation. Because the legality of the 
Attorney- General's decision was not as yet clear, the Magistrate was 
directed to send in his ruling in this respect, but meanwhile he was to release 
all the accused persons on bail on the ground that it was the Attorney-
General's right to keep them in, which right he had now forfeited. He was 
also directed not to take any further action in respect of the resumption of 
the investigation. 
 It was held that an order of nolle prosequi by the Attorney-General 
before completion of a criminal investigation is not in compliance with Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1925, S. 231A and is therefore void; that an order of 
nolle prosequi not made to the magistrate concerned in compliance with the 
form prescribed in Code of Criminal Porcedure 1925, s. 231A is void and 
may be disregarded by the magistrate; and that an order of  nolle prosequi by 
the Attorney-General is a quasi-judicial order and is therefore subject to 
review by the High Court on writ of certiorari. 
 The court explained the circumstances in which section 231A applies 
as follows:55  
 The above-mentioned section, as can be seen, gives the Attorney-General 
the right or discretion, after compliance to a definite formal procedure and 
without showing any reason whatever, automatically to terminate such 
proceedings and thus bring them to an end.  
 
Whether the result of such act is discharge or acquittal will not be discussed 
as it is here irrelevant. This right is given to the Advocate-General (now the 
Attorney-General) to terminate the proceedings under the following 
circumstances: 
a) at any stage after the completion of an investigation and before the 
commencement of any inquiry or trial; 
 
b) at any stage in any inquiry; 
 
c)  at any stage before the finding in any trial; 
 
d) that these proceedings should have been conducted under the Code. 
 
 To explain the basis on which it could interfere with the power of the 
Attorney-General under s. 231 A the High Court said: “The High Court by 
its power of certiorari can vitiate any act of the Executive purported to be 
done under a quasi-judicial power. Certiorari will thus lie where the action 
of the authority is in contravention of express provisions. A quasi-judicial 
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authority must strictly conform to the limits laid down in the statute under 
which it is functioning”. 
 Then the Court stated the grounds on which it set aside the decision of 
the Attorney-General56:  
 From the above it can be seen that the Attorney-General's act of 
asking for stay of proceedings was illegal because it was contrary to the 
express provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, section 231A, which 
gives him the right to do so at any stage after completion of the investigation 
and before the commencement of an inquiry. It is also bad in form as it does 
not refer to any law giving it that right, and even if it was done under the 
above mentioned section, as indeed is thought to be, it is also bad in law, as 
it does not conform with the manner prescribed for bringing it to the notice 
of the magistrate concerned. The said magistrate was therefore entitled to 
reject it and treat it as devoid of any force or effect. It should be remembered 
that the above principles apply to the acts in question even if it were to be 
acceded that his said power is absolute, i.e. in the nature of a pure ministerial 
or administrative character, for even in such case he must act within the law. 
As to the definition of the phrase "quasi-judicial" the Court stated57: 
 The decisions point out that quasi-judicial decision is a determination 
affecting rights and liabilities of subject arrived at after consideration of 
facts and circumstances by a competent authority. 
  A writ of certiorari and the instances in which it applies were 
stated by the Court as follows58:  
 Certiorari is a very old and high prerogative writ drawn up for the purpose 
of enabling the High Court  to  control  the  action of inferior Courts and 
to make certain that they shall not exceed their jurisdiction; and therefore 
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the writ of certiorari is intended to bring into the High Court the decision 
of the inferior tribunal in order that the High Court may be certified 
whether the decision is within the jurisdiction of the inferior court. This 
writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts, but on the other hand 
its application is not narrowly to inferior courts in the strict sense. Broadly 
speaking it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a 
judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will 
lie. 
 
Nolle prosequi is in England, a creature of the common law. In India and the 
Sudan the position is different, for here it is the creature of Statute, i.e. 
sections 333 and 444 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure and section 
231A of the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925. 
In the case of Zahra it has been seen that nolle prosequi is made by the 
Attorney-General, without showing any reason whatever, to the Magistrate 
concerned. But in an obiter dictum in the case of Sudan Government v. 
Ismat Hassaballa Malasi and Others 59 the Court said  that  an  order  of  
nolle  prosequi so  made by the Attorney-General or his representative must 
be on grounds of public interest. Of course this did not represent the law of 
this country as the wording of section 231A does not clearly require of the 
Attorney-General to state reasons for exercising the power of nolle prosequi.  
Whether the result of stay of proceedings in accordance with section 231A is 
a discharge or acquittal was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of 
S.G. v. Ayad Riad Toma .60 It held that: 
1. No one can compound a public prosecution. The Attorney-General may stay 
proceedings, if he sees fit, in accordance with section 231A of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, but this is merely a discharge and not an acquitted of 
accused. 
2. Prosecutor does not have the power to stay proceedings enjoyed by the 
Attorney-General. 
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 Nolle prosequi was not the only power vested in the Attorney- 
General in the 1925 Act. He, in accordance with section 211, possessed 
power to conduct prosecutions. This section read:  
 Prosecution may be conducted by the Advocate-General or any person 
appointed by him to represent him, or by any person appointed by the 
Governor or District Commissioner or by the complainant or a pleader 
appointed by him. Provided that the Advocate-General or Governor may 
intervene to remove the conduct of the prosecution from the complainant 
or his pleader and in such case the Advocate- General or Governor shall 
direct by whom the prosecution shall be conducted.   
 
 Those were the only powers with which the Attorney-General was 
bestowed under the 1925 Act. The powers relating to inquiry into offences 
and investigation were vested in the magistrate.  
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925 had been repealed by the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 197461. In this Act the powers of the Attorney-General under 
sections 211 and 231A were preserved intact and hence need no discussion 
again. But under it the Attorney- General had new power of investigation 
provided for under section 122 E which read: 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, where the Attorney-General or his 
representative is satisfied on his own knowledge or upon information received 
that there is reason to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed, 
he or his representative may undertake investigation on the matter or authorize 
any other person, not being a Magistrate , to undertake such investigation. 
2. The person undertaking investigation under sub-section (1) shall have all the 
powers of a police investigating an offence under this Act. 
3. Where an investigation is commenced or completed under sub-section (1) no 
Magistrate or policeman shall undertake or continue any investigation of the 
same offence except with the prior approval of the Attorney-General. 
4. If the person undertaking the investigation required for the purposes of the 
investigation the assistance of the officer in charge of a police station such 
officer shall offer the required assistance. 
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 This limited power of the Attorney-General in investigation was 
parted from with the coming into force of the Attorney-General's Act 1981. 
Section 6, previously discussed, gave the Attorney-General wide powers of 
investigation62. 
 Another new power he had in this Act is provided for under section 
276 (4) which read:  
 A committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the Minister of the Interior 
and the Attorney-General shall be established and shall be charged with 
the duty of considering and reporting to the President of the Republic upon 
the case of every prisoner in respect of whom a recommendation for 
suspension or remission of sentence has been submitted to the President of 
the Republic prior to consideration by the President of the Republic. 
 
 In 1983 Islamization of laws in the country prompted the repeal, inter 
alia, of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1974 and a new legislation named the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1983 was enacted instead. Nolle prosequi survived 
the repeal and was re-enacted under section 215(1) but as provided for in 
sub-section (2) of this section, nolle prosequi is not exercisable by the 
Attorney-General when it contravenes the Sharia Law i.e. when the offence 
charged is robbery, theft, adultery etc. Another power of the Attorney-
General which is unaffected is his power of investigation provided for by 
section 138. Section 216 also gave the Attorney-General discretionary power 
to tender pardon to an accused person provided that such person makes full 
and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge 
relating to such offence and the connection therewith of every other person 
concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission of the offence. 
The object of such tender is to obtain the evidence of any person supposed to 
have been directly or indirectly involved in or party to the offence. Every 
person accepting a tender of pardon under these conditions must be 
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examined as a witness at trial who must, subject to bail, be detained in 
custody until the termination of the trial. Tender of pardon is to be made on 
grounds to be recorded by the Attorney-General or else it will be considered 
as bad in form and hence without effect63. The Court trying a person who 
has accepted tender of pardon is to record the plea and proceed with the trial 
if such person pleaded that he had complied with the conditions under which 
tender was made. It must, in the process, find out whether or not the accused 
had complied with the conditions of the pardon and if it is found that he had 
so complied it must pass a judgement of acquittal. But tender of pardon must 
not be contrary to Sharia Law.  
 In certain instances tender of pardon, made pursuant to section 216, is 
revocable under section 218 which read: 
1) When a pardon has been tendered under s.216 and any person who has 
accepted such tender has either by willfully concealing anything essential or 
by giving false evidence not complied with the condition on which the tender 
was made, he may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was 
so tendered or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty 
in connection with the same matter; provided that such person shall not be 
tried jointly with any of the other accused and that it shall be necessary for the 
prosecution to prove that he did not comply with the condition on which the 
tender was made. 
2)  The statement made by a person who has accepted a tender of pardon may be 
given in evidence against him at such trial. 
 
 It is clear, given the provisions of the above section, that pardon so 
tendered is subject to revocation if the person who had accepted such tender 
had either willfully concealed anything essential or he had given false 
evidence. 
 Except as provided for under section 216, section 219 prohibits any 
other influence, by policeman or any other person in authority, on the 
accused, i.e. torture, threat, enducment or any other means to induce him to 
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disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge were made illegal. 
And any statement given by the accused as a result of such influence ought 
not to be accepted by the Court as evidence against him or against any other 
person and any such evidence would be without legal effect. It is worth-
mentioning that the power to tender pardon had been under the 1974 Act 
exclusively exercised by the Magistrate. 
 The last legislation, now in force, in relation to the field of criminal 
justice is the Criminal Procedure Act, 1991 section 2 of which has repealed 
the 1983 Act. Under this Act the Attorney-General, now Minister of Justice 
and his representatives,  enjoy wide powers in connection with investigation, 
interrogation and inquiry into offences. As expected his power of nolle 
prosequi is provided for under section 58(1) which reads: 
  The Attorney-General, may at any time after the completion of 
investigation and before the judgement of first instance in a criminal case, 
make a reasoned decision under his own hand to stop the criminal 
proceedings against any accused and his decision shall be final and cannot 
be subject to any objection and the Court shall stop the proceedings and 
pass the necessary orders to stop the criminal proceedings. 
 
Sub-section (3) of the same section also reads:  
 The Attorney-General or his representative may request the perusal of the 
Court proceedings in the exercise of his power, to stop criminal 
proceedings pending the decision of the Attorney-General. 
 
 Since the Attorney-General is a public authority whose decision under 
sub-section (1) affects the rights of the citizens he puts to the Supreme Court 
an application for interpretation of the provisions of the above-mentioned 
section to ensure consistency in its application64. The Attorney-General's 
version is that once his decision conforms with the requirements of sub-
section (1) the trial Court must forthwith end the proceedings and order for 
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the discharge of the accused. And since his power is not a quasi-judicial 
power but purely administrative, courts have no jurisdiction to question it. 
The Court determined that the decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to 
sub-section (1) is like any other administrative decision, subject to judicial 
control where it might have been made in excess of authority or without 
jurisdiction, defective in form, amounts to a departure from the law or he 
acts in such a manner as may constitute an abuse of power. And that where 
such decision is made free from these defects it is not subject to judicial 
control as the Attorney-General, in that case, will be exercising his 
discretionary power which is not subject to judicial control. The Supreme 
Court continued to say that if the Court to which an order of nolle prosequi 
by the Attorney-General rejects the same it must notify him of such rejection 
so as to enable him, if he so wishes, to rectify the situation by complying 
with the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 58. And that since the 
attorneys represent the Attorney-General they are entitled, based on the 
provisions of subsection (3), to submit a request for perusal in order to 
prepare the basis  for the decision of the Attorney-General to stay 
proceedings. Such Court is obliged to suspend the proceedings pending the 
decision of the Attorney-Genera to whose end only it must send the papers 
of the case65. 
 It is useful to state the ingredients of section 58 and some of the 
arguments upon which the Supreme Court proceeded in order to arrive at the 
interpretation of the said section. According to the Court these ingredients 
are as follows66: 
a) The decision of the Attorney-General must be based on stated facts. 
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b) The decision must be under his own hand. 
 
c) Once under section 58(3) the Attorney-General or his representative puts a 
request for perusal in order to exercise his power under this section, the Court 
must stop the proceedings pending his decision, and allow the perusal to take 
place. 
 
The effect of an order of nolle prosequi by the Attorney-General on  the  
proceedings  has  been stated by the Court as follows67: 
Once the Attorney-General has made his decision to stop the trial proceedings in a 
criminal case, and such decision conforms with the conditions or form 
stipulated under section 58(2) the trial Court is bound to stop the 
proceedings immediately. But where the decision is defective in form, that 
is where it is not made or signed by him or where no reasons have been 
stated, the trial Court must normally proceed with the trial, provided that 
the trial judge is not entitled to evaluate the fairness of the reasons stated 
by the Attorney-General, once they have been stated.  
 The power of the Attorney-General under sub-section (1) is 
discretionary and in relation to it the Court stated the following68  :  
 The general rule with regard to whether or not a discretionary 
power may be distributed or not, is that the Court will not disturb or 
interfere with an administrative decision taken in exercise of a 
discretionary power, unless the discretion had been arbitrarily exercised or 
where its exercise constitutes an abuse of law. In other words where the 
jurisdiction has been properly exercised, or where its exercise does not 
violate the law or amount to an abuse of law, the Court will not interfere 
. 
 The Supreme Court passed a similar ruling in the case of Ibrahim 
Khidir Ibrahim v. Omdurman Islamic University .69 It stated:  
 The power to appoint suitable candidates to posts of Lecturers in the 
University fell within the discretionary powers of the University authority 
and that its exercise could not  be  subject to judicial control. Nothing 
apparently amounted, in the decision, to an abuse of law. 
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 In the process the Supreme Court also considered the meaning of the 
word  "finality" contained  under sub-section  (1)  and  it  stated  the 
following 70 :  
According to the comments made by the Attorney-General his decision under 
s.58(1) is administrative and not quasi-judicial and for this reason it cannot 
be questioned in the Court. This comment reminds us of the old distinction 
existing between administrative decisions and quasi-judicial decisions. 
Previously, the only decisions subject to judicial control were quasi-
judicial. Judicial control has been however extended to judicial decisions 
of bodies which are not courts of law. Such control has been exercised 
where the authority making it has some legal authority to determine 
questions affecting the rights of subject, a duty to act judicially or 
administratively nowadays and acted in access of that legal authority. The 
Attorney-General is a public authority whose decision under s.58(1) 
affects the rights of the citizens. Hence, whether his decision is 
administrative or quasi-judicial, it is subject to judicial control or to the 
revisional jurisdiction of superior courts of law. The word "finality" means 
that the decision of the Attorney-General to stop the criminal proceedings 
against an accused person is not subject to review by another 
administrative or executive body. Further, it cannot be questioned by way 
of appeal or objection. It is also final as far as matters of facts are 
concerned. But it is not final as far as matters of law are concerned 
because the law does not confer immunity on the decisions  of  the  
Attorney-General  under s. 58(1)  to  violate  the  law  or  to  act in such 
manner as may constitute an abuse of law or to apply the law wrongly. 
Hence, S. 188 of Criminal Procedure Act, 1991 confers revisional 
jurisdiction (not appellate jurisdiction) on Superior Courts to determine 
the correctness of the decision of inferior courts or administrative bodies 
like the Attorney-General. 
 
 The word "finality" also has been a subject of discussion in an Article 
entitled "The Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Sudan" in 
which the position in English Law has been stated as follows71: 
  The expression of finality of decisions of certain administrative 
institutions does not under the English Law (perhaps also under the 
Egyptian Law) preclude Courts jurisdiction except where the law provides 
this in very clear and explicit terms. Thus it was held in Smith v. East 
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Elloe RDC (1956). All ER P.856, that a private clause of this kind could 
not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to declare a determination to be a 
nullity where it was void ab initio. In this case the Court stated that ' if a 
statute declares that a decision of a Minister or other administrative 
agency is to be final this does not have the effect of excluding judicial 
review by means of certiorari. The objective of the law cannot be allowed 
to be defeated by the mere expression of finality. Hence, where cases of 
glaring violation of the law or acts done in excess of or without 
jurisdiction cannot be ignored because of this expression. It is well settled 
the remedy of certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by 
the most clear and explicit words. The word final is not enough. That only 
means without appeal. It does not mean without recourse to certiorari . It 
means the decision is final on the facts,  not  final  on the law. 
Notwithstanding that  the  decision  is  by  statute made final certiorari  
can  still  issue for excess of jurisdiction or for the error of the law on the 
face of the record. If tribunals were to be at liberty to exceed jurisdiction 
without any check by courts the rule of law would be at end. 
 
 The position in the Sudanese law has been expressed in the same 
Article as follows: 
 According to the Sudanese precedents the expression (finality) of 
decision of certain administrative bodies precludes the statutory judicial 
review is envisaged under SS.309 and 315 of the Act, which is appellate in 
nature. Thus, in the case of the Institute of Technology v. (1) Officials and 
Workers of Trade Unions (2) The Institute of Technology 72 s.25 of the 
Working Peoples Act, 1977 provided a procedure of appeals by the working 
peoples against administrative decisions. The Act also exclusively vested the 
appellate jurisdiction in the Court of appeal for objections raised by the 
workers. An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal was rejected 
by the Supreme Court on the ground of finality of the decisions of the 
former Court. The Supreme Court relied on its former decisions. In the case 
of Mohamed Gamal Sadaar v. Sudan Government (Attorney-General)73 the 
Public Service Act, 1973 which prescribes the procedure of appeal against 
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the decisions of the Board of Discipline was applied. An aggrieved party in 
the dispute submitted his objection to the Court of Appeal against the 
decision of Working Peoples Appeal Committee. According to s. 53 of this 
Act, the decisions of the Committee were final and liable for execution. The 
Court of  Appeal  held  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  as  it  had  been 
precluded by law. The Supreme Court held that the Court's jurisdiction to 
review the administrative decision was effectively excluded by the 
legislation and the Court therefore had no jurisdiction.  
 But the writer74  of the above mentioned Article entertains a contrary 
view that the Court's jurisdiction which is ousted by the expression of 
finality of administrative decision is the appellate jurisdiction. That Courts 
can still interfere to review such administrative decisions by way of 
prerogative orders. In support of this view he cites an obiter dictum in the 
case of Sudan Government v. Pio Madilo 75 :  
 The learned Counsel for applicants by this connection is denying the 
Competent Courts of Justice the inherent powers vested in them to see that 
administrative tribunals of inferior jurisdiction are kept within bounds by 
exercising prerogative writs which are quite different from intervention by 
way of appeal. It is evident that the arms of the writ of certiorari are long 
enough to reach the judicial acts of administrative bodies of inferior 
jurisdiction exercising the authority given to them by law, even if no right of 
appeal (to the High Court) is provided for in the ordinance. The general rule 
of law is that a writ of certiorari lies unless expressly taken away and an 
appeal does not lie unless expressly given by statute. Certiorari is quite 
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different from an appeal. The purpose of the former is to see that bodies of 
inferior jurisdiction do not exceed or abuse the power given to them by law. 
 The above dictum has received a support in a statement made by 
Judge Mohamed Mahmoud Abu Gasseisa in the case of the General Football 
Union and Others v. Zahra Sports Club. 76In his words:  
 Where an administrative body is a party to the dispute, the Court may 
entertain an objection raised against a decision (administrative decision) 
which has been passed under a piece of legislation that precludes the Court's 
right to see the objection. Under the English law the Courts intervene by 
way of judicial review where a legislation precludes its intervention by way 
of appeal. In the Sudan the courts reviewing administrative decision under 
the provisions of the Act, except where the act complained of was done in 
excess of jurisdiction or in abuse of law does so in an appellate capacity. 
Hence, the court will have no jurisdiction where a piece of legislation 
excludes appeal to the Court. 
 It is essential to indicate that in addition to the requirements provided 
for under sub-section 1 of section 58, sub-section 2 of the same section 
contains a proviso similar to that which used to be provided for under 
section 215 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1983; that an order of nolle 
prosequi must not lie if it violates the rights of private citizen or the general 
principles of Sharia Law.  
 In the light of the provisions we have already considered it is vital to 
reveal that there is a major departure from the past as far as the power of 
nolle prosequi is concerned. In the 1925, 1974 and 1983 legislations it used 
to be a quasi-judicial power to be exercised by the Attorney-General without 
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giving reasons whatsoever but subject to judicial control by the higher 
Courts by way of certiorari. Neither finality of the decision nor its scope, 
except under section 215(2)  of the 1983 Act, had been expressly provided 
for in those laws. Hence, his power, except as shown, covered all the 
offences. The position in the 1991 Act is different. The Attorney-General 
must give reasons and his decision is no longer quasi-judicial but a mere 
administrative decision subject to judicial review in absence of specific 
given requirements. Finality of the decision as explicitly stated does not 
debar the Courts from jurisdiction as long as there are specific grounds for 
exercising judicial review. But the scope of the power of nolle prosequi, 
similar to that in 1983 Act, is narrower than it had been in the 1925 and 1974 
Acts. 
 Besides that of nolle prosequi the Minister of Justice exercises other 
powers under sections 17, 18, 20, 30, 209, 211, 212 and 213 of the Act. 
Under section 17 he is the top attorney and in this capacity his decision, in 
connection with the investigation of offences and inquiry, is final77. In this 
context the next person to him is the Undersecretary78  but the fact of the 
matter is that the post of the State Minister of Justice has been established in 
the Ministry of Justice. Hierarchy-wise the State Minister is actually senior 
to the Undersecretary but in no legislation are his powers provided for. This 
has arisen in the case of Inaam  Mohamed  Ali  Lutfi and Others v. Sudan 
Government79. In this case the Constitutional Court has been on record as 
saying that the State Minister of Justice is, in accordance with  the  
provisions  of  Article 50(1) of the Sudan Constitution 1998, in his own right 
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a Minister who exercises functions by law. His decisions, relating to 
investigation of offences and inquiry based on section 10(2) of the Business 
of Criminal Attorney Agency Regulation, 1998 are final and hence not 
subject to any review by any other administrative authority. They are only 
subject to review independently by a competent Court if such decisions 
violate the law, constitute an abuse of law or the law has been applied 
wrongly. The law excludes the State Minister of Justice from the hierarchy 
as far as decisions during investigation  are  concerned. The top person in 
this  context  is  the  Minister of  Justice   followed  by   the Undersecretary. 
There is nothing in law that subjects the decisions made by the State 
Minister to review by the Minister of Justice or any other administrative 
authority. Therefore the Minister's interference in this case lacks legal 
backing.  
 In my opinion, the way in which the Constitutional Court construed 
the provisions of Article 50(1) of the Constitution and section 10(2) of the 
Regulation is inconsistent with section 6(1)  of the Interpretation of Laws 
and General Clauses Act, 1974 which reads:  
The provisions of every law shall be construed in such manner as to achieve 
the purpose for which it has been enacted and in all cases the construction 
which achieves such purpose shall be preferred to any other construction. 
 The inconsistency is represented by the fact that the construction 
reached by the Court does not achieve the purpose for which Article 50(1) of 
the Constitution and sections 4 and 5 (2) (f) of the Ministry of Justice 
Organization Act, 1983 have been enacted. According to these provisions 
the Minister of Justice, and not the State Minister of Justice, is the Highest 
Authority in the Ministry who exercises given legal functions and powers. In 
fact the law is silent about the functions and powers which the State Minister 
of Justice would exercise and the hierarchy set forth under section  10(2) of  
the  Regulation does not embrace him either. Hence, there is no way the 
State Minister of Justice can exercise any legal functions and powers except 
by way of delegation pursuant to the provisions of section 17 of the 
Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act. Such delegation does not 
preclude the Minister of Justice from interfering on appeal or of his own 
motion with the decisions of the State Minister. Therefore, the construction 
which would achieve the purpose would be to allow the Minister of Justice 
on appeal or of his own motion to interfere with such decisions if contrary to 
the provisions of law; and to construe the provisions in question in the 
manner the Court did would defeat the purpose for which they have been 
enacted. 
 Under section 18(1)  the Minister of Justice is vested with the power 
to establish, by order made under his own hand, Criminal Attorney 
Agencies and to specify their jurisdiction. He may, by similar order, 
establish specialized Criminal Attorney Agencies to investigate any kind of 
offences. Sub-section(2) of the same section also empowers him to make 
regulations for the organization of the business of such Agencies and the 
making of chart thereof. The Minister of Justice as well and on the strength 
of section 20 may confer, upon any person or committee, powers of 
investigation and inquiry into any offence, if he deems necessary in the 
interest of justice. Another power he exercises is provided for under 
section 30. He may transfer, during investigation, the case papers from the 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Attorney Agency to that of another inside the 
Sudan if he, in the interest of justice, deems it necessary. 
 Section 209(1) (a) provides that the President of the Republic may, in 
consultation with the Minister of Justice or on application of the convicted 
person or his relatives to the Minister of Justice for recommendation in 
consultation with the Chief Justice, remit the sentence or drop the conviction 
of any person for any offence. However, such power of the President of the 
Republic does not lie if the offence of which the person is convicted is, in 
accordance with section 208, a Hudud offence or if remission of the sentence 
or dropping of the conviction, except with the leave of the aggrieved person 
or his relatives after the satisfaction of the judgement debt, violates the rights 
of a private citizen. The Minister of Justice also has another role to play 
under section 211. The President of the Republic exercises his power of 
promulgation of the general amnesty in consultation with the Minister of 
Justice. The Minister of Justice is as well empowered by section 212 to 
make rules, within his jurisdiction, for the execution of the provisions of the 
1991 Act. And finally under section 213 the Minister of Interior ought to 
consult him when making regulations aimed at organization of custody and 
stipulation of duties, rights and disciplinary measures in connection with 
persons in custody. 
 Despite the wide powers vested in the Minister of Justice and his 
representatives in the 1991 Act there are powers which, though related to 
investigation and inquiry into offences, are not exercised by the Minister of 
Justice or his representatives namely, recording of confession by an accused 
person, remand of an accused person in custody for a period exceeding three 
days and ordering of general search. These powers belong to the Magistrate 
based on section 7(2) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of 1991 Act. 
 
(v) Customs Act, 1986: 
 The Customs Act, 1986 was preceded by the Customs Act, 1939. The 
Attorney-General had functions to carry out in accordance with the 
provisions of the old Act. Under section 215 there were formalities to be 
complied with in order to institute customs prosecutions. Unless with the 
leave by the Attorney-General or Director of Customs and Excise, institution 
of such prosecution was not possible. This section read: 
(1) Customs prosecutions shall be instituted in the name of the Attorney-General or 
the Director in any Court having jurisdiction therein in accordance with the 
provisions of section 216 
. 
(2) The Attorney-General or the Director may in order to bring any customs 
prosecution within the limit of the jurisdiction of any Court, limit the total 
amount of penalty together with the value of any means of conveyance or goods 
the forfeiture of which is claimed in such prosecution to the award of penalty 
linking the jurisdiction of any such Court as set out in section 216. 
 
 The legal consequence of instituting customs prosecutions in violation 
of section 215 was considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Sudan 
Government v. Karar Mohamed Sulieman and Others80. In this case it was 
held that unless with the leave of the Attorney-General or Director of 
Customs, institution of Customs prosecutions in violation of section 215 of 
Customs Act, 1939 must be decreed void. Under section 216(5) and upon 
the application of the Attorney-General the Province Court had the 
discretion, in certain instances, to direct the beginning or continuation of the 
prosecution in a Court of unlimited jurisdiction. The sub-section read: 
 The Attorney-General if he thinks fit may call for the proceedings in 
any customs prosecution, and upon the application of the Attorney-General, 
the province Judge may if the case presents unusual difficulty or 
complication or of any general importance to the administration of the 
customs or for other sufficient reason, direct that the prosecution, be begun 
or continued in a Court of unlimited  jurisdiction. 
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 Based also on the provisions of section 218 there were certain cases in 
which  police  investigation, magisterial inquiry and committal  had been 
dispensed with in respect of any offence against the provisions of the 1939 
Act provided that thereupon the  Attorney-General should frame appropriate 
charge or charges. This section provided as follows:  
 It shall not be necessary for a police investigation to be made nor, if 
the  Attorney-General shall so certify by  writing underhis hand and shall 
thereupon frame the appropriate  charge  orcharges, should a magisterial 
inquiry be held or the accused formally committed  for trial in respect of any 
offence against the provisions of this Act. 
 However, the magisterial inquiry referred to in the above section is no 
more part of the 1991 Criminal Procedure Act. The Attorney-General again 
had a function to perform under section 220 of the 1939 Act. He conducted 
customs prosecutions thereunder:  
 Customs prosecutions shall be conducted by the Attorney-General or by 
the Director or by any person appointed by either of them to represent 
him; provided that the Attorney-General may intervene to remove the 
conduct of any prosecution to himself or to his representative. 
 
 The Attorney-General, in the process of carrying out his duty under 
section 220 was prevented by section 221 from cohercing witnesses and 
hence the witnesses were protected from compulsion to disclose any 
information, the nature thereof or the name of the person who gave such 
information. The wording of this section went as follows: 
 No witnesses on behalf of the Attorney-General or the Director in any 
customs prosecution shall be compelled to disclose the fact that he received 
any information, or the nature thereof or the name of the person who gave 
such information, and no officer appearing as a witness shall be compelled 
to produce any reports made or received by him confidentially in his official 
capacity or containing confidential information. 
 It has to be stated that any information obtained by the Attorney-
General in contravention of section 221 was to be based on section 118(3) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, 1974, without legal effect. If the Attorney-
General or convicted person did not agree to a judgement passed by a 
competent Court he was entitled to appeal against such judgement as he was 
empowered to do so by section 224 which read: 
 An appeal by petition in writing at instance of a convicted person or of the 
Attorney-General shall lie: 
a) from every finding or sentence or both given in a customs prosecution by a Major 
Court or by a Province Judge sitting as a First Class Magistrate, to the person 
authorized, and  
  
b) from every finding or sentence or both given in a customs prosecution by a 
Magistrate of the Second Class or of the First Class other than a Province Judge, to 
the Judge of the Province Court in the Province. 
 
 If an appeal had been made in accordance with section 224 the Judge 
of the Province Court or any authorized person must, based on section 226, 
deliver to the Attorney-General if he was respondent to the appeal, a copy of 
petition of appeal for reply in writing. The wording of this section went as 
follows:  
A copy of every petition of appeal shall be delivered by the person authorized or the 
Judge of the Province Court, as the case may be, to the Attorney-General or to 
the convicted person whoever is respondent to the appeal, and the respondent 
within seven days from the date of delivery thereof, may present to the 
authority to whom the petition of appeal is addressed, or in the case of a 
committed person in prison to the person in charge of such prison who shall 
forward the same to such authority, an answer in writing which shall state 
fully and succinctly the ground upon which it is sought to support the finding 
or sentence appealed against. 
 
 Finally and in accordance with section 228 the Attorney-General had 
power to compromise or withdraw customs prosecutions. This section 
provided:   
 In any customs prosecution or in any application for revision of or appeal 
against any final judgement, the Attorney-General if satisfied that any 
penalty, fine or forfeiture was incurred without any intention of fraud or that 
it may be inexpedient to proceed may at any stage of such proceedings 
compromise or withdraw the same as he may think fit. 
 
 The next legislation was the Customs Act, 1984 section 2 of which 
repealed 1939 Act. In this new Act, provisions relating to institution of 
Customs prosecutions under section 207, dispensation with police 
investigation, magisterial inquiry and committal in certain cases under 
section 210, Conduct of Customs prosecutions under section 212, protection 
of witnesses under section 213, appeals under section 216, right of 
respondent to reply petition of appeal in writing under section 217 and 
power of the Attorney- General to compromise or withdraw customs 
prosecutions had remained unaffected by the repeal and hence preserved 
intact and need not be gone into again. But the 1984 Act has also been 
repealed by the Customs Act, 1986 which is now in force. Under section 210 
the Attorney-General, now Minister of Justice retains, his power to 
compromise or withdraw customs prosecutions already discussed in the 
1939 Act. As to the institution and conduct of customs prosecutions. Section 
214 (1) reiterates that customs prosecutions must be instituted with the leave 
of the Attorney-General or Director of Customs and Excise. And sub-section 
(2) of the same section provides that notwithstanding the functions and 
powers of the Attorney-General regarding conduct of prosecutions, the 
Director of Customs and Excise or any person authorized by him must 
conduct Customs prosecutions. The consequence of acting contrary to the 
provisions of this section has been explicitly shown by the Supreme Court in 
the case of Sudan Government v. Fatarahman Ibrahim Mohamed and 
Another81. In this case it was held that in connection with offences in 
contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act, the Court must, before 
                                                 
81 (1991) SLJR, 66 
proceeding with the trial, obtain prior written permission from  either the 
Customs Authority or Attorney-General as provided for under section 214 of 
the Customs Act, 1986. failing to do so all the proceedings must be declared 
void and without legal effect. But in the case of Sudan Government v. Abdel 
Rahim El-Sayed and Others,82  the Supreme Court passed a judgement that 
the National Committee for the Combat of Smuggling is the authority 
concerned regarding permission to institute customs prosecutions and that 
such permission need not necessarily be given by the Attorney-General. This 
judicial authority of course complies with section 214(2).  
 It is clear that the Customs Act, 1986 does not reiterate the provisions 
of sections 210, 213, 216 and 217 of the 1984 Act as these issues are left to 
be regulated as provided for under section 211 which provides as follows: 
  Subject to the provisions of this part, the Provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Act  shall apply to customs prosecutions and to any appeal from 
any finding or sentence given therein and to any revision of such finding or 
sentence. 
 
(vi) The Public Premises Eviction Act, 1969: 
 The Attorney-General, now Minister of Justice, in accordance with 
section 3(1)  of the 1969 Act, exercises  the  power  to  evict  any  person  in 
occupation of any public premises. Section 3(1) reads:  
 The competent authority may at any time give notice to any person in 
occupation of any premises to vacate such premises within such period as 
may be specified therein, and if on the expiration of such period the public 
premises are not vacated, the Minister of Justice may, on an application 
made to him by the competent authority and notwithstanding any provisions 
to the contrary contained in any other law, order the police authorities to 
effect the vacation of such premises and to use such force as may be 
necessary for that purpose. 
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 The phrase "public premises" is defined under section 2 of the Act to 
mean any premises owned or taken on lease by the Government or any of 
the People's Local Government authorities or by any public body established 
by law. This definition is wide enough to embrace all the premises owned or 
taken on lease by the State institutions as defined under section 33(5) of the 
Civil Procedure Act, 1983. Section 4 of the Public Prermises Eviction Act 
ousts the jurisdiction of course to subject the power of the Attroney-General, 
provided for under section 3, to judicial control. The constitutionality of this 
has been at issue before  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case of Mahjoub Breir 
Mohamed Nur v. Sudan Government83. The provisions of this section were 
interpreted as ousting the jurisdiction of Courts and therefore incompatible 
with the provisions of Article 26 of the Sudan Transitional Constitution, 
1985 which guaranteed to all persons the right to litigate and that no one was 
to be denied the right to sue even against the State which ought to be subject 
to the rule of law. Hence, the Court declared it as unconstitutional. The 
provisions of Article  26 are reiterated under Article 31 of the 1998 
Constitution. Article 31 reads:  
 The right to litigate shall be guaranteed for all persons and no one shall be 
denied the right to sue or shall be involved in a criminal or civil litigation, 
save in accordance with the procedures and rules of the law. 
 
 (vii) The Advocates Act, 1983: 
 The Advocates Act, 1983 is the law now in force. It contains a few 
sections relating to the role of the Attorney-General, now Minister of Justice. 
For example section 4 provides for the mechanism for achieving the 
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purposes of the Act and what is required of the Minister of Justice in order to 
constitute such mechanism. It reads: 
(1) For the purpose of this Act, there shall be established a committee to be called 
"The Bar Association Committee" which shall have power to grant licenses for 
practicing as an advocate and to discharge the other functions conferred on it by 
this Act. 
(2) The Committee shall be constituted as follows: 
 A senior Legal Counsel to be appointed by the Minister of Justice. 
 
 Furthermore, section 42 regulates remuneration due to an advocate for 
the discharge of the duties assigned to him on behalf of his client. Sub-
section (2) (d) provides for the powers of the Minister of Justice in this 
regard as follows: 
(i) the Minister of Justice may, on complaint from the persons concerned and after 
consulting the Committee, amend any  agreement made by an advocate with his 
client concerning  the fees to be paid to him if he is satisfied, taking into    
account the circumstances surrounding the agreement and  affecting it, that the 
fees are high or excessive or are  disproportionate to the amount, type and 
nature of the legal  services which the advocate has carried out or has 
undertaken  to carry out for his client under the agreement and the Minister of 
Justice shall in that case assess the fees which he  considers fair and reasonable 
in accordance with the  provisions of sub-section (3) or shall request the 
Committee to assess them   thereunder. 
 
(ii)  if the advocate has received all or part of the fees agreed to  in writing in 
accordance with this sub-section or pursuant to an oral agreement under sub-
section (3) the Minister of Justice may, on receipt of a complaint from the 
persons concerned made within twelve months from the date of last  payment of 
fees to the advocate and after consulting the  Committee, order the advocate to 
repay to such persons all or part of the fees paid to him if the Minister of Justice 
is satisfied that, in the circumstances surrounding the  agreement and affecting 
it, the fees were paid for work  which the advocate did not do or were too high, 
excessive or disproportionate to the amount, type or nature of the legal services 
which the advocate carried out for his client in  accordance with the agreement; 
 
(iii) an order for repayment of fees made by the Minister of  Justice shall be deemed 
as a sentence of fine against the  advocate and may be executed under the 
provisions of the  Criminal Procedure Act, 1991 and the Minister of Justice 
shall have power to make orders for execution under the  provisions of that Act; 
 
(iv) the acceptance of fees that are too high or excessive or of  fees which are 
disproportionate to the amount, type or  nature of legal services shall be 
considered as an act in  breach of and contrary to the rules of professional 
conduct and as lowering the dignity of the profession in which case the Minister  
of Justice may order that the advocate be tried by a board of discipline. 
 
 There are other functions provided for under the Act which are 
performed on behalf of the Minister of Justice by his representatives from 
legal Counsels. The Council for the investigation of complaints against 
Advocates is constituted in accordance with the provisions of section 54(1). 
The Minister of Justice is represented in the council. The same is true in 
respect to constitution and decision of the  board of discipline based on 
sections 57 and 62(1) respectively, regarding complaint against an advocate. 
(viii) The Legal Profession (Regulation) Act, 1966: 
 In accordance with the provisions of the Legal Profession 
(Regulation) Act, 1966 the Attorney-General, now Minister of Justice, 
exercises several and joint powers and duties. Hence, he is the ex-officio 
Chairman of the Council for regulation of legal profession established and 
constituted pursuant to sections 4 and 5 respectively. The powers and duties 
of the Council are spelt out under section 6 which reads: 
  It shall be the duty of the Council to ensure that legal practitioners attain a 
high standard of professional ability and for such purpose the Council shall 
have power to prescribe the minimum academic and professional standards 
for entry into the legal profession by holding examinations provided for in 
this Act. 
 
 The Minister of Justice, under section 5(1) (d), has power to appoint 
four legal practitioners as members of the Council for regulation of legal 
profession. Based on sub-section (2) of the same section every member so 
appointed shall hold office for a term of three years and he may be eligible 
for re-appointment for a further such term or terms. He also has power in 
accordance with section 8(4)  to include under separate heading in the 
budget of the Ministry of Justice details of the estimated revenue and 
expenditure of the Council. Any deficit in the Council's budget shall be 
made good by a grant from the Minister of Justice. Furthermore the Minister 
of Justice under section 9(1) has discretion to make regulations for carrying 
out the provisions of the Act. 
 (ix) Prevention of Unlawful Enrichment Act, 1989: 
 Section 6 of this Act defines the phrase "Unlawful enrichment" to 
mean any property of any kind obtained from the Government without 
consideration. Therefore any person who commits an act covered by the 
aforementioned definition is deemed to have committed an offence 
punishable under section 15 of the Act. The mechanism for unearthing 
evidence pointing to the commission of an offence in contravention of the 
provisions of the Act is provided for under section 4.The section empowers 
the Minister of Justice to appoint a Commission. This Commission is 
charged with the duty of investigating the affairs of any person who is 
accused or suspected of any unlawful enrichment and enquiring into the 
sources from which any property was acquired. The first panel of the 
Commission so constituted is, under section 14 , headed by the Minister of 
Justice and the duty is to investigate the affairs of persons mentioned under 
section 12(a), (b) and (c). Under the Act the Minister of Justice also has 
power, after completion of the investigation with regard to every case 
brought before the Commission, to prepare a report of all the material facts 
and of the findings reached by it and submit such report to the President of 
the Republic, who shall issue directives concerning the legal action that may 
be taken with respect to the property which is suspected of being the subject 
of an unlawful enrichment, and with respect to the person who was the 
owner or possessor of that property with respect to any other person who 
participated or joined in the ownership or possession of such property. In 
addition, the Minister of Justice may make regulations for carrying out the 
provisions of the Act. 
 
(x) The Constitutional and Administrative Justice Act, 1996: 
 The object of the Constitutional and Administrative Justice Act, 1996 
is to provide for the rules governing, inter alia, interpretation of the 
Constitution and Constitutional suits. With respect to this section 9 provides 
that the Government is to be regarded as an interested party in any 
constitutional suit or petition and the Attorney-General, now Minister of 
Justice, must be summoned. Besides that the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
section 16(1) is the only judicial end competent to interpret the Constitution 
on the application by the Minister of Justice. Such application based on sub-
section (2) of the same section is discretionary as he may on his own motion 
or on the application of the interested parties, submit an application for 
interpretation if he is satisfied that the nature and importance of the 
provisions submitted require such interpretation to ensure consistency in 
their application. Nevertheless the Supreme Court is, based on section 18, at 
liberty to call on the Minister of Justice to file further statements or 
explanations. But the position is rather different now given the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Sudan, 1998 and Constitutional Court Act, 1998. The 
fact of the matter is that neither the Constitutional Court Act, 1998 nor any 
other law in force has repealed the Constitutional and Administrative Justice 
Act, 1996. Hence, this implies that it is still in force and it provides for vital 
rules which regulate the procedures relating to institution of objections 
against administrative decisions. It cannot be deemed as spent and therefore 
subject to omission by the Minister of Justice in accordance with section 6 
(1)  (a) of the Revised Edition of the Laws Act, 1974. Therefore, the only 
possibility left is, in my opinion, that there are, in force, two overlapping 
laws governing the matter of institution of constitutional suit in which case 
the only remedy is the application of section 6(4)  of the Interpretation of 
Laws and General Clauses Act, 1974 which reads: 
 Any special law or any special provision in any law in respect of any 
matter shall be deemed an exception to any general law or general provision 
in any law governing such matter. 
 Based on the above provision the Constitutional Court Act, being a 
special law, must be deemed an exception and prevalent on the 
Constitutional and Administrative Justice Act, being a general law. 
 
Conclusion: 
 It has already been known that the Attorney-General or Minister of 
Justice, as it is now the case, is an important legal integral part and parcel of 
the executive who is, constitutionally and legally, a legal advisor of the 
State. He, in this capacity, carries out, on behalf of the State, all the 
businesses of legal nature. In the Sudan laws he exercises sweeping powers 
to an extent that it cannot be contemplated that the State would function 
without his vital legal services. And though the Attorney-General and 
Minister of Justice are not the same public persons the Sudanese experience 
shows that both posts could be held at the same time by one person or 
distinctly by two persons, and in this case the Attorney-General had been 
responsible and subordinate to Minister of Justice for the discharge of his 
duties. The instances in which the Attorney-General alternated with the 
Minister of Justice in presiding over the Ministry of Justice or Chamber 
show that they exercised the same legal functions and powers84. These 
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circumstances give an impression that there is no significant difference 
between them in the Sudan legal system. However, there is serious loophole 
in the power of the Minister of Justice to make legal advise in accordance 
with section 7 of the Ministry of Justice Organization Act, 1983. The law in 
this particular area is rid of any mechanism for enforcing such legal advise 
against defiant Government institutions. Another situation which needs 
legislative mending is the uncertain position of the State Minister of Justice. 
Finally, the Peace Agreement of a January 2005 between the Sudan 
Government and Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement is certain to 
bring forthwith tremendous changes in the law applicable and re-
organization of legal institutions including the Ministry of Justice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Powers of the Attorney-General in  
Constitutions and Laws of Other Countries 
 
 It is common knowledge that in the various countries of the world, 
there exist many legal systems. This chapter will be devoted only to three of 
them, namely, the English legal system, the United States of America legal 
system and the Indian legal system. The focus will be on the position and 
powers of the Attorney-General in the Constitutions and laws relative to 
those legal systems. They will be considered in turn. 
1. The English Legal System: 
(i) The Constitutional and legal position of the Attorney-General: 
 It is conceded that the legal system in England is not an organized 
service as it is in the case of France. There is no single figure at the head of 
this system comparable to a Minister of Justice and hence the control is 
shared by a number of persons, including the Attorney-General. The English 
law closest approach to a Minister of Justice is the Lord Chancellor85. The 
idea of federal law is also completely foreign to English law for England has 
a unitary political structure86. 
 The operation of those political structures is governed by a 
Constitution. This Constitution is described as unwritten constitution 
because it is not embodied, wholly or mainly in one enactment or formally 
related series of enactments87. Therefore it is not possible to point to any 
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particular written document as possessing any extraordinary sanctity and set 
on that basis as it is the practice in most other countries88. A Constitution is 
normally defined as a document having a special legal sanctity which sets 
out the framework and the principal functions of the organs of Government 
of a State and declares the principles governing the operation of those 
organs89. Thus constitutional law is, for example, concerned with the 
organization of Government departments and the constitutional status of the 
Ministers and civil servants to the exclusion of the details of services such as 
education90. Thus constitutional law is also defined as that part of law which 
relates to Government91. In other words it means the rules which regulate the 
structure of the principal organs of Government and their relationship to 
each other, and determine their principal functions92. 
   The British constitution does not permit the King to appear in his own 
courts in order to support his interest in person. Therefore the King is 
represented before those courts by his legal representatives who include his 
attorney who bears the title of Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is 
primarily an officer of the Crown and in essence an officer of the public and 
although he performs important judicial functions, at common law he is in 
no case a court in the ordinary meaning of the word93. Thus he represents the 
Crown in the courts in all matters in which rights of a public character come 
into question, and is therefore, the representative and legal advisor of all 
public departments which have capacity to sue and be sued. He is a 
necessary party to the assertion of public rights even where the moving party 
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is a private individual. The Attorney-General as representing the Crown can 
be sued in equity for a declaration of right94. In his absence or incapacity his 
duties devolve upon the Solicitor-General who is in fact deputy to the 
Attorney-General. Together they are known as Law Officers and both are 
appointed by the Prime Minister95. Both posts are salaried and the office is 
conferred by patent and is held during pleasure. Neither the Attorney-
General nor the Solicitor-General is allowed to engage in private business96.  
 Besides the constitutional and legal position of the Attorney-General, 
noted above, he enjoys, under the British Constitution, administrative as well 
as political position. He is politically a member of the Ministry but not of the 
Cabinet97. 
 There are separate law officers who represent the Crown for Scotland 
under the title of the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor-General for Scotland 
and for Ireland by the Attorney-General for Ireland. There are as well 
separate law officers for Lancaster and Duchan whose duty is also to 
represent the Crown98.  
 
(ii) Powers of the Attorney-General: 
(a) Criminal Powers: 
 It has been stated before that England, unlike many countries, has no 
Minister of Justice. There the conduct and supervision of criminal 
proceedings are not concentrated in the hands of the minister or ministry. 
They are divided among a number of ministers and law officers of the 
Crown. These ministers and law officers including Attorney-General, are 
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mainly, the Lord Chancellor, Home Secretary, the Solicitor-General and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions99.  
 The Home Secretary plays an important role in the control and 
supervision of certain aspects of the criminal process. Thus he has control 
over penal institutions and he advises the Crown on the exercise of the 
prerogative of mercy. The Home Secretary is empowered to appoint the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and he exercises an essential measure of 
supervision over the police. In addition, he exercises the powers of granting 
an accused bail in cases of treason and of granting leave to prosecute aliens 
for offences committed within British territorial waters. All these powers 
make the Home Secretary something of a Minister of Justice in the field of 
criminal law100. Still, as indicated previously, the British nearest approach to 
a Minister of Justice is the Lord Chancellor. 
  The same is true in relation to the Solicitor-General. He is a law 
officer of the Crown whose appointment is made on political basis. He is 
deputy to the Attorney-General and is a barrister and a member of the House 
of Commons. By law any functions authorized or required to be discharged 
by the Attorney-General may, unless expressly excluded, be discharged by 
the Solicitor-General in case office of the former is vacant, or he is absent or 
ill or if the Attorney-General authorizes his deputy to act in any particular 
case. Hence the Solicitor-General has no independent special powers or 
duties in respect of criminal proceedings.  
 Another official who exercises powers in the sphere of criminal 
proceedings is the Director of Public Prosecutions. His department was set 
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up in 1879 under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1879101. The purpose of 
the office is to institute, undertake or carry on such criminal proceedings and 
to give such advice and assistance to chief officers of police, clerks to justice 
and other persons as may be prescribed by regulations made under the 1879 
Act or may be directed in a special case by the Attorney-General. It is a 
prerequisite that a person who is appointed by the Home Secretary to occupy 
the post of the Director of Public Prosecutions must be a barrister or solicitor 
of at least ten years standing. 
 It is the duty of the Director of Public Prosecutions to institute, 
undertake or carry on criminal proceedings in specific cases mainly when 
the offence is punishable with death and the case has been referred to him by 
a Government department and he considers that criminal proceedings should 
be instituted or the case appears to him to be important or difficult or for any 
other reason it requires his intervention. It is also the duty of the Director of 
the Public Prosecutions to appear for the Crown or the prosecutor if he is 
directed to do so by the court. In all these cases the Director is not of course 
personally and actually to conduct the proceedings but his department, at 
least in the higher courts, will nominate counsel to appear for the Director. 
 Apart from the police, private citizens occasionally have the right of 
prosecution. Likewise Government departments, public bodies and large 
commercial firms often have legal departments and conduct their own 
prosecutions. For example commercial firms prosecute for offences that 
interfere with their business, government departments, for instance the 
Board of Inland Revenue prosecutes for income tax violations, the Board of 
Trade prosecutes for commercial frauds and the Post Office prosecutes for 
mail offences. The chief officer of every police station also has the duty to 
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report to the Director of Public Prosecutions offences which are punishable 
with death; offences for which the Director must prosecute or for which the 
prosecution requires his consent; prosecutions for indictable offences which 
have been wholly withdrawn or not proceeded with in a reasonable time; 
where the Director himself makes a request for information; offences in 
respect of which the advice or the assistance of the Director is desirable; and 
certain other specific offences, for example, incest, sedition, manslaughter, 
rape, abortion and prosecution for obscene or indecent libels. In these cases 
the Director will then tender such advice as he considers desirable and, when 
necessary, he will institute or take over the proceedings. 
 Generally, the onus of proof in criminal cases rests on the prosecution. 
It is the prosecution to establish positively that the crime was committed and 
that the accused committed it. If the prosecution fails to furnish evidence 
against the accused at the trial the judge is obliged to record the verdict of 
“no guilty”. The prosecution is at liberty at some later stage of a trial not to 
ask for a conviction i.e. withdraw charges. Then the trial court can direct the 
jury to acquit the accused102.  
  The Attorney-General also plays an important part in the control and 
supervision of the criminal process. Certain criminal cases must be reported 
to the Attorney-General, and his consent is necessary before criminal 
proceedings are taken in certain cases, for example, bribery, incest, corrupt 
practices and offences against the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 and 1939, the 
Dangerous Drugs Act, the Public Order Act, 1936 and various other Acts. 
He is also head of the English Bar103; and he exercises a power of 
supervision over the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
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 One of the most important powers of the Attorney-General is his right 
to enter a nolle prosequi in respect of proceedings on indictment or 
inquisition104. This does have the effect of putting an end to the proceedings 
but the accused is not thereby acquitted because subsequently he may, at 
least in theory, be reindicted for the same offence105. Nolle prosequi was at 
issue in the case of R.v. Comptroller-General of Patents.106 The facts of the 
case were as follows: an application was made to the comptroller by Felex 
Meyer for the grant of a patent for improvements in power looms for 
weaving two or more cloths simultaneously. The prosecutor, J.D. 
Tomlinson, gave notice, at the Patent Office, of opposition to the grant of 
patent, on the ground that the invention had been patented in this country in 
two applications of prior date. The prosecutor did not shew that he was 
interested in the subject-matter of the earlier patents, and the Comptroller-
General applied to the Attorney-General under section 59 of the Patents, 
Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, for directions as to hearing the 
prosecutor in opposition to the grant of the patent.  
 The Attorney-General directed that the prosecution should not be 
heard. This was an appeal from a judgment of a Divisional Court 
discharging a rule nisi obtained by the prosecutor asking for a Mandamus to 
compel the Comptroller- General of patents to hear his objection to a patent 
applied for by one Meyer. The Court of Appeal, held, inter alia, that a nolle 
prosequi may be entered at any time after the signing of the bill of 
indictment or inquisition and before judgment and that whether a nolle 
prosequi is in fact entered is in the complete discretion of the Attorney-
General and is not subject to any control by the courts. It is an established 
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rule in the English law that a nolle prosequi is only entered where there is no 
likelihood that adequate evidence will ever be available to secure a 
conviction107. The right to enter a nolle prosequi extends to civil 
proceedings108.  
 The Attorney-General also acts as prosecutor both for the House of 
Lords and for the House of Commons. In connection with offences directly 
concerning the House, the House directs the Attorney-General to 
prosecute109; in the case of offences not directly concerning the House, the 
House requests the Crown that the Attorney-General be directed to 
prosecute. In connection with the administration of criminal law, the 
Attorney-General together with the Solicitor-General are included in the 
Commission of the Peace for every county and division. He has the right to 
file criminal information ex-officio for misdemeanor110. He is also entitled to 
demand trial at Bar as of right where the Crown is interested, if he waives 
the right, the Attorney-General is entitled to have the venue changed to any 
county in which he selects to have the case tried111. 
 It is worth mentioning that English criminal procedure is essentially 
accusatory and it is a system of free accusation i.e. the right to prosecute and 
accuse belongs to every citizen whether that citizen is interested or not in the 
crime which he prosecutes112. 
  
(b) Civil powers:  
 The Attorney-General represents the Crown in the courts in civil 
matters where the public interest is concerned. He advises the Cabinet and 
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Government departments on legal matters as mentioned earlier. He has 
precedence over all King’s counsels. When representing the Crown in the 
courts, the Attorney-General has no greater legal rights than other members 
of the Bar although, he is the head of the Bar, in so far that he or any person 
acting for him must conform to the rules of the court in which the 
proceeding he is engaged takes place113. The courts exercise over the 
Attorney-General the same authority which they exercise over every other 
suitor or his advocate. Where a prerogative is claimed on behalf of the 
Crown it is for him or any other representative of the Crown to clearly 
establish such prerogative which makes them to be on a different footing 
from the subject regarding procedure. The opinion of the Attorney-General 
is, in the eyes of the court, entitled to no more authority than that of any 
other member of the Bar. Admissions made by him bind the Crown as to 
matters of fact but not as to matters of law. The courts have no right to call 
upon him in order to be examined as a witness. 
 The Attorney-General also has the duty together with the Solicitor-
General and judges to attend the House of Lords at the beginning of every 
Parliament. In peerage cases, in which a claim is made by petition to the 
Crown, the petition is referred to him for report and advice to the Crown that 
the petition be referred to the House of Lords sitting as a Committee for 
Privileges. And he, on hearing of the same attends as assistant to the 
Committee114.  
 It has been shown before that one of the functions of the Attorney-
General is the representation of the Crown in the courts in all matters in 
which rights of a public character come into question. It is accepted that 
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Crown in fact means Government115 and from the legal point of view, 
Government may be described as the exercise of certain powers and 
performance of certain duties by public authorities or officers, together with 
certain private persons or corporations which exercise public functions116. Of 
course like a corporation, the Crown can only operate through human agents 
or servants. And having considered the constitutional and legal functions of 
the Attorney-General vis-à-vis the Crown it will be important to go through 
the history of remedies against the Crown before embarking on the present 
state of English law. The oldest remedy available to a subject which would 
enable the courts to give redress was petition of right117. At common law it 
was recognized in Henry III's rein that the King could not be sued in the 
courts of law for no sovereign could be sued in his own courts. But it was 
admitted that the King, as the fountain of justice and equity could not refuse 
to redress wrongs when petitioned to do so by his subjects. Hence it became 
an established rule that the subject though he could not sue the King, could 
bring his petition of right which, if acceded to by the King, would enable the 
courts to give redress. Usually the petition of right was brought for a 
grievance which would have been the subject of a real action if relief had 
been sought against anyone except the King. To a petition of right there 
must always be a reply and the proceedings if the petition is successful will 
end up in a judgment118. Petition of right is thus defined by Staunford as 
follows: 
 Petition is the remedy the subject has when the King sieseth his land or 
takes away his goods from him having no title by order of his laws so to 
do. And therefore is his petition called a petition of right, because of the 
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right the subject has against the King by the order of his laws to the thing 
he sues for. 
 
  The remedy of petition of right had four serious procedural defects 
and they were as follows119: 
(i) There was a lengthy preliminary procedure before the legal question at issue 
could be brought before the court. 
 
(ii) A garland of prerogative in the pleadings and proceedings of the King’s suits 
place a very heavy burden on the petitioner; that in a petition all conveyances 
and acts which give possession to the King ought to be expressly stated, and 
in it the King ought to be informed of all his titles, and that in certain, and not 
generally as by showing that divers persons were seized or the like, and 
otherwise the petition is worthless. When this fence had been successfully 
surmounted the petitioner was further handcuffed by the fact that the King had 
many advantages in pleading what he had not.  
 
(iii)When the petition of right turned, as was usually the case, upon a complaint 
redressable by real action, all the causes which made these actions so dilatory 
applied to these proceedings.  
 
(iv) It was not sufficient for the petitioner reply to show the King had no right, 
unless he could prove that he was entitled.  
 
 These defects encountered by a petitioner in the petition of right gave 
rise to other remedies. Hence it was enacted in 1360 that the person 
aggrieved should in certain cases be permitted to traverse the facts found by 
an office. Thus, in case to which the statute was applicable the subject got 
either by means of a traverse or a monstrans de droit a far speedier remedy 
than that of petition of right. The statute of 1360 had been construed 
liberally, and further extended by an Act of 1548 to an extent that the 
remedies of traverse and monstrans de droit became valuable remedies 
whereby many of the delays incident to a petition of right could be 
avoided120.  
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 In connection with the remedies available against the Crown the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries witnessed transition from the 
mediaeval to the modern law. Modern relations between law and equity 
began to emerge and other branches of law notably the law of contract 
started to take shape. But yet and before the enactment of the 1947 Act the 
principle underlying the remedy of petition of right, that the subject must get 
the same legal redress against the Crown as he had against a fellow-subject, 
was a still living principle, that was upheld in the modern common law, to 
safeguard the subject’s  rights.121 In the aforementioned period the remedy of 
equitable relief as against the Crown emerged. It was in the case of Pawlett. 
v. The Attorney-General122 in 1668 that it was first decided that the subject 
was entitled to relief against the Crown. In that case the plaintiff had 
mortgaged property to a mortgagee. The legal estate had descended to the 
mortgagee’s heir, who had been attainted of treason. The King had therefore 
seized his property; and the plaintiff brought his bill in the Exchequer 
against the Attorney-General for redemption. It was argued that the plaintiff 
could not proceed this way, but must petition the King to allow him, as a 
matter of grace and favour, to redeem. 
 But in the nineteenth century the courts refused to develop the remedy 
of petition of right into a general remedy in tort123. Before 1947 the Crown 
enjoyed immunity from tortious liability. But this immunity had been 
mitigated by the Crown as a matter of grace ‘standing behind’ any servant 
who committed a tort in the course of his employment. If the injured person 
was successful in suing the servant who was personally liable, the Crown 
would satisfy the judgment. It transpired that this petition had three main 
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defects; that the plaintiff might not know the identity of the person who 
injured him and hence he had none to sue; that the Crown might despite that 
the tortfeasor was its servant and in that case the injured person could not 
obtain a judicial decision on the question and that most importantly for the 
present law, the Crown’s practice provided no machinery for recovering 
damages from the Crown in situation whereby private employer would be 
liable directly rather than vicariously. Because of these defects the United 
Kingdom Parliament enacted the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, which, inter 
alia, makes the Crown liable in tort. This enactment provides for the liability 
of the Crown in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents. As a 
result tortious liability is imposed on the Crown in four separate categories 
mainly torts committed by servants or agents, breach of employers duties, 
breach of occupiers duties and breach of statutory duties124. We need not go 
into details of these categories.  
 It has been also accepted that the petition of right would lie against the 
Crown for breach of contract. Thus the Crown proceedings statutes simply 
preserve the Crown’s liability in contract125. More importantly there are two 
requirements for the contracts made or purporting to be made by a 
Government representing the Crown; that the contract must be within the 
power of the particular government department and that the contract must 
have been made by a servant or agent acting within the scope of his 
authority. In case there are restrictions on the power of the Government to 
contract they must be complied with. Likewise a contract within the 
authority of the Government representing the Crown will bind the Crown 
only if it is made by a servant or agent of the Crown, acting within the scope 
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of his authority. This is often determined by statute or regulations made 
under statutory authority. In this case the requirements of the statute or 
regulations must be complied with and if mandatory, then a contract made in 
their breach will be invalid. Hence no Crown servant has authority to 
dispense with the requirements of a statute or regulations126. Besides statute 
or regulations the scope of authority of Crown servant is also determined by 
the principles of the law of agency127. In short the act of an agent binds the 
principal if it is within the agent’s actual authority; the agent’s ostensible 
authority or the agent’s usual authority. 
  In fact the Act, drastically, changed the substantive law by creating a 
right to sue the Crown in contract, tort, infringement of intellectual property 
rights and by applying to the Crown the existing law as to indemnity, joint 
and several tortfeasors and contributory negligence128. Hence the general 
effect of the 1947 Act is to treat proceedings against the Crown as if they 
were proceedings between subjects. But there are a number of exceptional 
provisions in connection with the proceedings where the Crown is a party to 
an action. They are as follows129:  
(i) Where proceedings are issued out of a District Registry, the Crown may elect 
to file its acknowledgment of service either in the District Registry or in the 
Central Office. 
 
(ii) Proceedings may not be transferred without the consent of the Crown. 
 
(iii)The Crown is entitled to particulars as to how its liability is alleged to have 
arisen; it may request further information and the time for acknowledgment of 
service is extended to four days after the Crown has notified the claimant in 
writing that it is satisfied with the information furnished.  
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(iv) A person may not set-off any counterclaim against the Crown where the 
claim by the Crown is in respect of taxes, duty or penalties.   
(v) Where the proceedings are by or against the Crown service on the Crown 
must be effected: 
(a)  by leaving the document at the office of the person who is in 
accordance with section 18 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, 
to be served, or of any agent whom that person has nominated 
for the purpose, but in either case with a member of staff of that 
person or agent; or 
(b)  by posting it in prepaid envelope addressed to the person who is 
to be served as aforesaid or to any such agent as  aforesaid. 
  
(vi) No application for summary judgment may be made against the 
Crown except with permission of the court and a default judgment 
may not be entered against the Crown. 
 
(vii) Except where the Crown is already a party to proceedings a claim 
form may not be issued against the Crown without the permission of 
the court.  
 
(viii) Civil proceedings by or against the Crown must not except with the 
consent of the Crown be tried elsewhere than at the Royal Courts of 
Justice 
 
(ix)  Except with their written consent the commissioner of Inland 
Revenue may not be joined as a party to proceedings. 
 
 After having gone through the remedies available against the Crown 
and the change that affected them as a result of the enactment of the 1947 
Act which represents the present position of the English law, it is also 
important to consider the position of the Crown vis-a-vis remedies of 
Mandamus, prohibition and Certiorari, Habeas Corpus, Declaration, 
Injunction, Specific Performance, Discovery and Interrogation130. Regarding 
Mandamus it is a prerogative writ which lies to compel the performance of a 
public duty. It is an established rule that Mandamus neither lie against the 
Crown nor against a Crown servant to compel him to perform a duty which 
is owed by the Crown. There are reasons for the Crown’s immunity from 
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Mandamus that there would be an incongruity in the King commanding 
himself and that the writ of Mandamus could not be enforced against the 
King. These reasons are not valid today because the courts have mitigated 
the severity of the King’s immunity from Mandamus by the development of 
the persona designata rule. The gist of this rule is that where a Crown 
servant is the person designated by statute to perform a public duty then 
Mandamus will lie against such servant in that capacity. But when 
Mandamus is sought in the manner indicated it is a question of statutory 
construction whether the duty is owed by the Crown, in which case 
Mandamus will not lie, or by the servant as a designated person, in which 
case Mandamus will lie.  
 In relation to writs of prohibition and certiorari the general assumption 
is that they will not lie against the Crown. The reasons given for the Crown’s 
immunity from Mandamus are also true regarding these prerogative writs 
since each involves issuing of an order against the respondent with the 
exception that prohibition and certiorari will lie only to bodies which are 
under a duty to act judicially. It is certain that both prohibition and certiorari 
will lie against Crown’s servants, including Ministers and Government 
departments, that are under a duty to act judicially. 
 Regarding the writ of habeas corpus it requires the body of a detained 
person to be brought before the court, and show cause for his detention; to 
enable the court to enquire into the legality of the detention. This writ is 
directed to the Crown’s servant having control of the body. Usually 
therefore it issues to a Crown’s servant who is simply performing his 
ordinary duties. 
  There is also the remedy of declaration which is a judgment which 
declares the law affecting a controversy but which is unaccompanied by any 
coercive decree. The lack of a coercive order is often a disadvantage because 
public officials are expected to obey the law once it has been declared.   
 Another remedy is injunction. It is an order which directs a person not 
to do, or to do, a particular act. There are two types of injunction, 
prohibitory, which directs the defendant not to do a particular act and the 
mandatory which directs the defendant to do a particular act. In order to 
obtain an injunction a private individual must show the invasion of a private 
right recognized at law or in equity. If an act by a public servant was 
authorized, then injunction will not lie, for the court will not prohibit that the 
act sought to be enjoined is or would be ultra vires. The Attorney-General, 
either of his own motion or at the initiative of a private individual, may bring 
a suit for an injunction to restrain an invasion of public rights. 
 There is also a remedy of specific performance. It is not available in 
the United Kingdom against the Crown; instead the court may not make an 
order declaratory of the rights of the parties.  
 Then comes the remedies of discovery and interrogatories which are 
available against the Crown by virtue of specific statutory provisions. Of 
course the Crown enjoys the privilege whenever the disclosure of a 
document or the answer to an interrogatory would be injurious to the public 
interests. Hence discovery and interrogatories have always been available to 
the Crown against a subject except in criminal prosecutions or civil actions 
to recover penalties.  
 
2. Position and Powers of the Attorney-General in the Legal System 
of the United States of America: 
 
(i) Constitutional and Legal Position: 
The legal system of the United States of America is part of the Common 
Law tradition131. The Common Law is defined as that body of law which 
originated and developed in England and is in effect among those states 
which were originally settled and controlled by England. It consists of those 
principles and rules of action applicable to the Government and security of 
persons and property which do no trest for their authority upon the positive 
declarations of the wills of the legislature.  
 The United States of America is a republic that operates under a 
federalist system132. A federal system is briefly defined as a system which 
provides for a division of the powers of Government on territorial basis133. 
 Therefore, Governments at each of the two levels, national and state, 
are assigned specific powers which they exercise upon the people each 
within its jurisdiction. In other words a federal system is a Government and 
legal system in which the central, national Government shares powers with 
states each of which is to some degree sovereign in its own right134. Thus as 
a result of the United States of America being federal system any particular 
legal transaction may be governed solely by state law, or solely by federal 
law or by both. This means that there is not one legal system in the 
aforementioned country, but there exist fifty-one legal systems including the 
federal system135.  
 The most pivotal document that regulates federalism in the United 
States of America is the 1787 Constitution. It is described as a written 
document which was drafted at Philadelphia in 1787 plus the amendments 
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which have since been added136. It is the supreme law of the land which 
provides the base for the United States of America Government137. No laws 
may contradict its provisions and no Government authority is excused from 
complying with it. There are also state constitutions which are the supreme 
law within the state138. State statutes must conform to respective state’s 
constitution. Federal constitution or legislation prevails over all state 
constitutions or legislation. 
 According to the Constitution of the United States of America federal 
Government is comprised of three branches, namely, the executive branch, 
the legislative branch and the judicial branch. It is the executive branch that 
will be focused on because of its relevance to this dissertation. The executive 
branch, inter alia, includes the president and all federal departments and 
Government agencies. All executive power of the Government is vested in 
the President, who inter alia, selects the heads of the fourteen Government 
departments. These departments, among which is the department of justice, 
are not mentioned in the Constitution139. The department of justice was 
created in 1870 and it is headed by the Attorney-General140. The Attorney-
General constitutionally and legally is the chief law enforcement officer of 
the Federal Government who represents the United States in legal matters 
generally and who gives advice and opinions to the President and to the 
heads of the executive departments of the Government when so requested. 
He appears in person to represent the Government before the United States 
Supreme Court in cases of exceptional gravity or importance141. Thus the 
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Attorney-General in that country is constitutionally and legally an integral 
part of the executive and is the legal representative and advisor of the 
Government of the United States. 
(ii) Powers of the Attorney-General  
 The department of justice is to carry out most of the legal activities of 
the national Government. Its leading purpose is to enforce federal laws, by 
furnishing legal counsel in federal cases and by construing the enactments 
under which other departments act. The department also conducts all suits in 
the Supreme Court which involve the United States, supervises the federal 
penal institutions and investigates, detects and prosecutes violation against 
federal law142. The Attorney-General of the United States, unlike his 
counterparts in the States, has the power to supervise and direct the activities 
of prosecuting attorney, called United States attorney, in the national 
structure. Although neither appointed nor removed by the Attorney-General, 
the United States marshals and attorneys are subject to his control. The 
function of federal law enforcement falls on this category i.e. marshals and 
attorneys. There are also, within the federal Attorney-General's department, 
other lawyers whose business is to institute investigation, supervise or direct 
litigation in federal courts. The Antitrust Division, the Civil Division, the 
Civil Rights Division, the Criminal Division, the Internal Security Division, 
the Land Division, the Tax Division and the Administrative Division all 
perform these kinds of legal activities. The activity of each division is 
determined by the degree of congressional support plus the energy of the 
Assistant Attorney-General in charge. There is nothing that prevents the 
Attorney-General himself to intervene to set general policy particularly in 
sensitive political matters. Likewise the United States Attorney-General has 
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discretion to request the Solicitor-General to have special charge of the 
business of the Government in the Supreme Court, to conduct and argue any 
case in which the United States is interested and to give his approval to all 
appeals taken by the United States. Thus the Solicitor-General is the most 
frequent and the most successful litigant to appeal before the Supreme Court 
or to suggest cases for its review. Other agencies nominally fall under the 
control of the Attorney-General within the Justice Department and they are, 
namely, the Federal Bureau of investigation and the immigration and 
nationalization service143. 
 But in accordance with the provisions of the United States Code all 
functions of all other offices of the Department of Justice and all functions 
of all agencies of the Department are transferred, except a few, to the 
Attorney-General who is vested with power to authorize their performance 
or the performance of any of his functions by any of such offices, agencies 
or employees. Based on the provisions of the same Code the Attorney-
General in the discharge of his functions is assisted by a number of officials, 
namely, the Deputy Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and a number of 
Assistant Attorneys-General. All these are officers who must be learned in 
the law before their appointment to their respective posts. The Code 
provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the Attorney-General, or in 
his absence or disability, the Solicitor-General is empowered to exercise all 
the powers of that office.  
 Having generally dealt with the functions and powers of the United 
States Attorney-General, it is important to lay some emphasis on the issues 
of prosecution and suits against states in that country. But first it is essential 
to consider the type of criminal procedure applicable in the United States of 
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America. There are three fundamental types of procedure that are in effect 
distinguishable, namely, the accusatory type, the inquisitorial type and the 
mixed type144. Criminal procedure in the United States is accusatory, with 
the prosecution taking the leading role145. The trial of criminal reflects the 
adversary nature of the judicial process with the prosecutor on the one side 
and the accused on the other. The United States law of criminal procedure, 
accusatory as it is, has been affected to a greater extent than that of civil 
procedure by both federal and state constitutions. It is statutory in form and 
varies largely from one jurisdiction to another since there are fifty-one 
different legal systems as previously seen. Thus in describing prosecution in 
that country, it is necessary to deal separately with the three levels of 
Government namely, federal, state and local146. The federal Government has 
its own system of courts and prosecutors completely different from the 
courts and prosecutions in each of the fifty states. The federal judicial 
system is divided into ninety-two districts, each having its own trial court 
and its own United States Attorney. His duty is to represent the federal 
Government in both criminal and civil litigation. Therefore he prosecutes in 
federal court all federal crimes committed within his district. The United 
States Attorney is a lawyer appointed by the President with the approval of 
the Senate and he is in turn vested with the power to appoint a staff of 
lawyers to assist him. His office being part of the federal department of 
justice, is not entirely autonomous. Though he enjoys a wide discretion in 
running his office, he is ultimately under the supervision of the Attorney-
General of the United States, who is, as shown, both the head of the 
department of Justice and a member of the President’s Cabinet. Crimes other 
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than federal ones are ordinarily a matter of state law prosecuted in the state 
courts by state officials of two kinds: attorneys-general and district 
attorneys. The attorney-general works on a state basis whereas the district 
attorney works on local, usually a county basis. Each state has an attorney-
general who is directly elected in forty-one states, appointed by the governor 
in seven states, by the legislature in one state and by the state supreme court 
in an other. The attorney-general has few duties in relation with prosecution 
of criminal cases because his main duty is to represent the state Government 
in civil litigation. The bulk of offences are left to be prosecuted on a local 
basis by the district attorneys. As a rule, the district attorney is autonomous, 
his office not being administratively subordinate to the state’s attorney-
general or any other official. He is usually locally elected for a term of two 
or four years. He enters a criminal case at the point where police 
investigation stops. The only cases he is barred from handling are those tried 
in traffic and juvenile courts; for they are prosecuted by the police.  
 The most important functions of the prosecution are that he must take 
a decision on whether or not to bring criminal charges against an alleged 
offender, he must put the accusation into proper form and place it before the 
proper judicial authorities and he must present to the court evidence tending 
to establish the guilt of the accused147. 
 The most essential power exercised by the prosecuting attorney is 
nolle prosequi.148 A nolle prosequi is described as a formal entry of record 
by the prosecuting attorney by which he declares that he will not prosecute 
the case further. It may apply to some count of an indictment, a part of 
divisive count or to some of the defendants or all of them. In the absence of 
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a controlling statute or rule of court, the power to enter a nolle prosequi lies 
in the sole discretion of the prosecuting attorney. The court has no 
justification to proceed further in the case after the entry of the nolle 
prosequi. The effect of the nolle prosequi entered by the prosecuting 
attorney is that it terminates the prosecution and frees the defendant. In some 
jurisdictions there are statutes or court rules requiring the consent of the trial 
court to the entry of a nolle prosequi by the prosecutor. Because nolle 
prosequi is an exclusive power of the prosecuting attorney, the court will 
not, on the motion of the defendant, advise the attorney to enter or file a 
nolle prosequi149. Nolle prosequi may not be entered before indictment. 
There also may be a nolle prosequi before trial which does not bar a 
subsequent prosecution. Possibly, a nolle prosequi may be withdrawn during 
the same term of court150.  
 It has been shown previously that the functions of the United States 
Attorney-General are, inter alia, the representation of Government before 
the United States Supreme Court in exceptionally grave and important cases. 
Representation of the federal Government in cases other than that is the duty 
of the United States Attorney. 
 Regarding suits against States each state court system, as well as 
federal court system, operates under its own law of civil procedure151. Thus, 
the law of civil procedure in that country is far from uniform. Procedure 
varies not only with the jurisdiction but also with the remedy sought by the 
plaintiff. Parties to litigation, including Government of a given state, are 
represented by lawyers. i.e. a state attorney-general in case of a litigation 
against a state. An action is commenced by two writings, complaint and a 
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summons152. The compliant is a statement which sets out the nature of the 
plaintiff’s claim and his demand for relief. The summons is a notice 
informing the defendant that an action is being brought against him and 
calling upon him to answer the complaint. 
 Despite codification of rules of civil procedure governing litigation at 
both federal and state level, the United States Constitution provides, in 
Article 11, for an important principle relating to suits against states. That 
Article provides as follows: 
 
 The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizen of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state. 
 It is clear that the above Article provides for state immunity against 
suits commenced or prosecuted by certain categories. In determining 
whether a suit is brought against a state or not it is an established rule that 
the court will look behind and through the nominal practices on the record to 
ascertain who are the real parties to the suit153. More importantly, the other 
rule is that a state official possesses no protection from an unconstitutional 
statute of a state.  
 However, there are other cases giving Article 11 a restrictive effect by 
holding that counties and municipalities are suable in the federal courts; and 
that Government corporations of the state are not immune when suable 
under the law which created them154. But it is also true that other cases have 
expanded state immunity by expanding the prohibitions contained in the said 
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Article to include suits brought against a state by its own citizens, by a 
foreign state, by a federally chartered corporation or by a state as an agent of 
its own citizens to collect debts owed them by another state. This ruling in 
effect is based on the premise that the provisions of Article 11 prohibit any 
suit against a state without its consent except when brought by the United 
States or another state. Suits brought against state officials present special 
difficulty in that such suits brought against those officials acting either in 
excess of their statutory authority or in pursuance of unconstitutional statute 
are suits against the officer in his individual capacity and therefore are not 
prohibited by the provisions of the Article. Suits against an officer for the 
commission of a tort belong to the same category; on the other hand, suits 
against the officers of a state, involving state property or suits asking for 
relief which clearly calls for the exercise of official authority are not 
sustainable. Therefore Mandamus proceedings which seek affirmative 
official action on the part of state officials as the performance of an 
obligation required of the state in political capacity are regarded as suits 
against the state and hence not sustainable155. But conversely, Mandamus 
proceedings to compel a state official to perform plain or ministerial duty 
which admits of no discretion are not suits against the state since the official 
is regarded as acting in his individual capacity in failing to act according to 
law. Another category of suits which are considered to be an exception to 
the provisions of Article 11 are injunction proceedings against the states 
which are upheld even if they restrain state officials from exercising their 
discretionary duties and even if they enjoin the enforcement of the  statute 
prior to a determination of its unconstitutionality156. It is clear that the 
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provisions of Article 11 impliedly encourage settlement of disputes out of 
courts. 
 
3. The Attorney-General in the Legal System of India: 
 
(i) Constitutional and Legal Position: 
 India, being a federal republic, operates under a federal constitution. 
There are two levels of Government, the national level referred to as the 
Government of India and the state level represented by the Government of 
the state. According to the provisions of Article 76 of the constitution, the 
appointment of the Attorney-General is vested in the President of India. The 
person so appointed must be of the status of a Supreme Court judge. It is a 
constitutional duty of the Attorney-General to give legal advice to the 
Government of India upon such legal matters and to perform such other 
duties of a legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned 
to him by the President. He is also under an obligation to discharge the 
functions conferred on him by the Constitution or any other enactment for 
the time being in force. Remarkably, the Attorney-General for India, in the 
performance of his functions, has a right of audience over others in all courts 
in India157. He holds office during the pleasure of the President. 
 At the State level Article 165 of the Constitution provides that the 
Governor of each state is vested with power to appoint a person who is 
qualified to be appointed a judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General 
for the state. The legality of such appointment may be challenged by an 
application for quo warranto which is regarded as a civil proceeding. In a 
proceeding for quo warranto, the High Court may make an order of ouster 
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of the person holding the office in question158. It may issue an injunction 
restraining the person holding the office from discharging any of the 
functions, rights or duties of the office in question or it may even declare the 
office to be vacant. If the appointment is not challenged in the prescribed 
manner the Advocate-General holds office during the pleasure of the 
Governor159. It is the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to the 
Government of the state on legal matters, to perform such other duties of a 
legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by 
the Governor and to discharge the functions conferred on him by the 
Constitution or any other law for time being in force160. Thus the Advocate-
General for a state has the same position in relation to that state as the 
Attorney-General for India has to the union except that he does not enjoy 
any ex-officio right of audience in courts outside his state. But within the 
state he has ex-officio right of audience over all other advocates161. His 
office, in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act, 
1935, had no connection with the political changes in the provincial 
Government and hence enjoyed a tenure during the pleasure of the 
Governor. The most essential object is to secure for the provincial 
Governments legal advice from officers who had been free from the 
trammels of political or party associations. But under the Constitution the 
position is different, for the Advocate-General is no longer independent of 
the Government of the day as he was under the 1935 Act.  
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 The law referred to under Article 165 (2) includes the Government of 
India Act, 1935. It enumerates the functions of the Advocate-General as 
follows: 
(i) to advice the state Government on any legal problems which may be 
referred to him; 
(ii) to represent the state in original causes in the High Court to which the 
state is a party; 
(iii) to represent the state in any criminal appeals in the High Court which are 
regarded as of special importance. 
 
(iv) to enter a nolle prosequi or to grant a fiat for review of verdict in criminal 
cases tried by the High Court in its original jurisdiction; and 
 
(v) to protect public rights in such matters as public charities and public 
nuisances.  
 
 Despite the above functions the Advocate-General is, according to the 
rules in force in West Bengal, debarred from: 
(i) advising or holding briefs against the state; 
 
(ii) defending accused persons in criminal prosecution; 
 
(iii) advising private parties in cases in which he is likely to be called on to 
advice Government; and  
 
(iv) accepting appointment as director in any company without sanction of 
Government.  
  
 Based on these provisions it is unequivocal that, constitutionally and 
legally, the Attorney-General for India is, inter alia, the legal advisor of the 
national Government. The advocate-General for a state enjoys the same 
position in relation to that particular state.  
 
(ii) Functions of the Attorney-General: 
 The functions of both Attorney-General for India and Advocate-
General have already been considered. These duties include representation 
of Government and appearance on its behalf before courts of law in cases to 
which Government is a party. Suits by or against Government or public 
officers in their official capacity are regulated by rules of civil procedure. In 
any suit by or against the Government, it is required that the plaint or written 
statement must be signed by such person as the Government may, by order, 
appoint in this behalf. They also must be verified by any other person 
appointed by the Government and acquainted with the facts of the case162. 
Persons who act for the Government in respect of judicial proceedings are 
deemed to be the recognized agents of the Government by whom 
appearances, acts and applications are made or done on behalf of the 
Government163. The Government pleader in any court is also the agent of the 
Government in receiving processes against the Government issued by such 
court164. He has only to intimate to the court that he is representing the 
Government and no stamped power is required. For the Government to 
answer to the plaint the court issues instructions to the Government pleader 
to appear and answer on behalf of the Government165. Where the 
Government also undertakes the defence of a suit against a public officer, 
the Government pleader, once furnished with authority to appear and answer 
the plaint, must apply to the court which must cause a note of his authority 
to be entered in the register of civil suits. Where no such application is made 
by the Government pleader on or before the day fixed in the notice for the 
defendant to appear and answer, the case must proceed as if it were between 
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private parties166; provided that the defendant must not be liable to arrest nor 
his property to attachment.  
 In suits against Government it is required that the plaintiff gives 
notice of suit prior to the filing or institution of the same167. It has been 
stated that the object of notice is to give the Government or public officer an 
opportunity to consider his legal position and to make amends and settle the 
claim without litigation. In other words the object is manifestly to give the 
Government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is 
proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the 
position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff 
should be accepted or rejected; that the Government or officer should be 
informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it  or him and 
the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise relief asked for. It is 
an established rule that notice is not part of the plaintiff’s cause of action 
although it is a condition precedent which must be pleaded and if necessary 
proved unless waived before a suit can be instituted and maintained against 
the Government. The fact that notice was sent from a place does not in any 
way give the court of that place jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is no part 
of a cause of action. The period of notice is clear two months and failure to 
abide by this rule renders the suit premature and therefore it must be 
dismissed. In construing the notice the court is required to use common 
sense and must look at the document and understand it in a fair and 
reasonable sense in the way in which the writer meant and the addressee 
understood it. If notice is defective a suit cannot be maintained and the only 
order that could be passed is that dismissing the plaint. But if a notice fails to 
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mention the defendant whom plaintiff wishes to sue correctly or does not 
mention him at all except in a general manner, then his suit cannot be 
rejected on the ground that he has not complied with the requirements 
provided for under the civil procedure code so long as he states the cause of 
action, which is the foundation of his suit and gives his own name, 
description and address and states the relief, which he claims; and so long as 
the party which he subsequently sues is the party from whom he is entitled 
to that relief; notice must be such as to enable the addressee to identify the 
claimant. And a notice which does not state the intention to file a suit will 
not constitute a valid notice. It is also a rule that failure on the part of the 
Government to reply to the notice does not in any way amount to an 
admission of liability on the part of the Government and the Government is 
entitled to dispute its liability. Despite the above rules notice may be waived 
by the authority for whose benefit notice is provided; because there is no 
inconsistency between this and the one that notice is mandatory and must be 
enforced by the court. 
 In relation to the machinery of criminal justice the Advocate-General 
and the public prosecutor have an important role to play. The most essential 
power of the Advocate-General is that of nolle prosequi.  At any stage of 
any trial before a high Court, before the return of the verdict, the Advocate-
General may, if he thinks fit, inform the court on behalf of Government that 
he will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge, and therefore all 
proceedings on such charge against the defendant must be stayed, and he 
must be discharged of and from the offence. But such discharge must not 
amount to acquittal unless the presiding judge otherwise directs168. Thus 
entering a nolle prosequi in a trial before a High Court does not depend on 
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the consent of the court which a public prosecutor has to obtain. This power 
is indeed, right and privilege which the Advocate-General owns by virtue of 
his appointment. The effect of order of discharge is that it does not operate 
as a bar to fresh proceedings being taken before a competent magistrate 
upon a police report169.  
 Other important officers are public prosecutors who are appointed by 
the state Government, generally, or in any case or for any specified class of 
cases, in any local area170. It is important to show that appointment of a 
public prosecutor cannot be objectionable and the needs of the area would be 
the determining factor. It is also an obligation of the Government to indicate 
the local area within which the person appointed as public prosecutor is to 
exercise his powers. Failure to comply with this rule renders the 
appointment not valid with the result that the person invalidly appointed will 
be incompetent to exercise the duties for which he was appointed171. 
 The duty of public prosecutor in India resembles that of his 
counterpart in England. The rule is that in the case of a Crown prosecution in 
England where the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General is conducting the 
case for the prosecution there is never the least of animosity or prejudice172. 
It has been established that the public prosecutor has no other duties than 
those of the ordinary counsel for the Crown. He has nothing with getting up 
the case. His object should be to see that justice is vindicated, but not to 
obtain an unrighteous conviction; that the counsel for the prosecution is to 
be an assistant to the court in the furtherance of justice and not to act as 
counsel for any particular person or party; that he should not by statement 
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aggravate the case against prisoners or keep back a witness because his 
evidence may weaken the case for the prosecution; that his only object 
should be to aid the court in discovering truth; that a public prosecutor 
should avoid any proceeding likely to intimidate or unduly influence 
witnesses on either side; that it is beyond the region of doubt that counsel for 
the prosecution ought not to struggle to obtain a conviction, but should 
regard themselves rather than as ministers of justice, assisting its 
administration rather than advocates; and that it is his duty to put before the 
court all that can be said in support of the charge and he should not state that 
a lesser offence has been committed when a greater one is in fact committed. 
 The public prosecutor may always avail himself of the services of 
counsel retained by a private individual, and in so doing, he does not deprive 
himself of the management of the case. If the public prosecutor and the 
counsel retained by a private individual do not work in harmony, the counsel 
may retire or the public prosecutor may claim solely to himself the further 
conduct of the case. Furthermore, Indian law entrusts to the public 
prosecutor discretion to withdraw from the prosecution with the consent of 
the court and the effect of such withdrawal is that it puts to an end the 
case173. The law gives him a real discretion in the matter and it is open to 
him to withdraw the case at any stage of the case even after it has 
commenced and before the return of the verdict to the jury. He can even 
withdraw the case instituted by a private complaint without consulting the 
complainant. Withdrawal is not contemplated after the conviction of an 
accused by the first court and in the appellate state of a case. It is the duty of 
the public prosecutor who applies for permission for withdrawal to give 
cogent reasons and to satisfy the court that the withdrawal is in the interest 
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of justice. The court is entitled to demand from the public prosecutor reasons 
for the withdrawal of prosecution. A person against whom prosecution has 
been withdrawn can be examined as a witness in a case in which he had been 
accused174. An order of discharge passed on withdrawal of the case does not 
amount to an acquittal as to prevent the magistrate from re-arresting the 
accused for the same charge. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 The English legal system is one of the oldest legal systems of the 
world. It is based on common law and so are those the United States of 
America and Indian legal systems as they are former colonies of England. 
The Attorney-General in those countries, plays an important legal role which 
is indispensable. Given the nature of duties assigned, he is necessarily a 
lawyer by profession and according to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, he is part of executive. But in none of those countries can anybody 
envisage him as a judge despite his exercise of important judicial functions 
in England, for example. In those countries, the Attorney-General is assisted, 
in the discharge of his duties, by lawyers bearing different titles. The type of 
legal duties exercised by the Attorney-General in each of those countries is 
largely influenced by the system of government that is operative in each 
country. Thus federalism necessitates that he exercises legal duties at federal 
level leaving the rest of the legal duties to be exercised by other legal 
officers at state and local levels as it is the case in the United States of 
America. Representation of government in courts and legal advice to it are 
the most common legal business of the Attorney-General in those countries. 
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And because of his vital legal role he has precedence in courts in India, a 
privilege which he does not enjoy in England for instance.  
 Each legal system has its own remedies against the government and 
for reasons already stated the United States of America Constitution makes it 
more difficult for certain categories of claimants to sue state governments. 
Nevertheless no legal system is static and each of those three legal systems 
is bound to develop. 
Chapter Four 
Conclusion 
 
 The territories of what is today known as the Republic of the Sudan 
were first defined by the Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan 
which was concluded between the British and Egyptian Governments in 
1899. Prior to that there had been independent political entities which came 
into existence at different points of time, being kingdoms, Sultanates or 
States. Each of these sovereigns had its own legal system with Christianity 
mixed with local values or Islam tainted with the same, as the basis thereof. 
The most obvious characteristic of those legal systems had been the 
establishment of courts of various jurisdictions. But none of those systems 
comprised that important legal institution called Attorney-General’s 
Chamber, now Ministry of Justice. That institution was established two 
years before the independence of Sudan in 1956. Although it is so short a 
legal phenomenon, compared to those of the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America and India, it developed much more rapidly as it covers the 
whole country. And with the help of the Sudanese Government it is able to 
discharge its business which is of legal nature. Hence Attorney-General is 
part of executive, given the doctrine of the separation of powers. He is surely 
not a court of law, as that is the case in all the legal systems which entertain 
Attorney-General. In all those legal systems he is assisted, in the discharge 
of his functions, by numerous lawyers bearing different titles. But despite 
the important role he plays in the Sudanese legal system, the Attorney-
General is incapacitated by serious legal lacunae or deficiencies which need 
prompt intervention from the legislature. The most obvious are those 
regarding lack of machinery for enforcing legal opinion vis-à-vis defiant 
government institutions. The position of the Sudanese State Minister of 
Justice also needs legislative intervention. 
 Officially, federalism is the basis of rule in the Sudan and it follows 
that ‘Attorney-General’ is a matter of federal legislation and hence belongs 
to Federal Government. Even the provisions of the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement, 1997 could not change anything despite the fact that it allowed 
for the establishment of State Attorney-General who could tackle business of 
legal nature at state level. This could have brought the Sudanese experience 
to something nearer to that of the countries which apply real federalism. But 
surely the Sudanese experience regarding Attorney-General has been 
derived from the English law as the British, given the right of reconquest, 
were the architects of the present legal system in the Sudan. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that he is entirely independent from the other important 
institution of justice called the Judiciary. Given also the equality of all 
parties before the courts of law, the Attorney-General in the Sudan does not 
enjoy any special rights over others. This seems to be the position in the 
United States of America. The Sudanese Attorney-General, unlike his 
counter-parts in the United Kingdom and the United States of America is not 
independent in the exercise of his legal functions as his work is largely 
influenced by politics given the fact that those beautiful concepts as 
supremacy of the rule of law are only on paper. Yet he is indispensable for 
no country can meaningfully operate without the vital service of the 
Attorney-General or Minister of Justice as the case may be. Therefore in 
most of the constitutions his position is firmly provided for. It has also been 
seen that each of the legal systems considered has peculiarities of its own 
relating to the nature of functions exercised by the Attorney-General. The 
top position in the Chambers or Ministry of Justice fluctuated between the 
Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice . At times the same person 
occupied both posts of Minister of Justice and Attorney-General. The 
Attorney-General is always a lawyer but the Minister of Justice is 
necessarily not. The concept of Minister of Justice is prevalent in the civil 
law countries like France where a single person called Minister of Justice 
presides over the legal system.175. However, this is not the case with the 
Sudanese legal system in which the Judiciary and Ministry of Justice 
function as separate legal institutions. 
 Regarding the English legal system it is common knowledge that it is 
the origin of common law. Its influence is apparent over the Sudan, the 
United States of America and India which were once ruled by Britain. Thus 
no doubt that the concept of Attorney-General was borrowed from Britain. 
The English Attorney-General is a very important law officer who 
discharges vital duties in both civil and criminal spheres. The way the 
system of rule has been organized in the United Kingdom gives him duties 
which his Sudanese counterpart does not exercise. For instance, it may be a 
good idea that the Sudanese Attorney-General is empowered by the 
legislature to exercise the power of nolle prosequi in civil cases. Withdrawal 
of cases by the prosecution is also not provided for in the Sudanese law. But 
in spite of his important role in the English legal system the Attorney-
General is among lesser ministers of state176. So he suffers from lesser 
political influence and pressure in the exercise of his functions given the 
truly democratic atmosphere which prevails in the United Kingdom. And 
unlike the position in the Sudan, this important law officer is persistently 
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called Attorney-General in the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and India.  
 No doubt the United States Attorney-General has a vast task to 
perform given the fact that there are fifty-one legal systems in that country. 
Federalism has great impact on the functions he exercises. But basically 
those functions are legal and the idea behind establishing that post is the 
same. Of course the United States of America Attorney-General exercises 
functions relating to Federal Government. A United States Attorney is the 
most important helper of his throughout the country. The position in India 
resembles that of Sudan except that federalism is much effective in India to 
the extent that an Attorney-General at federal level, exercises specific legal 
functions. However, the Sudanese legal system is bound to adapt itself to 
true practice of federalism regarding Attorney-General. Therefore, 
fluctuation between the post of Attorney-General and of Minister of Justice 
must be resolved as the two posts do not mean the same thing. 
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APPENDIX 
 
It may be useful to enumerate persons who were Ministers of Justice, both 
Minitster of Justice and Attorney- General, State Ministers of Justice and 
Undersecretaries177.  
 
1. Ministers of Justice:     From   To 
(i) Ali Abdel Rahman Elamin.   9/1/1954 
 26/12/1954 
(ii) Mudathir Elboshi    16/11/1955  2/2/1956 
(iii) Mubarak Zarouk     2/2/1956  4/7/1956 
(iv) Ziada Osman Arbab    March 1958  October 
1964 
(v) Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Khalil   1965   1966 
(vi) Mamoun Mahjoub Senada   27/7/1966  15/5/1967 
(vii) Abdel Magid Abou Hassabou   27/5/1967  26/5/1968 
(viii) Amin Eltahir Elshibili    25/5/1969  19/6/1969 
(ix) Babikir Awadalla    28/10/1969  14/10/1971 
(x) Ahmed Suleiman     October 1971 May 1973 
(xi) Abdel Aziz Shidou    1993   1996 
(xii) Abdel Basit Sabdrat    20/4/1996  8/3/1998 
(xiii) Ali Mohmed Osman Yassin March 1989  2005 
 
2. Attornys General: 
(i) Dr. Zaki Mustafa     1973   1975 
(ii) Abdel Majeed Imam    October 1975  February 1976 
(iii) Zaki Abdel Rahman    1976   1977 
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(iv) Mahdi Elfahal     29/7/1978  24/11/1981 
(v) Dr. Hassan Omer     29/5/1977  1/12/1978 
(vi) Elrasheed Eltahir Bakr    1984   1985 
(vii) Dr. Hassan Abdalla Elturabi   17/8/1979  24/11/1981 
(viii) Awad Eljeed Mohmed Ahmed  6/3/1985  22/4/1986 
(ix) Omer Abdel Atti     22/4/1986  3/5/1986 
(x) Abdel Mahmoud Haj Saleh   1986   1988 
  
3. Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-Gerneal (both posts by one 
person): 
(i) Osman Omer     25/3/1989  30/6/1989 
(ii) Hafiz El-Sheikh El-Zaki   March 1989  July 1989 
(iii) Hassan Ismail El-bili    19/7/1989  11/8/1990 
(iv) Ahmed Mahoumd Hassan   August 1990 February 
1992 
(v) Dr. Abdel-Sameii Omer   20/4/1992  20/5/1992 
(vi) Dr. Abdalla Idris     21/5/1992  18/1/1993 
4. State Ministers of Justice: 
(i) Mahmoud Adam Eissa    1985   1985 
(ii) Shawgei Hussein El-Afend   13/12/1998  27/1/2000 
(iii) Amin banani Neo    January 2000  February 2001 
(iv) Ali Ahmed Karti     February 2001 Todate  
5. Undersecretaries: 
(i)Ahmed Mutuwali El-Atabani   1953   1953 
(ii)Mahdi Sherif     1953   1953 
(iii)Osman El-Tayeb     1960   1964 
(iv)Gallal Ali Lutfi     1965   1967 
(v)Abass Musa Mustafa    1969   1969 
(vi)El-Tyaeb Abass El-geily    1973   1975 
(vii)Ramadan Ali Mohamed    March 1975  30/9/1976 
(viii)Yusif Michael Bakhiet    1976   1977 
(ix) Ali Mohamed El-Awad    1977   1981 
(x)Abdel-Rahman Ibrahim El-Agra  1981   1989 
(xi)Omer Ibrahim Hassan    1986   1989 
(xii)Ali Mahmoud Osman Yassin   July1989  October 1991 
(xiii)Shawgi Hussein Mohamed   October 1991           December 1998 
(xiv)Abdel-Rahman Ahmed Ibrahim    1997   2001 
(xv)Dr. Ahmed Mohmed Omer El-Mufti   1998   2002 
(xvi)Abdel Daim Mohamdein Zumrawi  February2002    2005 
 
